
**Introduction**

**Wealth, Empire, Cabals, and the Public State**

*I hope we shall crush in its birth the aristocracy of our monied corporations which dare already to challenge our government to a trial of strength, and bid defiance to the laws of our country.*

Thomas Jefferson, 1816

*We hold it a prime duty of the people to free our government from the control of money.*

Theodore Roosevelt, 1912

*The real truth...is, as you and I know, that a financial element in the larger centers has owned the Government ever since the days of Andrew Jackson.*

Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Colonel E. M. House, 1933

In this book I try to explain the paradoxes that distress most of the Americans I've met over the past few years. Whether they live in Berkeley, New England, or West Texas, these people wonder why the United States steered deliberately—and seemingly inevitably—into a war with Iraq that had little domestic support. They wonder why so many open processes of our government have been replaced by secret decisions at the uppermost levels. They wonder why our country, which is not currently facing any major enemies, is increasing its defense budget more rapidly than ever before.

A stock answer often used to explain these changes is to invoke the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. But pressures for them had been building long before 9/11. Even more disturbing, some of those lobbying for a "revolution in military affairs," including huge new defense budgets and military action against Iraq, stated before 2001 that such changes would not occur quickly without "some catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor." 1 Since the 9/11 attacks, leading members of the Bush administration have spoken of the attacks as a "great opportunity" (President Bush) or (in Donald Rumsfeld's words) "the kind of opportunities that World War II offered, to refashion the world." 2

I wrote this book in an effort to contextualize 9/11. In one sense, 9/11 is an event without precedent, and one that threatens to move America beyond the age of public politics to a new era in which power, more than ever before, is administered downward from above. But at the same time, 9/11 must be seen as a culmination of trends developing through a half century: toward secret top-down decision making by small cabals, toward the militarization of law enforcement, toward plans for the sequestering of those who dissent, toward government off-the-books operations, transactions, and assets, and toward governance by those who pay for political parties rather than those who participate in them.

Essentially, I agree with political commentator Kevin Phillips that a major answer to these questions, although not a complete one and insufficiently discussed, is found in an area beyond politics: the "connecting lines . . . between tainted government, corrupted politics, corporate venality, and the unprecedented two-decade build-up of wealth itself." 3 Domination of the public state by private wealth is not a novelty in America, as the epigraphs at the beginning of this chapter make clear. The novelty since World War II, however, lies in the secret growth and articulation of this top-down power within government. In particular, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), a group hidden from the public eye, was secretly created in June 1948 and dominated at first by a small ex-Office of Special Services (OSS) elite from Wall Street. Wall Street's secret intrusion of its views and personnel into American covert policy justifies our speaking of an American
"overworld"—that realm of wealthy or privileged society that, although not formally authorized or institutionalized, is the scene of successful influence of government by private power.

Of all the political systems in the world, America's has traditionally been characterized by its openness to self-analysis, self-criticism, and ultimately self-correction. Past periods of wealth disparity, notably in the Gilded Age, have been followed by reform movements that compressed the income gap. But, as Phillips has warned, the type of reforms that have followed past excesses of wealth in politics must happen again soon, or they may not happen at all: "As the twenty-first century gets underway, the imbalance of wealth and democracy in the United States is unsustainable. ... Either democracy must be renewed, with politics brought back to life, or wealth is likely to cement a new and less democratic regime—plutocracy by some other name."4

Economist Paul Krugman has transmitted statistics for the staggering increases in income for America's most wealthy: "A new research paper by Ian Dew-Becker and Robert Gordon of Northwestern University, 'Where Did the Productivity Growth Go?,' gives the details. Between 1972 and 2001, the wage and salary income of Americans at the 90th percentile of the income distribution rose only 34 percent, or about 1 percent per year.... But income at the 99th percentile rose 87 percent; income at the 99.9th percentile rose 181 percent; and income at the 99.99th percentile rose 497 percent."5 Many of these increases are marked by the transfer rather than the creation of wealth and derive from what Phillips has called the "financialization" of America: the "process whereby financial services, broadly construed, take over the dominant economic, cultural, and political role in a national economy."6

The Overworld, the Deep State, and Bureaucratic Paranoia

Obviously, as the wealth of the top 1 percent has increased radically, so has its power, particularly over communications. Conversely, the public state—the realm of open and deliberated policy decisions—has diminished at the hands of private manipulators. Under both presidents Bill Clinton and George H. W. Bush, for example, the United States was committed to controversial commitments and interventions, from Uzbekistan to Kosovo, which were the product of secret lobbying by cabals, not public debate. The political power of money has been analyzed in the media and Congress chiefly as the external problem of what is often called corruption, the role of money in choosing and influencing Congress and the White House.7 To this, since the 1970s, has been added a coordinated campaign by a few wealthy individuals (such as billionaire publisher Richard Mellon Scaife), foundations (such as Coors, Alien-Bradley, Olin, Smith Richardson), and their media (such as Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation) to shift the political culture of the country radically to the right.8

But this book also focuses on something else: the top 1 percent's direct or indirect control of certain specific domains of government, beginning in the 1940s with the creation of CIA. It is a story that looks beyond the well-defined public entities of open politics to include the more amorphous and fluid realm of private control behind them. This realm of wealthy private influence, the overworld, is a milieu of those who either by wealth or background have power great enough to have an observable influence on their society and its politics.9 Those parts of the government responding to their influence I call the "deep state" (if covert) or "security state" (if military). Both represent top-down or closed power, as opposed to the open power of the public state or res publica that represents the people as a whole.10

I argue in this book that the power of the American public state needs to be revived, and its out-of-control deep state radically curtailed. I am not an opponent of deep states per se: publics are not infallible and sometimes need to be opposed. But in our current crisis the proper balance between the public state and the deep state has been lost, and the deep state's secret top-down powers have become a major threat to democracy. A well-functioning deep state serves to impose needed wisdom and discipline, but in recent years America's unchecked deep state has been imposing both folly and indiscipline. The tension between an open public state and a closed deep state or security state existing within it is an old and widespread phenomenon.11 In the United States it has become more acute since the beginning of the Cold War in the 1940s, when the investment firms
of the Wall Street overworld provided President Harry Truman with his secretary of defense, James V. Forrestal. This same over-world provided them both with the ideas and personnel for a new Central Intelligence Agency.

The policy making of the closed deep state, shielded by secrecy, has tended increasingly toward global dominance at any price, without regard to consequences. The collective wisdom of foreign policy experts, usually most represented in the State Department, has been powerless to restrain it. Over and over throughout this book I reveal occasions where the relatively sane proposals of the State Department have been trumped by the bureaucratic paranoia of people whose career success was based on their commitment to worst-case scenarios. This "paranoid style in American politics" has traditionally referred to marginal elements that exist remote from true power. But there has been a paranoid tradition of the deep state as well, dating back to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1799 (recently cited by the Department of Homeland Security as a model for its Endgame program).12

Closed policy making that puts security first above all, especially when protected by secrecy, is a formula for bureaucratic paranoia. The United States experienced such paranoia with the Alien Act and the Palmer Raids of 1918 and again with the State Department and Treasury personnel purges after World War II. In this book I argue that the bureaucratic paranoia of the deep state was a major cause (as well as a result of) 9/11. I believe our present course of ever more heightened paranoia is a sure formula for more 9/11s.

This book will not address the often asked questions of to what extent the Bush-Cheney administration knew in advance of the impending attacks on 9/11, and then either let them happen or even possibly made them happen. Instead, this book makes a more general argument that the bureaucratic paranoia inside the American deep state, undisciplined by the available wisdom of the public state, helped years ago to create al Qaeda and then to create the circumstances in which, almost inevitably, elements in al Qaeda would turn against the United States.13

Having worked briefly in the Canadian bureaucracy, I have observed that bureaucratic debate where power is involved tends to favor paranoid or worst-case analyses, especially those that justify budget and bureaucratic growth. Today's bureaucratic paranoia has indeed been institutionalized by what has been popularized as Vice President Cheney's "one percent doctrine": "Even if there's just a one percent chance of the unimaginable coming due, act as if it is a certainty. It's not about 'our analysis,' as Cheney said. It's about 'our response'. . . Justified or not, fact-based or not, 'our response' is what matters. As to 'evidence,' the bar was set so low that the word itself almost didn't apply. If there was even a one percent chance of terrorists getting a weapon of mass destruction....the United States must now act as if it were a certainty."14

This doctrine is a license for untrammeled expansion of the secret deep state. As the deep state metastasizes, its origins in the overworld become less clear and possibly less relevant. In using the term "over-world," we must be careful not to reify it or attribute to it a unity and coherence it does not possess. It is a term of convenience to indicate, at least initially, a somewhat amorphous realm of sociopolitical change on which we should focus attention. The overworld is emphatically less cohesive than a class, despite what popular historian Frederick Lundberg and others have suggested.15 Ultimately its much discussed institutions, like the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Trilateral Commission, are more significant as symptoms and evidence rather than as sources of overworld power.

The overworld was clearly centered in Wall Street in the 1940s, and CIA was primarily designed there. With the postwar shifts of U.S. demographics and economic structure southward and westward, the over-world itself has shifted, becoming less defined by geography than by the interrelated functions of the petroleum-industrial-financial complex. Cheney's global oilfield services firm Halliburton, today a "bridge between the oil industry and the military-industrial complex,"16 was nowhere near the Wall Street power center in the 1940s. This shift in the overworld led by 1968 to a polarizing debate over the Vietnam War. The expanding military-industrial complex, dedicated to winning that war at any cost, found itself increasingly opposed by elements on Wall Street (which at the time I labeled the "CIA-financial establishment") who feared the impact of the war's costs on the stability of the dollar.17 I argue that Nixon's inability to satisfy either of the two polarized
factions—symbolized by the American Security Council and the Council on Foreign Relations—was a major factor in the unprecedented and ultimately unresolved drama of Watergate.

Today, with the relative decline of the domestic civilian economy and the proliferation of military business, we can see an emerging military-financial complex. This is symbolized by the easy movement up from the Pentagon to Wall Street of such key players as the director Bruce P. Jackson of the Project for the New American Century. One can measure the emergent power of the military in the establishment by comparing the relatively critical stance of the mainstream media toward the Vietnam War and the recent misleading White House propaganda about Iraq that was published uncritically in the *New York Times*. Increasingly a gap has widened between the mainstream press and television—the so-called old media—and the emerging new media of open communications via the Internet.

In a sense, the current American political crisis can be seen as a tension between the goals of this military-financial complex, on the one hand, and the requisite conditions for a healthy civilian economy and civil society on the other. This is another way of understanding the tension, described throughout this book, between the deep/security state and the public state. Through all these shifts certain essential continuities can be traced in the overworld's influence—first on CIA and increasingly on national security policy in general. Most recently, private power consolidated its influence by managing to establish a small but extremely important "shadow government," or "parallel government." The overworld did this through planning for what is officially known as continuity of government (COG), with its own secret, parallel institutions. Toward the end of this book I show how the plans for COG in a time of crisis were first implemented on 9/11. More important, they may also have contributed to changes in U.S. emergency defense responses that perhaps escalated a much smaller terrorist attack into "a new Pearl Harbor."

The Dialectics of Wealth, Expansion, and Restraint

History has demonstrated, four or five times over, the dialectics of democratic openness. This process determined the fates of the ancient city-states of Athens and Rome, and since the Renaissance we have seen it again with the empires of Spain, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. An urban civil society that was relatively free and open surpassed its neighbors in generating wealth. As wealth increased, it expanded the reach of the state beyond that society's borders. And then, as Yale historian Paul Kennedy wrote in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, a military overstretch ensued that weakened the homeland economically and precipitated its decline.

To the extent that wealth expanded, these extra-societal institutions came to lie outside the transparency of domestic civil society. In effect, they become both powerful and secret, and new elements of the state developed to interact with these institutions on a secret level. Paradoxically, as the power, scope, and exposure of the state increased, so did that society's paranoia—the fear of being surpassed by competing states. Within the state secrecy trumped openness. There is a political sociology of secrecy: those with higher clearances participated in policy making at a level where those without clearances were denied access. The result was the increasing dominance over the officially organized public state by an undemocratic top-down deep state, one that answered to other interests than those of the homeland public. Institutions and relationships outside the geographic bounds of civil society consolidated more and more into an overworld, usually strengthened by offshore resources, that had the wealth and de facto power to influence and eventually determine the policies of the public state.

America since World War II has differed from these empires before it in two respects. On the one hand, the modern nation-state system is now global; on the other, America's overwhelming military preeminence has contributed to the impression of a unipolar world. Because of these two factors, the flag imperialism of a century ago (such as the Spanish-American War) has evolved into trade imperialism: the flag now follows trade and investment, rather than vice versa. (Admiral George Dewey sent the U.S. Navy to the Philippines in 1898 before any major American firms had invested there. But when President George W. Bush dispatched U.S. troops to Georgia in 2002, it was only after U.S. oil firms had begun to develop a major oil pipeline across the country.)
This subordination of the flag to trade has satisfied most U.S. economic interests, or so-called traders, symbolized by Wall Street and the Council on Foreign Relations. But it also created a so-called Prussian backlash, especially in the military, from those who believed that as long as America had the military capacity to overwhelm its enemies, it should not hesitate to do so. As a result, postwar presidents from Harry Truman through Richard Nixon repeatedly had to restrain rebellious hawkish elements in the armed forces of which they were the commanders in chief. President Dwight Eisenhower was able to restrain Admiral Arthur Radford's demand in 1954 for direct U.S. intervention in the French Indochina War, when the French were being defeated at Dien Bien Phu. But the top CIA and Pentagon leadership plotted for further engagement in Indochina in the late 1950s, planning not so much with Eisenhower as against him. As I have described in detail in my book *Drugs, Oil, and War*, key decisions in escalating U.S. support in Laos were only belatedly approved by Eisenhower, at times when he was away from his office, either to play golf or for a planned check-up in a hospital.

Economist James Galbraith has revealed how, in the midst of the 1961 Berlin crisis, President John Kennedy angered the U.S. generals, and possibly CIA director Allen Dulles, by rejecting "the military's drive for a vast U.S. nuclear build-up" and possible first strike as well. A few days later Kennedy was told about a study by White House aide Carl Kaysen "that showed that a 'disarming first strike' against Soviet strategic forces could be carried out with a high degree of confidence that it would catch them all on the ground." Galbraith also notes the report of Nikita Khrushchev that at the peak of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Robert Kennedy told the Russian ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin: "Even though the President himself is very much against starting a war over Cuba, an irreversible chain of events could occur against his will. ... If the situation continues for much longer, the President is not sure that the military will not overthrow him and seize power. The American military could get out of control."

A recent study of the second Tonkin Gulf incident on August 4, 1964, which led eventually to the Vietnam War, indicates that the crucial decision to bomb North Vietnam did not come from President Lyndon Johnson, who "was deliberately prevented" by those below him "from making an informed decision" on that day. Later, we shall see that Nixon also faced opposition from the bureaucratic faction that wished for a more unrestrained exercise of U.S. military power. America's ignominious departure from Vietnam silenced, for a generation, the "Prussians'" demand for the reckless use of American military force. But it also gave rise to a compensatory belief, articulated by Marine Colonel Oliver North, that the war effort in Vietnam was not lost on the battlefield; rather, it was lost in the streets of America. Quietly and secretly, North and his allies began to make arrangements, through continuity of government planning, to ensure that in any future military engagement, American dissent at home would not be allowed to endanger the outcome.

**The Spread of Secrecy and the Road to 9/11**

In the 1987 Iran-Contra hearings the congressman Jack Brooks tried vainly to question Colonel North about his "work on plans for continuity of government in the event of a major disaster." Denied an answer, Brooks then accused North of being part of a secret "government within a government." Author Theodore Draper later echoed the charge when he wrote of a "junta-like cabal." North's work on so-called COG was important, and the planning was continued after his departure by a small cabal-like committee, including Dick Cheney (then a congressman) and Donald Rumsfeld (who at the time was a private citizen). Eventually North's most secret and controversial recommendations, including plans for the warrantless roundup and detention of minorities, saw fruition after 9/11. Chapter 14 of this book explores in detail how 9/11, or more accurately the U.S. response to that attack, is the fruit of COG planning in the 1980s.

These two apparently unrelated episodes—Iran-Contra and the U.S. response to 9/11—are in fact part of a continuous expansion of secret policy making by cabals going back to the 1940s. More and more, major redirections of U.S. foreign policy have been initiated and conducted not by those who are publicly charged with the responsibility for them, but by others, often in secret. This practice can be traced back chiefly to the creation, in 1947, of two related institutions: the National
Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. Indeed, one political motive for these institutions was to create a larger space for secrecy at the heart of what had been traditionally a more open form of government. Since then, secrecy, invoked at first as necessary to the defense of the public state, has become increasingly an enemy to the public state.

Perhaps no one in 1947 could have predicted the extent to which the public power of the open democratic state would be overridden by secret edicts and processes, imposed within government from outside sources, rather than publicly arrived at. But anyone interested in saving the American Republic will want to identify these secret forces that have been eroding it. This erosion was not an inevitable historical process. Rather, it was the result of recurrent intrusions into the public political process by a few individuals, above all from the overworld, who have influenced the course of American politics.

This influence is exercised both publicly and covertly. The most obvious influence is through money, changing hands both above and below the table. The right of the wealthy to donate to political parties and causes is a legally circumscribed one. Beyond the reach of the law, however, is the ability of wealth to subvert true public discourse by creating an artificial realm of media discourse, in which the honest reporters of unpleasant truths are marginalized and sometimes lose their jobs. One such example is that of Gary Webb, whose Pulitzer Prize-winning journalistic career ended after he wrote about the CIA and drugs.  

The sustained maintenance of bias in media discourse is thus reflected and enhanced by bureaucratic discourse. It is unusual for the overworld to intervene directly in the higher processes of government. More common is the maintenance of artificial consensus by influencing the selection and promotion of power experts within the government. Throughout this book I document how, time after time, solid expert advice on policy was overridden by power experts who knew next to nothing about the foreign region affected but everything about self-advancement in a corrupt Washington.

There are also less visible institutions that mediate and serve as a more secret interface between the American people and overworld power. Besides CIA itself, an institution initially guided more from Wall Street than from Washington, there are less-known institutions, such as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and, more recently, the group set up under Ronald Reagan to plan for so-called COG. As we shall see, the history of COG planning, which originated in the 1950s, assumed its current shape in response to the mobilization of U.S. Army intelligence and CIA against left-wing Americans during the civil disorder of the 1960s and 1970s. The reactive planning under Presidents Johnson and Nixon became increasingly proactive in the 1980s administration of President Reagan. Under him the COG project was developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) operating under the White House National Program Office (NPO), a group so supersecret it was not publicly named until a 1991 CNN news story.

This increasing articulation and institutionalization of secret power corresponds to an increasing subordination of public power to the private realm. Many Americans have become inured to the fact that major policy decisions, ranging from defense strategies to the initiation of preemptive war, are no longer formulated by the public state. Rather, many of these decisions are now imposed on it from outside.

The beginnings of this public implementation can be traced to the creation of CIA in 1947. This was the most important of a series of secret decisions made in the 1940s and 1950s, decades before many of the events I detail throughout this book. Right after World War II the chances seemed greater than ever before for a more peaceful, orderly, legal, and open world. The United States was then wealthy enough to finance postwar reconstruction in devastated Europe. Later the U.S. government would fund health and agriculture programs in the newly liberated former colonies of the third world. The world's two great superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—had apparently agreed on rules and procedures for mediating their serious differences through a neutral body, the United Nations.

But the United Nations was to prove inadequate for the resolution of international conflict. One major reason for this was that the Soviet Union, the United States, and (after 1949) China all
pursued covert expansive policies that brought them into conflict and occasionally into war. The Marxist-Leninist nations of the USSR and China lent support to other Marxist-Leninist parties and movements, some of them insurrectionary, in other parts of the world. The immediate concern of the United States was Europe, where it appeared that the French and Italian Communist parties might be elected to power in 1948.

From the beginning of the postwar era, Washington looked for assets and "proxy armies" of its own, to combat the threat it perceived from the Soviet Union and China. Some of these proxies, like the Nationalist Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) troops in Burma, or the mafias in Italy and Marseilles, soon outgrew their U.S. support to become de facto regional players, or parastates (exhibiting some but not all of the features of states) in their own right.

From 1945 to 1947 elements in the U.S. Army conspired to maintain contacts with former German anti-Communists in Europe and their German Army commander, General Reinhard Gehlen. Five men were involved, of whom three (William J. Donovan, Alien Dulles, and Frank Wisner) were representatives of the Wall Street overworld and also of the New York Social Register, which listed the members of New York high society. They were awaiting a new agency to succeed Donovan's Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and take over the Nazis' ethnic armies in Eastern Europe. But the idea of a centralized intelligence agency encountered fierce competitive opposition from the FBI's J. Edgar Hoover, who was backed at first by elements of army intelligence.

Although it took two years to overcome their opponents, the Wall Street lawyers and bankers in Truman's administration succeeded in 1947 in establishing CIA, which would report to the president through the new National Security Council (NSC). This new agency, based on the precedent and personnel of the OSS, had been urged on Washington by the War-Peace Studies Project of the Council on Foreign Relations in the early 1940s. It was reinforced by a report commissioned in 1945 by navy secretary James V. Forrestal. The report was written by Ferdinand Eberstadt, who like Forrestal was a private Wall Street banker from the investment bank Dillon Read.

As CIA director Richard Helms narrates in his memoirs, Alien Dulles (then a Republican lawyer at Sullivan and Cromwell in New York) was recruited in 1946 "to draft proposals for the shape and organization of what was to become the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947." Dulles promptly formed an advisory group of six men, all but one of whom were Wall Street investment bankers or lawyers. In 1948, Forrestal appointed Dulles chairman of a committee, along with two other New York lawyers, to review CIA's performance. "The three lawyers conferred for close to a year in one of the board rooms at J. H. Whitney," another Wall Street investment firm. In its first two decades, CIA, like its intellectual parent the Council on Foreign Relations, was dominated internally and externally by the aristocratic elements of the New York overworld. All seven of the known deputy directors of CIA during this period came from the same New York legal and financial circles; and six of them were listed in the New York Social Register as well. When joined by the young James Angleton, son of an international corporate executive, this early core became the basis for an inner "agency-within-an-agency" that survived into the 1960s.

Within a year the NSC was authorizing covert operations overseas through CIA. In fact, these operations were being implemented by an even more secret group within CIA, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). The CIA at least had been publicly empowered by the 1947 National Security Act, even though it contained a "loophole" through which CIA launched covert operations in a way Congress had "not intended." In June 1948 the National Security Council secretly launched OPC, without any congressional authorization at all.

The decision to create OPC was "based on what was seen as a CIA success in Italy," the election of a Christian Democratic government in April despite widespread fears of a Communist electoral victory. Key to this success was the rapid supply of millions of dollars to the non-Communist parties, another decision that had its origins in New York. As journalists David Wise and Thomas B. Ross wrote: "[Defense Secretary] Forrestal felt that secret counteraction was vital, but his initial assessment was that the Italian operation would have to be private. The wealthy industrialists in Milan were hesitant to provide the money, fearing reprisals if the Communists won,
and so the hat was passed at the Brook Club in New York. But Allen Dulles felt the problem could not be handled effectively in private hands. He urged strongly that the government establish a covert organization."

This episode is instructive. The defense secretary felt the operation should be a private undertaking, but a private Wall Street lawyer (from the political party that was not currently in power) determined that it should be carried out by the government. For years, we as common taxpayers have similarly unwittingly been taxed to pay for projects like those of the Brook Club and the wealthy industrialists in Milan. More important, a practice had been consolidated of subordinating public policy to overworld policy (as we shall see again in 1979, with respect to the shah of Iran).

Even more than CIA, OPC was a creation of the New York over-world. It was the work principally of four men associated with the Council on Foreign Relations: the career diplomat George Kennan and the three-man committee in 1948 chaired by CFR president Dulles. Dulles and his allies also arranged for the OPC chief to be Frank Wisner, another Wall Street lawyer who in 1947 had joined the State Department with the deliberately understated title "deputy assistant secretary for occupied countries." OPC set in motion at least three projects that acquired a life, culture, and momentum of their own. These projects—collectively and much later, long after the demise of OPC itself—contributed to the catastrophe of 9/11.

The first project was an arrangement for the creation and support of right-wing "stay-behind" groups in Europe to combat the risk of Communist takeover. This arrangement in Italy, known later as Operation Gladio, led in turn to a shadow system of parallel intelligence agencies, shielded from the overview of Italy’s public and more centrist government. These CIA-linked agencies developed a strategy of tension in which a series of lethal terrorist bombings, falsely presented as left-wing, were used to drive Italy further to the right. (The Piazza Fontana bombing of December 1969 killed sixteen people; the Bologna Station massacre of May 1983 killed eighty-five.)

Guido Giannettini, one of the Italian authors of this strategy of tension (and of the Piazza Fontana bombing eight years later), came to America in 1961 to lecture at the Naval War College on "Techniques and Possibilities of a Coup d'Etat in Europe." In March 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared their own documents developing Giannettini’s strategy. This was Operation Northwoods, which many books have cited as a "precedent" for "U.S. complicity in the attacks of 9/11." As journalist James Bamford wrote of Northwoods: "The plan, which had been written with the approval of the Chairman and every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for innocent people to be shot on American streets."

In addition to this stay-behind project, OPC began a psychological warfare campaign to go beyond the State Department’s official policy of containing Communism, by mobilizing public opinion and covert resources for the destabilization of eastern Europe. OPC’s third project, which eventually had global consequences affecting both Afghanistan and al Qaeda, was to combat Communism by using assets supported by illegal drug trafficking.

**OPC, The Drug Traffic, and Government Off-The-Books Assets**

One of Wisner’s projects in 1950 was so-called Operation Paper, the U.S. government’s support for the remnants of the Nationalist Chinese KMT forces in Burma and Thailand. These forces worked off and on with OPC and CIA for more than a decade. Operation Paper’s assets were off the books and self-financing—mostly by profits from drug dealing. By restoring the global drug traffic out of Southeast Asia, the KMT proxy institutionalized what would become a CIA habit of turning to drug-supported, off-the-books assets for fighting wars—in Indochina and the South China Sea in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s; in Afghanistan and Central America in the 1980s; in Colombia in the 1990s; and again in Afghanistan in 2001. As I have written elsewhere, nearly all these wars were in defense of the overseas interests or aspirations of major U.S. oil companies.

Because the use of drug-supported proxy armies was at odds with Washington’s official antidrug policies, the practice had to remain secret. This meant that major programs with long-term consequences were being initiated and administered by small cliques that were almost unknown in
Washington. Operation Paper brought OPC into contact not only with drug traffickers abroad but also with organized crime at home. OPC officer Paul Helliwell was the key figure involved in creating an infrastructure in Thailand (SEA Supply Inc.) and a supporting airline (Civil Air Transport, later Air America). Helliwell's infrastructure linked top CIA officials from the Wall Street overworld with leaders from the organized crime underworld. For example, he was the legal counsel for the small Miami National Bank used by gangster financier Meyer Lansky to launder his foreign profits.  

Operation Paper became a precedent for other, even larger operations where OPC (and later CIA) worked with criminals in off-the-books, self-financing operations. The OPC's use of the KMT as a proxy for U.S. power was followed without interruption by similar programs, first in Thailand and Laos and later against Cuba. In 1996 veteran Senate staffer Jack Blum told the Senate Intelligence Committee that "a careful review of covert operations in the Caribbean and South and Central America shows a forty-year connection between crime and covert operations that has repeatedly blown back upon the United States." Some of these drug-supported programs continued to receive direct overworld and/or CIA guidance. For example, the sponsor of CIA's drug-financed Thai Paramilitary Police Unit (PARU) operation in Thailand and Laos was former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) director William Donovan, who in 1953 returned from private life as a Wall Street lawyer to serve as America's ambassador to Thailand. Helliwell also worked after 1959 for CIA on anti-Castro projects; some of these Cuban recruits later became drug traffickers.

Today's vastly expanded global heroin traffic is largely the product of CIA's work with two different sets of proxy forces: the drug-supported KMT and PARU troops in Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, and the drug-supported Afghan networks in the 1980s. When OPC/CIA began to support the KMT troops in Burma in the 1950s, local opium production in the region was on the order of eighty tons a year. At the height of the Vietnam War, production reached a thousand tons in 1970, before declining at the war's end. Later, as first Pakistan and then CIA started supporting guerrillas in Afghanistan after 1973, opium production in this region began to rise spectacularly. From a hundred tons in 1971, it reached eight hundred tons in 1979, the year of CIA intervention, and then two thousand tons by 1991. With the U.S. occupation in Afghanistan, opium production, which the Taliban had nearly eliminated for the single year of 2001 reached a new high of five thousand six hundred tons in 2006.

The result of all of this is not just a worldwide drug scourge; the flow of drugs also supplies the socioeconomic infrastructure for the scattered terrorist groups collectively known as al Qaeda. Those who blame CIA for the rise of al Qaeda usually point to CIA's supply of training and arms during the 1980s Afghan war. But U.S. operations in conjunction with jihadi drug armies after the end of that war have been perhaps even more responsible. In chapters 8 and 9, I show that U.S. toleration of and even alliance with al Qaeda-backed jihadi groups—notably in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, and Kosovo—have been in areas of major interest to U.S. oil companies.

In sum, OPC established the practice of using off-the-books forces, some of which broke domestic drug laws. This practice endured and has had lasting consequences, affecting even the catastrophic events of 9/11. Eventually, the more bureaucratic and hierarchical CIA raised objections to the practices of the freewheeling "Fifth Avenue Cowboys" in OPC, with particular respect to the KMT in Burma and Thailand. By 1952 scandals over the KMT drug trafficking, some possibly involving OPC officers, had become so offensive that CIA director Walter Bedell Smith abolished OPC altogether, merging its personnel with CIA's own covert operations staff. This merger, far from suppressing or even controlling the former "cowboys" of OPC, gave them a more permanent home inside CIA.

Since the events of 9/11, it is clear that America has begun to turn away radically from its own professed ideals of a democratically governed state in an open civil society. But from as early as the 1940s the public power of the public state has been increasingly overridden by the covert power of elite and nonaccountable intelligence and security bureaucracies. Covert operations today represent a serious challenge to the Enlightenment hopes of the great liberal historian Lord Acton, that now "all information is within reach, and every problem . . . capable of solution."
The chronological record of events as reconstructed by archival historians from public records has become increasingly subverted by suppressed or deep history. We now have a chronology for which the public records are either nonexistent or have been falsified. The result is a serious challenge to the democratic hopes of the philosopher Jurgen Habermas for an expanding public sphere of rational discourse, protected against the intrusive policies of nongovernment groups.74

The Republicans and Rollback in the 1950s: A New Ruthlessness

In 1953 America’s strategic objectives expanded from a containment of the Soviet Union to a rollback of it. An era of covert interventions in countries with large non-Communist populations (notably in France and Italy) was succeeded by an era of trying to eradicate Communist and other movements that had demonstrably high support (specifically in Indochina and Indonesia). A sign that the United States had assumed more expansive ambitions was its participation in the overthrow of the democratically elected premier Mohammed Mossadeq and his government in Iran in 1953.75 In doing so, the United States intervened to rescue the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, a British company that had the backing of the British and U.S. overworld but no significant popular support in Iran.

A year later the United States intervened in Guatemala against another elected leader, on behalf of United Fruit, which faced expropriation of its lands not under cultivation. Both of these interventions, in Iran and Guatemala, were initially advocated within the Council on Foreign Relations.76

I call rollback’s expansion of U.S. intervention an overreach, not just on ethical grounds but because in these cases there was no lasting support for the operation from the local people.77 Both in Iran and Guatemala the pro-U.S. dictatorships established could only maintain themselves by brutal repressive tactics that eventually led to their overthrow.78 In the case of Iran it seems inevitable in retrospect that finally, in 1979, this overreach would be annulled by the victory of anti-American ayatollahs who are among America’s chief problems today. The first postwar political victory of Islamist extremism, can be attributed in part to CIA expansive overreach in 1953.

In a more general way the expansions of rollback contributed to the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and specifically to the type of U.S. military interventions, common in Central America a century ago, that Franklin Roosevelt appeared to have renounced with his “Good Neighbor” policy. After World War II rollback was supported inside the United States by a number of sources—from ethnic groups appalled by Roosevelt’s acceptance at the 1945 Yalta Conference of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, to the lavish funds of T. V. Soong and the China lobby, seeking to prevent U.S. recognition of the People’s Republic of China. There were elite pressures as well, from people like William Donovan, Henry Luce of the Time-Life empire, and the former Trotskyite James Burnham, who was taken up both by Luce and OPC.79

Official National Security Council doctrine for the Cold War was set down in the 1950 document NSC-68, drafted by Forrestal’s longtime protege Paul Nitze. NSC-68 assumed that conflict with the “inescapably militant” Kremlin was inevitable, U.S. policy must be “to check and to roll back the Kremlin’s drive for world domination.”80 The document’s paranoid exaggeration of Soviet strength and American weakness would be repeated: in the Gaither Report of 1957 (also drafted by Nitze), which became the basis of false fears about a "missile gap," and (as I discuss later) in the 1970s anti-Soviet campaign mounted by the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), in which Nitze was again prominent.81

Thanks largely to the Korean War, the U.S. annual military budget, which was at $14.5 billion in 1950, more than tripled by 1953 to $49.6 billion. It would remain over $40 billion throughout the 1950s.82 Soon what Eisenhower would label the "military-industrial complex" was asserting itself through new lobbying groups, notably the American Security Council (ASC), founded in 1955. The ASC united old-wealth oil and military corporations with new-wealth businesses in the South and the West, some of which incorporated investments from organized crime.83

As the goal of rollback became more ambitious and overreaching, U.S. foreign policy became more ruthless. OPC/CIA proclivity for so-called dirty tricks was sanctioned by the report of a special
committee chaired by Lieutenant General James Doolittle, a friend of the CIA's covert operations chief Frank Wisner. The whole of American foreign policy now reached for more costly and difficult goals. The most egregious example was the U.S. engagement in Indochina after 1959, urged by oil interests through the Council on Foreign Relations and by the military-industrial complex through the American Security Council.

The deep state’s expansion abroad was matched domestically. CIA developed covert relationships “with about 50 American journalists or employees of U.S. media organizations.” According to one CIA operative: “You could get a journalist cheaper than a good call girl, for a couple hundred dollars a month.” The agency arranged for the publication of books to be read in America, and for at least one of these works to be reviewed favorably in the New York Times. CIA also developed covert relationships with "several hundred American academics" on U.S. campuses.

Violent U.S.-supported overthrows of democratically elected leaders in the 1960s—such as those in Brazil, Ghana, and Indonesia—were followed by a radical increase of overseas U.S. direct and indirect investment in these same countries, particularly in fossil fuels. This was reflected in changes in the American overworld (now less dominated by the Europe-oriented Council on Foreign Relations) and in the deep state. The CFR became more and more allied with the traditionally powerful petroleum lobby, once primarily domestic but now increasingly global in its concerns. Especially before the withdrawal after 1967 of the British Navy from the Indian Ocean, U.S. strategy in the Middle East was dominated by CIA and international oil players, rather than by the Pentagon. Their policies were in the main pro-Arab and above all pro-Saudi, with the oil companies acquiescing in and even subsidizing the Saudi policy of expanding the influence of its extremist and anti-Western Wahhabi sect throughout the Muslim world.

The oil industry is the largest, richest, and most powerful in the world. But the power in Washington of the pro-Arab oil lobby (which journalist Ovid Demaris once characterized as "in itself a subgovernment, with roots planted deep in the soil of the real government") was increasingly matched by the legislative lobbying of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Today, U.S. policies on the Middle East, particularly with respect to Iraq and Iran, reflect a consensus of the expansionist agendas of both lobbies.

From Rollback to Globalization and Full-Spectrum Dominance

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the term "rollback" has also become a historical memory. But the forces that worked for it are very much alive in contemporary American foreign policy and characterize both sides of the two main global strategies—civilian and military—dominating it. This overarching policy has been characterized by scholar Richard Falk and others as a "global domination project." U.S. foreign policy specialist Andrew Bacevich has described it as a "strategy of openness," with a dual emphasis on "free trade and investment" complemented by "a belief in the necessity of American hegemony." The civilian strategy is for what I call top-down globalization—government-enforced market fundamentalism, or global economic integration on American terms, which include the opening of foreign markets to U.S. investment.

The military strategy is for full-spectrum dominance of the globe. "Full-spectrum dominance" was the key term in Joint Vision 2020, the U.S. Department of Defense blueprint for the future, endorsed on May 30, 2000, by General John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The term was taken from U.S. Space Command’s Vision for 2020 in 1998, which spoke of USSPACECOM as "dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect U.S. interests and investment." The same sense of mission as protecting investment can be seen in an article from the Foreign Military Studies Office of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which was published three months before the 2001 World Trade Center attacks: “The Caspian Sea appears to be sitting on yet another sea—a sea of hydrocarbons. . . . The presence of these oil reserves and the possibility of their export raises [sic] new strategic concerns for the United States and other Western industrial powers. As oil companies build oil pipelines from the Caucasus and Central Asia to supply Japan and the West, these strategic concerns gain military implications."
U.S. oil companies had worked actively to ensure this military interest. Since 1995, they had been united in a private foreign oil companies group to lobby in Washington for an active U.S. policy to promote their interests in the Caspian basin. Their meeting with NSC energy expert Sheila Heslin in the summer of 1995 was followed shortly by the creation of an interagency governmental committee to formulate U.S. policy toward the Caspian. Heslin told Congress in 1997 that U.S. policy in Central Asia was "to in essence break Russia's monopoly control over the transportation of oil [and gas] from that region, and frankly, to promote Western energy security through diversification of supply." A former CIA officer later complained about Heslin's subservience to the oil lobby in the Clinton administration. That oil company influence did not diminish with the election, financed in large part by oil companies, of President George W. Bush (formerly a Saudi-financed oilman) and Vice President Dick Cheney (formerly CEO of Halliburton and board member of the U.S.-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce).

The disastrous policy failure of the Vietnam War saw the first serious dissatisfaction expressed, by both the left and the right, with the role of America's foreign policy establishment in creating that war. The publication of such books as Noam Chomsky's *American Power and the New Mandarins*, Richard J. Barnet's *The Roots of War*, and David Halberstam's *The Best and the Brightest* supplied serious critiques of the roles played by men like national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, whom the mainstream media had previously treated as icons. The war produced unprecedented unrest and violence in the United States. In 1967 and 1968 this violence led to the creation of a special army directorate with plans to coordinate with local police in surveillance and control of left-wing protesters. This led to de facto use of right-wing gangs in surveillance and control, one of many factors that signaled a shift of the country to the right.

Nixon inherited these programs, but he also augmented them. Later I discuss how one vastly expanded army plan, known as Garden Plot, continued to proliferate after Nixon's fall from office. Garden Plot is the direct ancestor of the planning for continuity of government, which I see as contributing to the catastrophic events of 9/11. In the Nixon era the multilateralist policies of the once-dominant Council on Foreign Relations came to yield place to the unilateralist and neocon policies of the once-marginal American Enterprise Institute. A key moment was the split in the CFR establishment after 1968, dividing the "traders" (those who were concerned for international economic order) from the "Prussians" or "warriors" (those who were concerned for preserving U.S. predominance over the Soviet Union.) This last group included the first neocons.

Let's look in particular at what neocon founder Irving Kristol called the right wing's "intellectual counterrevolution" in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This counterrevolution arose from the fear, approaching panic, at the spread of chaos, violence, and revolutionary rhetoric in the United States during this period. Author and editor Lewis Lapham recalled the grave anxiety with which the overworld watched America coming apart: "I remembered my own encounter with the fear and trembling of what was still known as 'The Establishment,' ... at the July encampment of San Francisco's Bohemian Club. ... In the summer of 1968, the misgivings were indistinguishable from panic. ... [The] country's institutional infrastructure, also its laws, customs ... seemed to be collapsing into anarchy and chaos—black people rioting in the streets of Los Angeles and Detroit, American soldiers killing their officers in Vietnam.

Future Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell, in a 1971 confidential memorandum for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, warned that survival of the free enterprise system lay "in organization, in careful long-range planning and implementation, in consistency of action over an indefinite period of years, in the scale of financing available only through joint effort, and in the political power available only through united action and national organizations." Soon, funding for this right-wing ideological offensive was being provided "by a small sewing circle of rich philanthropists—Richard Mellon Scaife in Pittsburgh, Lynde and Harry Bradley in Milwaukee, John Olin in New York City, the Smith Richardson family in North Carolina, Joseph Coors in Denver, [and] David and Charles Koch in Wichita." With support from these foundations America saw a spate of new and well-funded right-wing organizations, such as the Scaife-backed Moral Majority and the interlocking
Coors-backed Council for National Policy (once called by ABC News "the most powerful conservative group you've never heard of").

The stage was set for what political commentator Kevin Phillips and others have called the "greed decade" of the 1980s, when "the portion of the nation's wealth held by the top 1 percent nearly doubled, skyrocketing from 22 percent to 39 percent, probably the most rapid escalation in U.S. history." With the spreading gap between rich and poor, the ideal of a public state in which all classes participated was further weakened by the reality of a deep state or security state in which, more than ever before, a few manipulated the many. This was facilitated by a parallel development in the media, with the emergence of new press barons like Rupert Murdoch and Conrad Black. As journalist David Brock wrote: "In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Keith Rupert Murdoch [the prime example] went on a buying spree in the United States, purchasing papers in San Antonio, New York City, Boston, and Chicago. American journalism was never the same."

In addition, the Reagan administration instituted its own Office of Public Diplomacy in the State Department, staffed by "perception management" experts from CIA and Special Forces, to plant anti-Communist propaganda in the American press. As a result of these trends, the old media—the mainstream press and television—became less and less likely to present critical perspectives on controversial government policies.

"A New Pearl Harbor"

Once in power, Ronald Reagan, his CIA director William Casey, and vice president George H. W. Bush initiated emergency planning, building from the Garden Plot plan, for what Alfonso Chardy of the Miami Herald called "suspension of the Constitution, turning control of the government over to FEMA [the Federal Emergency Management Agency], emergency appointment of military commanders to run state and local governments and declaration of martial law." The plan also gave FEMA, which had been involved in drafting it, sweeping new powers, including the power "to surveil political dissenters and to arrange for the detention of hundreds of thousands of undocumented aliens in case of an unspecified national emergency."

What is most astonishing about this 1980s planning is that Congress was "completely bypassed." Once again, as in the early days of OPC, private power allied with the extreme wealth of the overworld was imposing policies and structures by secret procedures that radically redirected the course of the public state. It was doing so at a constitutional level. COG—more properly characterized as change of government rather than continuity of government—was not seeking to influence or assist constitutional authority, but to control it, and if necessary, to override it. Questions about this program emerged briefly in the 1980s, particularly in the Iran-Contra hearings of July 1987 when Oliver North was asked (but did not get to answer) whether he had worked on "a contingency plan . . . that would suspend the American constitution."

Public alarm was alleviated by the false assurance that this referred to a proposed executive order from FEMA and that this had already been "effectively killed" by the attorney general William French Smith. In fact, FEMA planning continued up to the day of September 11, 2001, when COG was first implemented. Worse, however, there are indications that COG planning may have helped set the stage for 9/11 to happen. Two members of the ultra-secret private group drafting COG in the 1980s were Dick Cheney (then a congressman) and Donald Rumsfeld (then the CEO of G. D. Searle, a pharmaceutical company). In the fall of 2000, a year before 9/11, Cheney and Rumsfeld signed on to a major study, Rebuilding America's Defenses, by the lobbying group Project for the New American Century (PNAC). The study called for a major increase in the defense budget, the removal of Saddam Hussein from Iraq, and the maintenance of U.S. troops in the Gulf area even after Saddam's disappearance.

The PNAC study was a blueprint for the George W. Bush foreign policy that has been and still is being implemented. It also reflected support from the private sector for the blueprint of full-spectrum dominance that had been articulated in the Pentagon's Joint Vision 2020. The similarity between the two blueprints was not coincidental. Joint Vision 2020 built on a draft known as Defense Planning Guidance written in 1992 for then Defense Secretary Cheney by future PNAC
members Paul Wolfowitz, I. Lewis Libby, and Zalmay Khalilzad. Every critical study of 9/11 has noted the PNAC report's frank assertion that the policy changes it advocated would be difficult to implement quickly, "absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor." Rumsfeld, in addition to being a PNAC member and a member of the COG secret team, endorsed the same idea as the chair of the so-called Rumsfeld Commission, which made proposals with regard to the projected multibillion-dollar project for the U.S. Space Command. This commission's report, issued January 7, 2001, said with respect to attacks in space: "The question is whether the U.S. will be wise enough to act responsibly and soon enough to reduce U.S. space vulnerabilities. Or whether, as in the past, a disabling attack against the country and its people—a 'Space Pearl Harbor'—will be the only event able to galvanize the nation and cause the U.S. government to act."

From these various quotations we can see that the high-profile PNAC report was merely the public face of a consensus that had already emerged at a high level. Throughout the 1990s both the U.S. oil industry and the Pentagon had contributed to the consensus that America would need full-spectrum dominance to guarantee access to oil and other resources in the rest of the world. This program would require massive expenditures, perhaps as much as a trillion dollars, and this could not be expected from Congress—except in response to an attack as massive and frightening as Pearl Harbor. This leads us to recall that America's entry into wars has frequently been triggered by disputed attacks, including the Tonkin Gulf incidents in Vietnam. With respect to the events of 9/11 it is clear that the administration's settled goal of invading Iraq depended on the attack. What we have been witnessing, to quote the Oslo researcher Ola Tunander, is "the use of terrorism to construct world order."

Almost two centuries ago the French statesman Alexis de Tocqueville wrote of America's "great democratic revolution" as being irresistible "because it is the most uniform, the most ancient, and the most permanent tendency that is to be found in history." The political developments of the past few years have led many Americans to fear that proponents of top-down power have at last found the means to frustrate that tendency. In this book's concluding chapter, I suggest ways to give renewed strength to what I call the prevailable will of the people—that potential for solidarity that, instead of being checked by top-down repression, can actually be awakened and reinforced by it. Whether the United States can again be counted among the forces working for democratic revolution may well depend on the future of the Internet, and whether the new media, profiting from the increasing limitations of the old media, can help create the public arena for a more democratic society.
Chapter 4
Brzezinski, Oil, and Afghanistan

The Demise of Détente

In a democracy, important questions of policy with respect to a vital commodity like oil, the lifeblood of an industrial society, cannot be left to private companies acting in accord with private interests and a closed circle of government officials. Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, 1975

In 1976 Jimmy Carter campaigned vigorously against both Donald Rumsfeld's plans for increased defense spending and Henry Kissinger's style of secret diplomacy, attacking "a one man policy of international adventure" that "is not understood by the people or the Congress." Carter's speeches proclaimed a vision of replacing "balance of power with world order politics" and of reducing war-peace issues to be "more a function of economic and social problems than of ... military security problems." But after four years "Carter had come full circle—from an enthusiast of global interdependence who hoped to develop concrete structures of cooperation that would put detente on a firm and lasting basis, to the leadership of a doctrine of global confrontation that brought with it prospects of Cold War tension for many years to come." In this chapter I analyze how the populist from Georgia, who promised to shift America away from military toward economic global strategies, came in the end himself to create a U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf. This reversal is one of the reasons that Carter is remembered as an uncertain and indecisive president. In fact, however, he was presiding over, or perhaps better trying to keep up with, a reversal of opinion within the overworld, one that would eventually maintain Cold War tension, or a substitute for it, into the twenty-first century.

In 1976 it appeared that trilateralism had defeated the Committee on the Present Danger. Carter and his running mate, Walter Mondale, were both members of the Trilateral Commission, and they campaigned on trilateral issues, even promising to cut the defense budget. On his election Carter picked twenty-five members of the Trilateral Commission for top policy positions. His new secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, had previously authored a report downplaying the Soviet threat. The Coalition for a Democratic Majority and the newly formed Committee of the Present Danger nominated fifty-three hawks for government service; not one was selected. It appeared on the surface that with the blessing of David Rockefeller's Trilateral Commission, the traditional U.S. search for unilateral domination would be abandoned. But, as detailed in chapter 3, the 1970s were a period in which a major "intellectual counterrevolution" was mustered, to mobilize conservative opinion with the aid of vast amounts of money.

A key figure in this avalanche of right-wing money was Nixon's former treasury secretary, William Simon at the Olin Foundation, where he "was joined by the legendary John J. McCloy... the recognized chairman of all things Eastern and established" (and longtime Rockefeller representative). Thanks in large part to these lavish expenditures, public opinion had shifted in favor of wanting an increase in defense spending. Meanwhile, the case against detente was helped by Soviet military adventurism in Africa, where the USSR introduced shiploads of weapons and fifteen thousand Cuban troops in support of a new Marxist dictatorship in Ethiopia.

An early blow to trilateralist detente, however, was delivered by two establishment trilateralists within the Carter administration. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former director of the Trilateral Commission and now Carter's national security adviser, brought in his friend and former coauthor Samuel Huntington to oversee a reconciliation between the conflicting CIA and Team B views on the U.S.-USSR balance of power. Huntington, like George H. W. Bush before him, brought in a number of hawkish outsiders. Thus the resulting product, Presidential Review Memorandum #10, or PRM-10, was not a reconciliation but a two-part document of opposing views. The PRM-10 conclusion proclaimed a new era in U.S-Soviet relations: "ERA TWO ... a period that embodies 'both the com-
petition of the Cold War era and the cooperation of the detente period. "Cooperation and competition" became Brzezinski's set formula for describing American-Soviet relations when talking to the press; in private, however, he pressed for competition.

As a result, the Carter administration was bedeviled by two competing foreign policies, with Brzezinski pursuing supremacy over the Soviet Union and Vance pursuing a SALT II disarmament agreement and detente. The Vance-Brzezinski opposition "spread into one of the most bitter rivalries in executive branch history." As Strobe Talbott later commented, it was so profound that "almost every issue provoked a fight." Brzezinski, like Kissinger, used a small network staff inside the National Security Council (or the public state) to trump the policy recommendations from the experts in the State Department (or the public state).

On the basis of PRM-10 Brzezinski secured a presidential directive, PD-18 of August 24, 1977, that affirmed the need to maintain "a 'deployment force of light divisions with strategic mobility' for global contingencies, particularly in the Persian Gulf region and Korea." By the time SALT II was signed in 1979, Carter had consented to significant new weapons programs and arms budget increases (reversing his campaign pledge). By the end of his presidency both Vance and his ally Paul Warnke, the chief negotiator of SALT II, were gone. Most significantly, PRM-10 reinforced Brzezinski's ideological overreactions in the Middle East. In a speech before the Foreign Policy Association, Brzezinski identified a so-called arc of crisis around the Indian Ocean, where the Soviet Union was poised to capitalize on regional instability. As State Department official Henry Precht later recalled: "There was this idea that the Islamic forces could be used against the Soviet Union. The theory was, there was an arc of crisis, and so an arc of Islam could be mobilized to contain the Soviets. It was a Brzezinski concept." Soon both the fall of the shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were interpreted by Brzezinski—paranoically rather than accurately—as proof of Soviet expansiveness and designs on the region.

The success of Team B and Huntington in redirecting the Carter administration toward militarism "created an important precedent." As James Mann wrote in *Rise of the Vulcans:* "From that point onward, whenever members of Congress believed that the CIA was minimizing the seriousness of a foreign policy problem, there were calls for a Team B to review the intelligence and make its own independent evaluation. During the mid-1990s the Republican majority in Congress set up a special commission, modeled upon Team B, to study the threat to the United States from ballistic missiles. After reviewing the intelligence, an independent commission concluded that the danger of a missile attack was considerably greater than the U.S. intelligence community had reported. That missile defense commission was headed by Donald Rumsfeld, and one of its leading members was Paul Wolfowitz."

Brzezinski mobilized support for his positions by creating a special coordination committee (SCC) in the White House, chaired by himself, to deal among other things with sensitive operations, covert activity, and crisis management. In his memoir Brzezinski wrote that he "used the SCC to try to shape our policy toward" a number of issues, of which the first listed by him is the Persian Gulf. In this way, in the words of South Asia specialists Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison: "As he boasts in his memoirs, Brzezinski had steadily eroded Vance's power. . . . This control over covert operations enabled Brzezinski to take the first steps toward a more aggressively anti-Soviet Afghan policy without the State Department's knowing much about it." More specifically, Brzezinski stymied Vance's efforts to negotiate a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, coupled with "a broader 'mutual restraint' agreement covering both Iran and Pakistan." Again, from Cordovez and Harrison: "The United States government was itself divided from the start between 'bleeders,' who wanted to keep Soviet forces pinned down in Afghanistan and thus to avenge Vietnam, and 'dealers,' who wanted to compel their withdrawal through a combination of diplomacy and military pressure." This led to the killing of Vance's proposal by Brzezinski, "in one of the least-noticed but most important of his many clashes with Vance." Even in the late 1980s "the 'bleeders' fought against the Geneva Accords until the very end." Since then, and to this day, America has had to cope with the consequences of Brzezinski's reckless adventurism.
Although right-wingers like Barry Goldwater and the John Birch Society continued to complain about Carter's trilateral administration, the trilateralist ideology had shown in practice to be less relevant than the trilateralists' sociology. In the latter the dominant figure was ultimately Brzezinski because of his proximity to his former mentor, David Rockefeller, and those around him. Two events, both of which I explore more deeply in this chapter, contributed to the demise of detente during the Carter presidency. These were the fall of the shah in 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a year later.

Carter had been elected as the so-called energy president, and his first steps, with energy secretary James Schlesinger, were to introduce a number of largely successful conservation programs. But fears of a Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf led the president, in his January 1980 State of the Union address, to proclaim the Carter Doctrine: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." As historian Daniel Yergin has commented: "The Carter Doctrine made more explicit what American presidents had been saying as far back as Harry Truman's pledge" in 1945 to the king of Saudi Arabia.

Carter's military approach to his Persian Gulf problems went beyond words. He authorized the creation of what Brzezinski had envisaged—a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. In April 1980, Carter mounted a disastrous attack, in an attempt to free the hostages being held in the Tehran U.S. embassy. There were rumors that he planned for a second, bigger operation. The uneasy team of Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski could point to one major foreign policy breakthrough: the Camp David agreement in 1978 that brought peace between Israel and Egypt. Intertwined with the negotiations for Camp David, in which Saudi Arabia played a big role, were other issues of moment. This book is concerned with two of these: (1) the joint policies to combat inflation and protect the weakening U.S. dollar and (2) the various Saudi-U.S. projects for collaboration to diminish the threat of the Soviet Union in Asia.

Brzezinski, Huntington, and FEMA

Before looking at Brzezinski's moves in Afghanistan, however, we have to look at one other way in which Brzezinski helped set the stage for 9/11. This was his bringing of Samuel Huntington back to the White House in 1979 to draft Presidential Memorandum 32, which created the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). What Huntington envisaged as FEMA's future role is uncertain. But hostile critics have pointed to what he had written for the Trilateral Commission in the mid-1970s, in his coauthored book Crisis in Democracy: "A government which lacks authority will have little ability, short of a cataclysmic crisis, to impose on its people the sacrifices which may be necessary to deal with foreign policy problems and defense... . We have come to recognize that there are potential desirable limits to economic growth. There are also potentially desirable limits to the indefinite extension of political democracy."

Huntington's words were attacked at the time for their unfashionable questioning of democracy. What may have been more significant was the warning that in a full democracy, "necessary" sacrifices can only be imposed by a cataclysmic crisis. Brzezinski echoed this thought in his case for American empire, in The Grand Chessboard, when he wrote that "democracy is inimical to imperial mobilization." What would make the American public willing to sacrifice for "imperial mobilization," he suggested, would be "a truly massive and widely perceived direct external threat."

Although Huntington's intentions for FEMA remain unknown, it is clear that FEMA soon became, under President Ronald Reagan, the agency responsible for preserving and refining the Garden Plot strategies for surveillance and detention of domestic protest. It may be relevant that FEMA was authorized on July 20, 1979. This was in the midst of mounting disagreement within the Carter administration about what to do concerning Iran and the deposed shah. Carter's key decision on Iran in November 1979, to freeze all Iranian assets (discussed further in chapter 5), was carried out under legislative powers that had just been given to FEMA in July. At the time
Carter’s director of FEMA, John W. Macy, made it clear that the agency’s chief task was crisis management and civil defense against external enemies, including terrorists; natural disasters were to be a secondary preoccupation.\(^{36}\) (With this mandate FEMA presumably answered to Brzezinski’s special coordination committee in the White House.) Later I show how FEMA did help prepare precisely for mobilization against an external threat, and also for dealing with protesters.

**Brzezinski, Afghanistan, and Central Asia**

As the son of a displaced aristocratic Pole, Brzezinski had never concealed his interest in breaking up the Soviet bloc. As early as 1966 he had cosigned, with political science professor William Griffith, a confidential report criticizing the programming of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, for being "too passive." The men "argued for adopting a more militant line in the non-Russian broadcasts, which would stimulate anti-Russian antagonism."\(^{37}\)

As national security adviser, Brzezinski pursued the same goal of stirring up antagonism by convening a Nationalities Working Group to exploit Muslim dissatisfaction inside the Soviet Union. The core of this group were disciples of another displaced aristocrat, Russian count Alexandre Bennigsen, who in his prolific writings saw fundamentalist Islam in Central Asia as a major threat to the Soviet State.\(^{38}\) (Robert Dreyfuss has commented astutely that "radical political Islam was not a factor in the dissolution of the USSR after perestroika . . . and the establishment of Central Asia’s republics."\(^{39}\) The importance of Islamism came in the next decade, by which time it presented a threat to the interests of both the United States and Russia.)

The efforts of the Nationalities Working Group were at first minor, with "the distribution of Korans in Central Asian languages and stepped-up efforts, in conjunction with Saudi Arabia’s intelligence service, to contact Soviet Muslims visiting Mecca for the hajj."\(^{40}\) A defining shift in Carter’s Islamic policy—one whose consequences for 9/11 would be significant—was when Brzezinski and his aide Robert Gates from CIA, on July 3, 1979, persuaded Carter to send secret aid to Islamist militants in Afghanistan, six months before the Soviet invasion in December 1979.\(^{41}\)

Brzezinski has since, in an interview with *Le Nouvel Observateur*, said that he explained to Carter that in his opinion "this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention." Brzezinski explained: "We didn't push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would."\(^{42}\) In another interview Brzezinski said he had hoped "to make the Soviets bleed for as much and as long as is possible."\(^{43}\)

Immediately after the catastrophic events on 9/11, the influential British intelligence review, *Jane’s*, traced the al Qaeda attack back to its "origins" in this 1979 decision by Carter and Brzezinski:

> The origins of last Tuesday's attack on the United States arguably have their roots in the 1970s. At this time, during the height of the Cold War, a Washington shamed by defeat in Vietnam embarked on a deep, collaborative enterprise to contain the Soviet Union.

> The genesis of the policy came to a head following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, when President Jimmy Carter set up a team headed by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to employ its "death by a thousand cuts" policy on the tottering Soviet empire, especially the oil- and mineral-rich Central Asian Republics then ruled by Moscow.\(^{44}\)

> As a Pole, Brzezinski had geostrategic motives for tempting the Soviet Union into an imperial overstretch that would weaken it and contribute to its eventual dissolution. As someone unhappy with both Vance and SALT II, he also had domestic reasons. One consequence of the Soviet invasion was the failure of the U.S. Senate, by one vote, to ratify the SALT II arms reduction treaty that Vance had negotiated and with which Brzezinski and the Pentagon were extremely uncomfortable.\(^{45}\) This could have been predicted: one hardliner in the Carter administration told the *Christian Science Monitor* that "Afghanistan is finally shaking people into shape. ... I think the Soviets have done us a big favor."\(^{46}\)

Brzezinski was unambiguously in favor of destabilizing the Soviet Union, not in normalizing relations with it. He later described how "as early as 1978, President Carter approved proposals
prepared by my staff to undertake, for example, a comprehensive, covert action program designed to help the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union pursue more actively their desire for independence—a program in effect to destabilize the Soviet Union."47 Under this program, CIA began to infiltrate written materials to diverse ethnic regions of the USSR, above all to the Ukraine.48 This also apparently began the operation whereby CIA helped the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), Saudi Arabia, and the Saudi International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)49 to distribute in the Soviet Union thousands of Wahhabi-glossed Korans, an important contribution to the spread of Islamism in Central Asia today.50 A January 1979 article in *Time* magazine endorsed the idea: "From Islamic democracies on Russia's southern tier, a zealous Koranic evangelism might sweep across the border into these politically repressed Soviet states, creating problems for the Kremlin."51

Note that Brzezinski's first stirring up of the jihadi hornet's nest occurred before either the fall of the shah in Iran (February 1979) or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979). In the history of oil exploration, this occurred at a time when U.S. oil companies, shaken by the power of OPEC in the 1973 oil crisis, were casting eyes on the potential for oil and gas exploration in the trans-Caspian basin.52 Whether oil was on Brzezinski's mind in his decision is an open question to which I shall shortly return.

A year later, as already mentioned, Brzezinski initiated his better-known destabilization program, south of the Amu Darya River in Afghanistan. By using Islamic fundamentalism against the Soviets, Brzezinski clearly regarded himself as a master chess player (to adapt the metaphor of his book *The Grand Chessboard*). In a subsequent interview with *Le Nouvel Observateur*, he famously showed no regrets:

> Asked whether he in any way regretted these actions, Brzezinski replied: "Regret what? The secret operation was an excellent idea. It drew the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? On the day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, saying, in essence: 'We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.'"

> *Nouvel Observateur*: And neither do you regret having supported Islamic fundamentalism, which has given arms and advice to future terrorists?

> Brzezinski: What is more important in world history? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some agitated Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?53

**Brzezinski Opens the Fazle Haq-Hekmatyar Drug Connection**

The ultimate costs of Brzezinski's adventure included not only the "agitated Muslims" of al Qaeda and Iraq, but also what former CIA al Qaeda expert Mike Scheuer has called "the Afghan heroin factories that have killed more Americans than the 11 September attacks."54 Others have with good reason described Brzezinski as "the Sorcerer's Apprentice."55 For generations in both Afghanistan and the Soviet Muslim Republics the dominant form of Islam had been local and largely Sufi. The decision to work with the Saudi and Pakistani secret services meant that billions of CIA and Saudi dollars would ultimately be spent in programs that would help enhance the globalistic and Wahhabistic jihadism that are associated today with al Qaeda.56

These dollars also went directly into expanding the drug traffic. It is now quite clear that this would be the consequence of Pakistan president Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's choice of Lieutenant General Fazle Haq (or Huq) to consult with Brzezinski on developing an Afghan resistance program.57 Haq, whom Zia had appointed to be military governor of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, soon became known as a CIA asset. He was considered the man for visiting dignitaries like William Casey or Vice President George Bush to see when reviewing the CIA Afghan operation.58 By 1982, Haq was also listed with Interpol as an international narcotics trafficker.59 An informant from the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) told U.S. authorities that BCCI president Agha Hasan Abedi's influence with Zia benefited from the backing of Haq, who was "heavily engaged in narcotics trafficking and moving the heroin money through the bank."60
Brzezinski did not initiate this contact. Haq's claim of a Pakistani rather than a U.S. initiative is corroborated by Robert Gates, who writes of "an approach by a senior Pakistani official to an Agency officer" in March 1979, one month before Brzezinski authorized CIA to work with the ISI, and four months before Carter signed the presidential finding to help the mujahideen. But only Brzezinski's witting authority can explain why by 1980 psychiatrist David Musto of the White House Strategy Council on Drug Abuse was being excluded, illegally, from access to White House documents about the opium-growing Afghan mujahideen.

In May 1979 the ISI put CIA in touch with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the mujahideen warlord with perhaps the smallest following inside Afghanistan. Hekmatyar was also the leading mujahideen drug trafficker, and the only one to develop his own complex of six heroin labs in an ISI-controlled area of Baluchistan (Pakistan). This decision by the ISI and CIA belies the usual American rhetoric that the United States was assisting an Afghan liberation movement. Instead, it was assisting Pakistani (and also Saudi) assets in a country about which Pakistan felt insecure. As an Afghan leader in 1994 told Tim Weiner of the New York Times: "We didn't choose these leaders. The United States made Hekmatyar by giving him his weapons. Now we want the United States to shake these leaders and make them stop the killing, to save us from them." Foreign correspondent Robert D. Kaplan reported his personal experience that Hekmatyar was "loathed by all the other party leaders, fundamentalist and moderate alike."

It is easy to understand why Pakistan insisted that Hekmatyar receive the bulk of U.S. (and Saudi) aid. He was the mujahideen leader most dependent on the ISI for survival, and allegedly the only one willing to accept the British-drawn Durand Line as the Afghan-Pakistan boundary. (The Durand Line, dividing clans and even families, left a large number of Pashtuns inside Pakistan.) The question is rather why Brzezinski agreed to an alliance with this drug connection, and proceeded almost immediately to protect it from critical snoops like David Musto. My answer to this important question will be more obvious by the end of this chapter. It is important to establish why the United States accepted an arrangement whereby of the $2 billion it supplied to the mujahideen in the 1980s, Hekmatyar, a leading drug trafficker, is estimated to have received more than half.

Let me clarify the blowback from Brzezinski's two decisions: Hekmatyar and Saudi-backed Islamist Abdul Rasul Sayyaf—the two principal instruments of his policies—became, far more conspicuously than Osama bin Laden, the protectors of the first al Qaeda plots against America. Al Qaeda itself can be traced principally to the thousands of Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) followers that Egypt released in the 1980s to fight in Afghanistan. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, said by the 9/11 Commission Report to have been the "principal architect" of the 9/11 plot, first conceived of it when he was with Sayyaf, a leader with whom bin Laden was still at odds. Meanwhile, several of the men convicted of blowing up the World Trade Center in 1993, and the subsequent New York "day of terror" plot in 1995, had trained or fought with, or raised money for, Brzezinski's "agitated Muslims."

This irony has been noted before. Less noted, but equally important, is that eventually through Pakistani channels the United States and its allies (chiefly Saudi Arabia) gave Hekmatyar more than $1 billion in armaments. This was more than any other CIA client has ever received, before or since. Those weapons, including the lethal ground-to-air Stingers, have since armed terrorists around the world. This unparalleled support to one of the world's leading drug traffickers, who later became one of America's primary enemies, occurred at a time when the United States was talking of a "war on drugs."

The consequences of Brzezinski's decision were felt immediately, in the form of a sudden flood of heroin from the Afghan border into the United States. In May 1980, only five months after arms began to flow to the Afghan guerrillas, Carter's White House adviser on drugs, Musto, complained publicly of the risks "in befriending these tribes as we did in Laos." Musto noted that the number of drug-related deaths in New York had risen by 77 percent. The key to this relationship may have been BCCI. Well into the 1980s the bank continued the cut-out activities for CIA that had been performed earlier by billionaire Saudi arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi and Kamal Adham, who became one of BCCI's principal shareholders.
As already noted, Fazle Haq was allegedly "heavily engaged in narcotics trafficking and moving the heroin money through the [BCCI] bank."\textsuperscript{72} The use of this drug trafficking to finance CIA's off-the-books assets in Afghanistan would explain what a highly placed U.S. official told Jonathan Beaty, coauthor of the book *The Outlaw Bank*: that Haq "was our man….everybody knew that Haq was also running the drug trade" and that "BCCI was completely involved."\textsuperscript{73}

On the Pakistan side this criminal relationship may even have been institutionalized. According to B. Raman, a well-informed Indian analyst writing in the *Financial Times*: "In the 1980s, at the insistence of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the U.S., the Internal Political Division of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), headed by Brig (retd). Imtiaz,.. started a special cell for the use of heroin for covert actions. This cell promoted the cultivation of opium and the extraction of heroin in Pakistani territory as well as in the Afghan territory under Mujahideen control for being smuggled into the Soviet controlled areas in order to make the Soviet troops heroin addicts. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the ISI's heroin cell started using its network of refineries and smugglers for smuggling heroin to the Western countries and using the money as a supplement to its legitimate economy. But for these heroin dollars, Pakistan's legitimate economy must have collapsed many years ago."\textsuperscript{74}

The Congressional Research Service confirms that "according to some experts, Pakistan's drug economy amounts to as much as $20 billion. Drug money reportedly is used to buy influence throughout Pakistan's economic and political systems."\textsuperscript{75}

**Brzezinski's Bureaucratic Paranoia**

Brzezinski’s decisions to intervene in Soviet Asia (1978) and in Afghanistan (1979) merit close consideration. The first may be said to define the moment when the United States moved away from goals of coexistence and containment to the goal of dismantling the Soviet Union. The second decision rapidly generated a commitment of U.S. power to the Gulf (the Carter Doctrine) that broadly explains why the United States is in Iraq today. Brzezinski, in short, was the first unilateralist national security adviser, even while working for a Democratic president with the trilateralist agenda of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet bloc. What motivated this naturalized American to embark on such groundbreaking and consequential initiatives? Was it triumphalism? Or paranoia? Was he fulfilling his own Polish agenda? Or was he fulfilling someone else’s?

The usual explanation indeed is the conventional bureaucratic paranoia by which Brzezinski repeatedly outflanked the more moderate Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Political commentator Eric Alterman has expanded on former CIA director Gates's account of the Afghanistan decision in Gates's 1996 memoir *From the Shadows* (from 1978 to 1979, Gates was detached from CIA to become a member of Brzezinski's staff): "The $500 million in nonlethal aid was designed to counter the billions the Soviets were pouring into the puppet regime they had installed in Kabul. Some on the American side were willing—perhaps even eager—to lure the Soviets into a Vietnam-like entanglement. Others viewed the program as a way of destabilizing the puppet government and countering the Soviets, whose undeniable aggression in the area was helping to reheat the cold war to a dangerous boil.... A key meeting took place on March 30, 1979. Under Secretary of Defense Walter Sloc[o]mb[e] wondered aloud whether there was value in keeping the Afghan insurgency going, 'sucking the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire.' Arnold Horelick, CIA Soviet expert, warned that this was just what we could expect."\textsuperscript{76}

The italicized phrases accurately summarize what was being spoken in Washington at the time about the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. In 2001, Brzezinski told Alterman on the phone that he had sold the plan to Carter on the grounds that "the Soviets had engineered a Communist coup [in 1978] and they were providing direct assistance in Kabul. We were facing a serious crisis in Iran, and the entire Persian Gulf was at stake."\textsuperscript{77} Vance, who saw no such threat, "recalls that the April [1978] coup was depicted by Brzezinski as the opening gambit in a Soviet master plan for achieving hegemony in Southwest Asia."\textsuperscript{78} It is certainly true that the United States was facing a crisis in the Persian Gulf. The Nixon-Kissinger strategy of detente with Moscow had been based on the assumption that this detente would stabilize the world. But instead of stability, the Middle East
was shocked by a number of destabilizing developments, almost none of which were in fact attributable to the Soviet Union.

One key shock was the April 1978 coup in Afghanistan by a group of Soviet-trained army officers under Khalq leader Nur Mohammed Taraki. Although some scholars still suspect Soviet backing for this coup, it is usually acknowledged to have been in fact initiated by the extremist Khalq faction of the Afghan communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), whose style acutely embarrassed Moscow. Vance wrote later that "we had no evidence of Soviet complicity in the coup."

One precipitating cause in fact was the shah of Iran's advice to Afghan president Mohammed Daoud Khan, who was on good terms with both the West and the Soviet Union, to purge his army of left-wing officers and clamp down on their party the PDPA. In the resulting confrontation, it was Daoud himself who was purged and killed. Another factor was the work of SAVAK- and CIA-supported Islamist agents who arrived from Iran "with bulging bankrolls." (SAVAK was the shah's domestic security and intelligence service from 1957 to 1979.)

The USSR was acutely embarrassed by this Khalq faction and the reform program it immediately instituted. As British foreign aid expert Peter Marsden wrote in *The Taliban: War, Religion, and the New Order in Afghanistan*, the "PDPA's use of force in bringing the changes to fruition, combined with a brutal disregard for societal and religious sensitivities, resulted in a massive backlash from the rural population." The result was the first broad-based Islamist coalition for jihad in Afghanistan, a cause that the USSR (because of its own Muslim populations) had at this time much more to fear than did the United States.

A second challenge was the fall in February 1979 of the shah of Iran, the ruler who under the so-called Nixon Doctrine had been deputized to serve as the defender of U.S. interests in the Gulf. Brzezinski analyzed the shah's problems in terms of the Soviets "asserting themselves in Iran" and saw his fall as in part "a Soviet threat to Persian Gulf oil fields." The Soviets feared that events in Iran might further feed the cause of U.S.-backed Islamism in Afghanistan. Again, from Marsden: "Indications that the USA might strengthen the Islamic resistance... combined with a growing rapprochement between Washington and Peking to create an acute sense of paranoia in the Kremlin." This paranoia was aggravated in mid-March 1979, when a violent rebellion in Herat, an Afghan city close to the Iran border, "resulted in the deaths of some 5,000 people including fifty Soviet advisers and their families."

Fearing the consequences of the Khalq's follies, the Soviets exerted increasing pressure on Kabul. They probably encouraged the overthrow of the Khalq leader, Taraki, in September 1979. I agree with historian Douglas Little that three months later "Moscow's military intervention in Kabul was probably a defensive measure and not the first step in a Kremlin master plan to drive the United States out of the Persian Gulf." There is no doubt that a chief purpose of the Soviet invasion was to replace an unpredictable extremist leader, Hafizullah Amin, with the more moderate Babrak Karmal from the other PDPA faction.

What was being played out in short between the world's two superpowers was apparently not a masterful chess game, but its opposite: a frightened descent into mutually assured paranoia that would eventually prove costly to both players. Both Brzezinski and the Soviets described as threatening moves by their opponents what were in fact indigenous or local developments that owed little or nothing to either camp. The American paranoia was still further heightened by America's recent and ignominious exit from Vietnam—"the specter of Vietnam" that in 1979 still seemed so much more dangerous than it really was.

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 was presented first by Brzezinski, and later by Casey, as "a potential threat to the Persian Gulf" and its oil fields. (In the eyes of Casey, about to become Reagan's director of central intelligence, it was part of Soviet "creeping imperialism," aimed at the two specific targets of the Central American isthmus and "the oil fields of the Middle East."). Carter responded with the Carter Doctrine, threatening military force if necessary to repel "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region." This was followed by a massive buildup in the U.S. armed forces, around the novel concept of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDF), operating from the new U.S. base of Diego Garcia in
the Indian Ocean. (In 1983 the RDF was renamed the United States Central Command, or USCENTCOM, the command responsible for the war in Iraq today.) As Brzezinski could subsequently tell an interviewer: "It was our response in those years which provided the basis for what subsequently was done by Reagan." During the 1980s the RDF would grow into a $45 billion per year enterprise.

The question remains whether Brzezinski's paranoia was genuine, or the rhetoric of a power expert skilled at winning bureaucratic contests. It is noteworthy how completely Brzezinski's defense of U.S. oil investments in the Middle East was in line with Kissinger's and Casey's, even though his style of implementation was different. It is also striking that he injected CIA into the Caspian basin, at a time when American oil companies were already looking there for alternative oil sources that would diminish their dependence on OPEC. The RDF, for which Brzezinski and Paul Wolfowitz (until 1980 the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for regional programs) can take credit together, can also be seen as a multibillion-dollar gift to the oil majors.

It is likely that Kissinger, Brzezinski, and Casey were not just reflecting the mind-set of one faction of Wall Street, but receiving advice and encouragement from that very quarter. This was certainly the case when Brzezinski and Kissinger, in alliance with David Rockefeller, were able to force Carter to reverse himself with respect to the shah.

Chapter 7
Afghanistan and the Origins of Al Qaeda

It was the original concept that covert activities undertaken under the [National Security] Act were to be carefully limited and controlled. You will note that the language of the Act provides that this catch-all clause is applicable only in the event that national security is affected. . . . However, as the Cold War continued ... I have read somewhere that as time progressed we had literally hundreds of such operations going on simultaneously. It seems clear that these operations have gotten out of hand.

Clark Clifford, 1975

For God's sake, you're financing your own assassins.
Afghan exile to U.S. State Department official, 1980s

The Bank of Credit and Commerce International and the Deep History of Afghanistan

The CIA-backed resistance to the 19805 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has been called "the largest covert operation in history." It was also in some respects the worst conceived. I am not talking about earlier decisions—the CIA's backing of the SAVAK's efforts in the 1970s to destabilize Afghanistan and incite disruption by Islamic fundamentalists, or national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's blocking of secretary of state Cyrus Vance's efforts to neutralize the region, or the almost inevitable decision to support the Afghan resistance.

I'm talking about the disastrous details of the U.S. covert support policy under CIA Director William Casey and Vice President George H. W. Bush: (1) to favor Islamist fundamentalists over native Sufi nationalists, (2) to sponsor an "Arab Afghan" foreign legion that from the outset hated the United States almost as much as the USSR, (3) to help them to exploit narcotics as a means to weaken the Soviet army, (4) to help expand the resistance campaign into an international jihadi movement, to attack the Soviet Union itself, and (5) to continue supplying the Islamists after the Soviet withdrawal, allowing them to make war on Afghan moderates.

By such shortsighted miscalculations, CIA's powers, by means of proxies and offshore-subsidized assets, were used to help propagate, almost to help invent, the Islamist extremism that produced both the Taliban and al Qaeda. From its related dealings with the discredited drug bank the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), CIA also became further enmeshed in
ongoing criminal activities with the drug-trafficking Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) and with many of the Islamist financial agencies that President George W. Bush has now attacked. These miscalculations helped turn Afghanistan, a country that before 1979 was not an important factor in the global drug traffic, into what it is today: by far the world's leading source of heroin.

America's out-of-control entanglements with jihadi Islamists, and particularly with the ISI, underlie the still misunderstood events of 9/11, and the ongoing inability of the U.S. bureaucracy and media to report honestly either on what happened that day, or on what those events reveal about the deep structure of U.S. global politics. Admittedly the mistakes can be attributed in part to America's limited resources in the area and above all to America's need to act through proxy networks like Saudi Arabian and Pakistani intelligence. But many conscious American decisions were made to compound the support for Wahhabist and Deobandi jihadis.

Consider, for example, the testimony of Michael Springman, the former head of the American visa bureau in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Springman told the BBC that since 1987 CIA had been illicitly issuing visas to unqualified applicants from the Middle East and bringing them to the United States for training in terrorism for the Afghan war. In his words: "In Saudi Arabia I was repeatedly ordered by high level State Dept. officials to issue visas to unqualified applicants. These were, essentially, people who had no ties either to Saudi Arabia or to their own country. I complained bitterly at the time there. I returned to the U.S., I complained to the State Dept. here, to the General Accounting Office, to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and to the Inspector General's office. I was met with silence. What I was protesting was, in reality, an effort to bring recruits, rounded up by Osama bin Laden, to the U.S. for terrorist training by the CIA. They would then be returned to Afghanistan to fight against the then-Soviets."

This and other disastrous policy errors should not be blamed primarily on the officers of CIA, who often opposed some of the worst decisions made in the Casey era. They should be blamed on the existence of history-changing secret powers, enabling a small clique controlling the deep state to embark on a reckless course that knowledgeable experts, some of them with bureaucratic appointments, warned against at the time.

In the 1980s Casey and Vice President Bush, using covert networks, embarked on a number of their own initiatives. Some of these were actively opposed by other cabinet members and also—in the case of the Contras—by the Democratic-controlled Congress. The result was the conduct of operations by a cabal of inner cadres, working with proxies and off-the-books assets like the Saudi GID and BCCI. Americans do not yet have access to the true history of that era. Indeed, we have a schizophrenic history: exhaustive parallel accounts that do not refer to each other and that contribute to the profound divisions and mistrust in the country.

For decades we have had on the one hand the archival history of professional historians, and on the other hand tentative and fallible outsider accounts of deep historical events. Today, however, we have mainstream accounts in different fields that take no note of each other. This schizophrenia is particularly prominent with respect to BCCI as a component of covert U.S. foreign policy, dating back to its involvement in the 1980 Republican countersurprise. The three most thorough histories of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan—those by Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, George Crile, and Steve Coll—do not once mention BCCI. Neither is there any mention of the drug money-laundering bank BCCI in two intimate biographies of Casey and the Bush family.

However, the role of BCCI in America's Afghan operations is acknowledged by mainstream journalists. A book coauthored by Wall Street Journal reporter Peter Truell tells us that in the "campaign to aid the Afghan rebels . . . BCCI clearly emerged as a U.S. intelligence asset." A book by two senior writers for Time confirms that in the words of a U.S. intelligence agent, "Casey began to use the outside—the Saudis, the Pakistanis, BCCI—to run what they couldn't get through Congress. [BCCI president] Abedi had the money to help." (Both books corroborate that Casey met repeatedly with BCCI president Abedi.) Thus BCCI enabled Casey to conduct foreign policy without the constraints imposed by the public democratic state. Our archival and mainstream histories have not yet acknowledged this.
As the U.S. commitment to the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan increased, the relative importance of BCCI’s contribution probably diminished. But one of the causes for the disastrously skewed U.S. campaign in Afghanistan was the importance of BCCI and the drug traffic at the outset. Relevant also is BCCI’s role as a cut-out, using its wealth throughout the 1980s to corrupt members of the U.S. Congress and other politicians, much as the billionaire arms dealer and CIA asset Adnan Khashoggi had done in preceding decades.

This corruption explains the inability of Congress to deal honestly with the problem of BCCI’s intelligence-related drug activities; some prominent members of Congress have even cooperated in suppressing the truth. It is true that Senators John Kerry and Hank Brown (a Democrat and a Republican) submitted an exhaustive report, The BCCI Affair, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which they were members. But the report remained just that—a report to the committee from two very isolated senators, while no report from the committee was ever issued.

If we are ever to see a more reasonable U.S. foreign policy in the Persian Gulf, we must begin by recovering more of the truth of what has driven the dark side of foreign policy. This includes the full story of why the United States, in invading Afghanistan in 2001, overthrew the Taliban (who had eliminated 94 percent of opium production in the country) with the aid of the Northern Alliance (who had just more than doubled opium production in their limited area.)

In this chapter I focus on what appear to have been disastrous miscalculations in Afghanistan, all made with little or no public debate and all implemented through the covert powers of CIA. These ill-considered U.S. ventures were launched by a few. The public state was barely involved: there was neither public discussion of these policies nor even clear awareness of their consequences, not in the entire administration and certainly not in Congress.

**The U.S. Miscalculations in Afghanistan**

**The First Miscalculation: Backing Islamists over Traditionalists**

The downing of U.S. Black Hawk and Chinook helicopters in Iraq in October and November 2003 was a typical example of how the aid supplied by CIA to Islamist terrorists in the 1980s contributed to the escalation and spread of terrorism in the world. At least two of the U.S. Black Hawk helicopters that crashed in Iraq were brought down by the same sophisticated technique: taking out the ship’s vulnerable tail rotor with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). As right-wing columnists and Web sites were quick to point out, this was exactly the technique that brought down three Black Hawks in Mogadishu, Somalia, in October 1993. Three weeks after this devastating attack, the United States pulled out of Somalia—an event Osama bin Laden has cited as proof that America can be defeated.

But at first no one pointed out what Mark Bowden, author of the best account of that battle, reported: that the Somalis on the ground had been trained by Arabs who had fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan. As Bowden wrote, it was these Arabs who taught that the best way to bring down a helicopter with an RPG was to shoot for the tail rotor (which keeps the helicopter from spinning by countering torque from its main rotor). In his book on al Qaeda print and television journalist Peter Bergen said of the Mogadishu battle: "A U.S. official told me that the skills involved in shooting down those helicopters were not skills that the Somalis could have learned on their own." In other words the training that the United States supplied to Islamists in the Afghan war in the 1980s, when the emphasis was on bringing down Soviet helicopters, was still coming back to haunt the United States in 2003. That training, according to author George Crile, included "urban terror, with instruction in car bombings, bicycle bombings, camel bombings, and assassination."

We now know that some of the Arab trainers of the Somalis were members of al Qaeda. Ali Mohamed, the chief al Qaeda terrorist trainer (and also an FBI informant) later confessed that he trained the al Qaeda teams in Somalia and fought there himself. The Egyptian-born Mohamed was also a veteran of the U.S. Army and CIA. As I discuss in chapter 9, while allegedly still on the U.S. payroll, Mohamed had been recruiting and training Arabs at the al-Kifah Center in Brooklyn,
This served as the main American recruiting center for the network that after the Afghan war became known as al Qaeda. It is easy in retrospect to challenge the wisdom of having imparted such skills to jihad-waging Islamists. These were extremists who even at the time made it clear they despised the West almost as much as they did the Soviet Union. But what remains is the dangerous system whereby small cliques of policy makers, acting at the highest levels of secrecy, are able to make ill-considered decisions, focused on the techniques and materiel of violence, that will have long-term and tragic effects worldwide.

This system also preserves itself by cover-up. The establishment version of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and al Qaeda has been set out in two excellent books—Charlie Wilson’s War by George Crile of 60 Minutes, and Ghost Wars by Steve Coll of the Washington Post. Both works give finely woven narratives based on extensive interviews with former and current CIA officers and other high-level officials. This wealth of detail, however, makes it the more striking that they make no mention whatsoever of Ali Mohamed, the al-Kifah training camp, or Springman’s statements about CIA visas for Islamists and jihadis. Nor does either of these privileged and apparently exhaustive accounts say anything about ISI and CIA use of the drug traffic against the Soviet Union or the CIA-favored bank BCCI, which was caught up in supplying both the mujahideen and this lucrative drug trade.

The United States is not the first country to have been derailed in Afghanistan. Great Britain’s original disastrous involvement there, in 1839, had the modest intention, like Washington’s in 2001, of lending support to a supposedly friendly Afghan ally. Of the sixteen-thousand-man expedition dispatched to Kabul in 1842, when Britain believed itself invincible, only one person survived.

The disastrous Soviet adventure with Afghanistan in the 1980s also began with a march to Kabul, to support a challenged pro-Soviet government there. A Pakistani military observer commented later that it took the Red Army tanks only two days to reach Kabul and eight years to begin to leave it. In like fashion the United States and its Northern Alliance allies reached Kabul swiftly in 2001 but came under increasingly heavy fire a year later. Despite the second President Bush’s original resolve to keep the United States out of pacification operations in Afghanistan, the dialectic of events there is exerting more and more pressure to increase the U.S. pacification effort with American forces on the ground and a complement of long-term military and civilian advisers in place.

What forces are behind these pressures? The Soviets in 1980 were clearly opposed from the outset by mujahideen (called "freedom fighters" in Washington but "terrorists" in Moscow), who had been armed, financed, and trained since 1978 or earlier by the combined secret services of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and CIA. The forces opposing the United States in the wake of the latest Afghanistan war, in contrast, are almost entirely of its own making. This is true of the Pashtun remnants of the Taliban, who can be traced back to the organizational arrangements (involving the Pakistani ISI, the Saudi GID, and CIA) for their antecedents in the mujahideen. It is if anything even more true of the so-called Arab Afghans of al Qaeda—the jihadi Muslims who were drawn (by the same three agencies) to fight against the USSR in the 1980s and have never been completely disbanded since.

We can debate whether the United States should have opposed Soviet aggression by aggressively backing an indigenous opposition. The disaster for the United States is that the indigenous opposition, the traditional tribal-based parties ("decentralized, unideological and non-hierarchical"), lost out "as the CIA-ISI arms pipeline supported the more radical Islamic parties," particularly the drug-trafficking network of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. An extreme instance was the Islamist party of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. It was "virtually nonexistent in the field," but because of Sayyaf's close connections to Saudi Arabia and "impeccable Wahhabite credentials," he and Hekmatyar were ideologically "in a position of clear advantage" to obtain funds.
The Saudis, Pakistanis, and above all the ISI had no interest in seeing Afghan nationalism prevail. Instead, the ISI set up an artificial council of seven parties, of which four were fundamentalist. Local commanders had to join one of these parties to get weapons, of which "67 to 73 percent" went to the four fundamentalist parties. Of the two major fundamentalist parties, Hekmatyar's was based on detribalized Pashtuns from the north, while the Cairo-trained Burhanuddin Rabbani's "consisted almost entirely of Tajiks." Thus the tribal Pashtun nationalists, whose dreams of a united "Pushtunistan" threatened Pakistan's borders, were deliberately underrepresented.

The United States missed an important opportunity in 1980 to rectify this fundamentalist bias. A loya jirga, or national assembly, convened to represent all of Afghanistan's divergent groups, called for a loose federal structure, nonaligned foreign policy, and nonsectarian Islam. Although the loya jirga was praised by the Christian Science Monitor for its representative character, the United States did not intervene when the ISI scuttled the venture by threatening to cut off the supply of U.S. weapons. The religious consequence of this unbalanced ISI support was that the traditional moderate Sufism that had been widespread in Afghanistan, and was represented by one of the two traditionalist parties, lost ground to the radical Salafi Islamism that was favored by Saudi Arabia as well as the ISI and its factions. This mirrored a longtime evolution inside Pakistan, where traditional Sufism had also been eroded by state-assisted radical elements, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-Islam, backed by Pakistan president Muhammad Zia-ul Haq.

The American journalist Selig Harrison has observed that this had a deleterious impact on the Pashtun resistance effort: "Ideologically, most commanders, with their tribal ties and their attachment to traditional forms of Islam, were repelled by fundamentalist demands for the abolition of the tribal structure as incompatible with their conception of a centralized Islamic state." Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter 4, the ISI preferred the fundamentalist Hekmatyar precisely because he lacked a popular base in Afghanistan and thus was more dependent on Pakistani support. Zia also allegedly "thought he could count on Hekmatyar to work for a pan-Islamic entity," one embracing not just Pakistan and Afghanistan but eventually Central Asia and Kashmir. In 2001 the drug network developed by Hekmatyar and his supporters in ISI was said by foreign observers to be a key element in the financial backing of al Qaeda.

Elsewhere it is acknowledged that CIA accepted the ISI's use of the drug trade to supplement the anti-Soviet campaign in the 1980s and consequently prevented U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration officers in Pakistan from pursuing well-known traffickers. CIA failed to foresee that the heroin traffic, having been allowed to flourish, could not be turned off, and in time would come to subsidize the independent, anti-U.S. operations of al Qaeda. In other words the United States in this new millennium is confronting forces that it helped launch two decades ago, without any clear idea of the consequences of doing so, or of how to close these forces down. It is as if CIA had learned nothing from the "disposal problem" it consciously faced with the Cuban exiles after the disastrous Bay of Pigs fiasco, one eighth of whom at least (according to U.S. government estimates) ended up as organized drug traffickers.

As I have argued in Drugs, Oil, and War, most of the U.S. operations abroad have been to consolidate U.S. influence in oil-producing areas, and the great majority of the major covert actions have been conducted with the assistance of local drug-trafficking proxies. This recurring convergence between oil and drugs is not a coincidence, but a feature of what I have called the deep politics of U.S. foreign policy—those factors in policy formation that are usually repressed rather than acknowledged. The role of oil in U.S. geopolitical thinking is generally acknowledged. Less recognized has been the role of drug proxies in waging and financing conflicts that would not have been financed by Congress and U.S. taxpayers.

This phenomenon is sometimes characterized as blowback: the CIA's own term for unintended consequences at home of covert (and usually illegal) programs implemented abroad. But the term, by suggesting an accidental and lesser spin-off, misrepresents the dimensions and magnitude of the
drug traffic the United States helped relaunch after World War II. That drug traffic has multiplied and spread throughout the world like a malignant cancer. It has also branched out into other areas— notably money laundering and people smuggling—which, like the drug traffic itself, have contributed to the problem of terrorism we now face.

The Second Miscalculation: Strengthening the Antecedents of al Qaeda

The U.S. error in the 1980s of strengthening Islamic radicals inside Afghanistan was compounded by a second disastrous miscalculation: creating conditions for the recruitment and training of a worldwide foreign legion of jihadi Muslim terrorists. At first the United States helped to facilitate the recruitment of jihadi Muslims (often called "Arab Afghans") to serve against the USSR in Afghanistan. Under the encouragement of CIA chief William Casey in 1986, the United States then participated in the decision to deploy these Muslims outside Afghanistan and inside the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Osama bin Laden has provided leadership to these same forces, which today continue to threaten both Russia and the United States. These forces will continue to threaten the secular world even if bin Laden and his immediate associates are captured or killed.

In 1981, Casey of CIA, Prince Turki bin Faisal of Saudi intelligence, and the ISI worked together to create a foreign legion of jihadi Muslims or so-called Arab Afghans (who in fact were never Afghans and not always Arabs) in Afghanistan. The foreigners were supported by the Services Center (Makhtab al-Khidmat, or MAK) of the Jordanian Palestinian Abdullah Azzam, in the offices of the Muslim World League and Muslim Brotherhood in Peshawar, Pakistan. This project did not emanate from the Afghan resistance but was imposed on it. According to the Spanish author Robert Montoya, the idea originated in the elite Safari Club that had been created by French intelligence chief Alexandre de Marenches in 1976, bringing together other intelligence chiefs such as General Akhtar Abdur Rahman of ISI in Pakistan and Kamal Adham of Saudi Arabia.

The relationship of CIA to the Arab Afghans, the MAK, and bin Laden has been much debated. Journalist Jason Burke denies the frequently made claim that "bin Laden was funded by the CIA." The 9/11 Commission Report goes further, asserting that "bin Ladin and his comrades had their own sources of support and training, and they received little or no assistance from the United States." Australian journalist John Pilger argues for a much stronger direction of Arab Afghans and al Qaeda by U.S. and British intelligence: "[In 1986] CIA director William Casey had given his backing to a plan put forward by Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, to recruit people from around the world to join the Afghan jihad. More than 100,000 Islamic militants were trained in Pakistan between 1986 and 1992, in camps overseen by CIA and MI6, with the SAS training future al-Qaida and Taliban fighters in bomb-making and other black arts. Their leaders were trained at a CIA camp in Virginia. This was called Operation Cyclone and continued long after the Soviets had withdrawn in 1989."

Unquestionably, as I explore in chapter 8, MAK centers in America, such as the al-Kifah Center in Brooklyn, were in the 1980s a major source of both recruitment and finance for the MAK, if only because the United States was one of the few countries in which such recruitment and financing were tolerated and even protected. "Millions of dollars each year" are said to have been raised for the MAK in Brooklyn alone.

In addition, Jalaluddin Haqqani, the chief host in Afghanistan to the so-called Arab Afghans, "received bags of money each month from the [CIA] station in Islamabad." (This was an exception to the general rule that CIA aid was funneled through General Zia and the ISI in Pakistan, cited by Burke as the reason why CIA funding "would have been impossible." Bergen, in arguing that CIA "had very limited dealings" with the Arab Afghans, concedes that "the CIA did help an important recruiter for the Arab Afghans, the Egyptian cleric Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman." Despite his known involvement with Egyptian terrorists, "was issued a visa for the United States in 1987 and a multiple-entry visa in 1990 [and] at least one of the visas was issued by a CIA officer working undercover in the consular section of the American embassy in Sudan." (This was in addition to the visas reluctantly issued in Jeddah by Michael Springman, as noted earlier.)

Journalist John Cooley has described the sheikh as "helpmate to the CIA in recruiting young zealots, especially among Arab-Americans in the United States, for the jihad in Afghanistan." Those
recruited through the al-Kifah Center were trained by a former CIA contract agent, Ali Mohamed, another Egyptian with connections to the same terrorist group as Rahman. Eventually both Rahman and Mohamed would be convicted for their involvement in 1990’s al Qaeda plots. But before that both men enjoyed a surprising degree of FBI protection, in Mohamed's case because he was a top FBI informant on al Qaeda.

The Third Miscalculation: Using Drugs Against the USSR

The United States probably had complex motives for assisting and protecting the al-Kifah Center. Like other countries it had security reasons for encouraging Islamist extremists to leave the United States and fight elsewhere. But another motive was their suitability for a Casey-endorsed plan, which Casey discussed with the ISI in 1984: to carry the Afghan jihad north into the Soviet Union. This plan was facilitated by the corrupting power of the drug trade, and it was thus convenient that Hek-matyar, the mujahideen leader closest to Pakistan and the United States, was already a major heroin trafficker.

Before 1979, Pakistan and Afghanistan exported very little heroin to the West. By 1981, however, the drug lords (many of them high-ranking members of Pakistan's political and military establishment) supplied 60 percent of America's heroin. As journalist Robert Friedman wrote in the Village Voice: "Trucks from the Pakistan army's National Logistics Cell arriving with CIA arms from Karachi often returned loaded with heroin—protected by ISI [Pakistan's internal security service] papers from police search." It is ironic that CIA helped set up and protect these networks of heroin terrorists in the first place. The ability of secret power to deform and corrupt public policy is perhaps best illustrated by a policy that was opposed by CIA professionals: CIA Director Casey's ill-fated decisions in the 1980s to use first heroin and later heroin-financed guerrillas to destabilize the USSR in the regions north of Afghanistan. The little that is known about these decisions suggests that Casey overrode his own officers and accepted advice from his wide circle of contacts abroad.

As a first step, Casey appears to have promoted a plan suggested to him in 1981 by the former French intelligence chief Alexandre de Marenches that CIA supply drugs on the sly to Soviet troops. Although de Marenches subsequently denied that the plan, known as Operation Mosquito, went forward, there are reports that heroin, hashish, and even cocaine from Latin America soon reached Soviet troops. Along with the CIA-ISI-linked bank BCCI, "a few American intelligence operatives were deeply enmeshed in the drug trade" before the war was over. Maureen Orth, a correspondent for Vanity Fair, heard from Mathea Falco, head of International Narcotics Control for the State Department under Jimmy Carter, that CIA and the ISI together encouraged the mujahideen to addict the Soviet troops.

CIA apparently returned to these narco-trafficking allies in 2001, when it developed a strategy for ousting the Taliban in Afghanistan. The informed Indian observer B. Raman charged in 2002 that “the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the USA, which encouraged these heroin barons during the Afghan war of the 1980s in order to spread heroin-addiction amongst the Soviet troops, is now using them in its search for bin Laden and other surviving leaders of the Al Qaeda, by taking advantage of their local knowledge and contacts.” The drug lords selected by CIA, according to Raman, were "Haji Ayub Afridi, the Pakistani narcotics baron, who was a prized operative of the CIA in the 1980s," Haji Abdul Qadeer, Haji Mohammed Zaman, and Hazrat Ali.

Philip Smucker, a journalist for the Christian Science Monitor, has confirmed that in 2001 the drug trafficker Haji Mohammed Zaman was recruited again in France for the anti-Taliban cause, by "British and American officials." In his words, "When the Taliban claimed Jalalabad[,] . . . Zaman had fled Afghanistan for a leisurely life in Dijon, France. Just a few years at the top of the heroin trade in Jalalabad had given 'Mr. Ten Percent' a ticket to just about any destination he could have chosen. In late September 2001, British and American officials, keen to build up an opposition core to take back the country from the Taliban, met with and persuaded Zaman to return to Afghanistan. The Asian Times corroborated Raman's claim that Zaman's longtime Pakistani drug-trafficking partner, Haji Ayub Afridi, was also released from a Pakistani jail at this time.
The Fourth Miscalculation: Recruiting Radical Muslims to Attack the USSR

But Casey's offensive plans against the Soviet Union went beyond heroin. In 1984, during a secret visit by Casey to Pakistan, "Casey startled his Pakistani hosts by proposing that they take the Afghan war into enemy territory—into the Soviet Union itself. . . . Pakistani intelligence officers—partly inspired by Casey—began independently to train Afghans and funnel CIA supplies for scattered strikes against military installations, factories and storage depots within Soviet territory. . . . The attacks later alarmed U.S. officials in Washington, who saw military raids on Soviet territory as 'an incredible escalation,' according to Graham Fuller, then a senior U.S. intelligence [CIA] official who counseled against any such raids."  

According to Steve Coll, "Robert Gates, Casey's executive assistant and later CIA director, has confirmed that Afghan rebels 'began cross-border operations into the Soviet Union itself during the spring of 1985. These operations included 'raising Cain on the Soviet side of the border.' The attacks took place, according to Gates, 'with Casey's encouragement.' " Cordovez and Harrison agree that Casey "urged Pakistani intelligence officials to carry the war into the Soviet Central Asian republics by smuggling written propaganda across the Oxus and conducting sabotage operations. . . . Casey's quiet encouragement emboldened the ISI to keep up the Central Asian operations throughout most of the war." Earlier, Casey had already discussed the proposal with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, which had its own Islamist operations in the trans-Caspian area. But Casey, Zia, and King Fahd may all have been encouraged in this program by Alexandre de Marenches, who from the 1970s had been seeking ways, beginning with Islamic broadcasts, to detach the Muslim areas of Central Asia from the Soviet Union.

This state decision did far more than bin Laden's ideological speeches to enhance the autonomous development of an Islamist foreign legion, whose scope of operations, as well as its membership, became international. As Pakistani observer Ahmed Rashid has noted: "In 1986 the secret services of the United States, Great Britain, and Pakistan agreed on a plan to launch guerrilla attacks into Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Afghan Mujahedeen units crossed the Amu Darya River in March 1987 and launched rocket attacks against villages in Tajikistan. Meanwhile, hundreds of Uzbek and Tajik Muslims clandestinely traveled to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to study in madrassahs or to train as guerrilla fighters so that they could join the Mujahedeen. This was part of a wider U.S., Pakistani, and Saudi plan to recruit radical Muslims from around the world to fight with the Afghans. Between 1981 and 1992 thirty-five thousand Muslim radicals from forty-three Islamic countries fought for the Mujahedeen."

"Thus it was," according to Pakistani brigadier Mohammed Yousaf, "the U.S. that put in train a major escalation of the war which, over the next three years, culminated in numerous cross-border raids and sabotage missions" north of the Amu Darya. Rashid has written that the task "was given to the ISI's favorite Mujaheddin leader Gulbuddin Hikmetyar," who by this time was already supplementing his CIA and Saudi income with the proceeds of his heroin labs "in the Koh-i-Sultan area [of Pakistan], where the ISI was in total control." But former CIA officer Robert Baer gives credence to the Russian belief that jihadis north of the Amu Darya "were under the command of Rasool Sayyaf . . ., bin Laden's Afghani protector," and Sayyaf's backer, the Saudi IIRO (International Islamic Relief Organization).

My impression is that both Hekmatyar and Sayyaf were central to the Trans-Oxus campaign, and that this (along with their Saudi and ISI backing) helps explain why the two leaders were the largest recipients of funds. At the same time, CIA was also helping the ISI, the IIRO, and Saudi Arabia distribute throughout the Soviet Union thousands of CIA-printed Korans that had been translated into Uzbek in the United States, an important contribution to the spread of Islamism in Central Asia today.

Casey's Central Asian initiative of 1984 was made at a time when right-wing oil interests in Texas already had their eyes on Caspian basin oil. Casey's cross-border guerrillas were recruited at first from ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks, but Hekmatyar "gathered around him the most radical, anti-Western, transnational Islamists fighting in the jihad—including bin Laden and other Arabs who arrived as
volunteers." Some of Hekmatyar's cadres evolved in time into the heroin-financed Islamist groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, who became the scourge of Central Asia in the 1990s. Others were recruited by bin Laden directly into al Qaeda.

In retrospect, no one should have been surprised at this outcome. Of all the mujahideen leaders, Hekmatyar and Sayyaf were the ultra-Islamists with the least following inside Afghanistan itself. A detribalized Kharufi from the northern Pashtun pocket of Kunduz, Hekmatyar lacked tribal backing and was thus the most amenable to ISI influence. By nearly all accounts he was also the principal drug trafficker and perhaps the only leader who was dealing not only in opium but heroin. I suspect that Casey, like Brzezinski before him, went along with the anti-Western Hekmatyar because he was attracted by the capacity of Hekmatyar's networks to disrupt the Soviet Union. The fact that these were heroin networks did not dissuade Casey, but would have been in keeping with CIA practice.

The Fifth Miscalculation: Prolonging the Conflict to Destroy Gorbachev

Selig Harrison has written how, as a result of the November 1985 summit between U.S. president Ronald Reagan and Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, both Reagan and secretary of state George Shultz showed a new interest in negotiating an Afghan settlement with Gorbachev. The following month, a State Department spokesman expressed a new U.S. willingness to accept and guarantee a UN-negotiated agreement, which would require the United States and Pakistan to cut off aid when the Soviets withdrew.

Almost immediately this new position was attacked by "bleeders" in the Pentagon and the National Security Council, who saw the Afghan war as a means to weaken and embarrass Gorbachev. In addition, members of a Pentagon faction, led by undersecretary Fred Ikle, were anxious to win in Afghanistan by deploying anti-aircraft Stingers to the mujahideen. Even in the late 1980s "the 'bleeders' fought against the Geneva Accords until the very end." For the details of this prolonged fight between Washington's so-called dealers and bleeders, I refer readers to the important book Out of Afghanistan by Cordovez and Harrison. As late as 1998, Brzezinski defended this strategy. Today we have to ask which opponent it would be better for America to deal with: Mikhail Gorbachev or Osama bin Laden and his allies? What was it that the bleeders feared most? A militant and threatening Soviet Union? Or a reformed and peaceful Soviet Union committed to coexistence—and thus constituting a threat to Pentagon and CIA budgets. Whatever the motive, the Ikle faction had succeeded by February 1986 in trumping the negotiations approach with a new and controversial policy decision: to supply the Stingers.

The signing of the Geneva Accords and withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1988 would, in retrospect, have been a good moment to terminate CIA support for the rebels. We can now recognize, in the words of journalist James Bamford, "how much better off the United States would have been had the CIA stopped with the ouster of the Soviet military and simply left [their premier] Muhammad Najibullah in office."

As Ahmed Rashid predicted accurately in 1990: "If Afghanistan fragments into warlordism, the West can expect a flood of cheap heroin that will be impossible to stop. . . . Afghanistan's President Najibullah has skillfully played on Western fears of a drugs epidemic by repeatedly offering cooperation with the DEA and other anti-narcotic agencies, but the West, which still insists on his downfall, has refused. If President [George Herbert] Bush and Margaret Thatcher continue to reject a peace process, they must prepare for an invasion of Afghan-grown heroin in Washington and London."

Within a decade Afghanistan had become by far the world's leading heroin producer. Instead the United States continued its program of support to the mujahideen. The CIA's campaign in 1991 included the shipping of T-55 and T-70 tanks captured in Iraq to Gardez, the stronghold of Haqqani, Hekmatyar, and the Arab Afghans. But by early 1991, U.S. efforts had declined into interagency sector intrigue. Both "the State department and the CIA . . . sought a change of government in Kabul, but they had different clients. [State] channeled guns and money to the new rebel commanders' shura [from which Hekmatyar had been excluded] . . . and they emphasized the importance of [Ahmed Shah] Massoud. . . . The CIA . . . continued to collaborate with Pakistani intelligence on a separate military track that mainly promoted Hekmatyar."


This was after State Department officer Edmund McWilliams had reported that "Hekmatyar—backed by officers in ISI's Afghan bureau, operatives from the Muslim Brotherhood's Jamaat-e-Islami, officers from Saudi intelligence, and Arab volunteers from a dozen countries—was moving systematically to wipe out his rivals in the Afghan resistance." The CIA persisted, even having received reports that ISI's new plan for Hekmatyar, which involved the Arab Afghans of al Qaeda, was receiving millions of dollars in support from Osama bin Laden. Once again, covert power was overriding public policy.

**Secrecy, Folly, and Vested Interests In Afghanistan: The Stingers**

Another tragic mistake was the decision in 1986 to equip the mujahideen in Afghanistan with Stinger missiles to bring down Soviet aircraft. The folly of this decision, increasingly recognized in retrospect, serves as a case study of how covert power corrupts when the pressures of special interests thrive and there is no alerted public opinion to correct them. First I must contest the widespread impression that it was the introduction of Stingers into the Afghan war in September 1986 that led to the Soviet defeat and withdrawal. Declassified Kremlin documents give no indication that this was a factor in Gorbachev's and the Politburo's decision two months later to adopt a withdrawal deadline. "At the key November 1986 Politburo meeting," wrote foreign affairs specialist Alan J. Kuperman, "no mention was made of the Stinger nor any other U.S. escalation." The continuance of the Stinger policy was also a symptom of the reckless and unhealthy relationship that had built up between CIA and the ISI. From the outset it was an open secret to those in the know that the ISI was not forwarding the bulk of the U.S.-supplied arms, including the Stingers, to the mujahideen in Afghanistan. Rather, the ISI was keeping the lion's share for itself. As early as January 1987, Andrew Eiva, director of the Federation for American-Afghanistan Action, complained publicly that in fact only eleven of the promised forty Oerlikon weapons had reached the mujahideen, prompting speculation at the time that the funds were being diverted for other purposes.

The concern of congressmen that Stingers might be diverted "proved to be justified when a resistance commander sold sixteen Stingers to Iran in 1987. One of the missiles narrowly missed a U.S. helicopter in the Persian Gulf on October 8, 1987, prompting U.S. insistence on tightened procedures for distribution of Stingers to resistance units." In 1990 foreign correspondent Christina Lamb wrote a series of articles in which she accused the ISI of selling off Stingers that had been allocated to the mujahideen. In the following years, Stingers turned up in connection with a number of covert Islamist projects, including Osama bin Laden's.

Why did CIA tolerate ISI's abuse of the program? Partly because it is a general characteristic of CIA, like other intelligence agencies, to put the preservation of structural relationships ahead of promoting particular national policies. (This is probably less a conscious doctrine than the result of a promotional system that rewards individuals for the number of assets they recruit.) Furthermore, intelligence agencies tend to share covert assets, like the BCCI bank; and the milieu of these connections becomes independent of the policy decisions to establish contact in the first place. Thus CIA would have been unlikely to break completely with the ISI, or any other unsavory agency, even if ordered to do so.

**The CIA, The ISI, and Al Qaeda**

There is evidence that elements of the U.S. government continued, even after 1990, to collaborate with elements of the ISI in support of mutual goals, including conflicting goals. Many observers, for example, are convinced that the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan had not only the active support of ISI elements, but the benign approval of the United States (which saw the Taliban as the best hope for a united Afghanistan through which oil and gas pipelines could be built). In 1997 the Wall Street Journal declared: "The Taliban are the players most capable of achieving peace. Moreover, they are crucial to secure the country as a prime transshipment route for the export of Central Asia's vast oil, gas and other natural resources."
It also seems quite clear that Western intelligence (at least British) found al Qaeda itself to be a useful ally against a common enemy—the secular dictator Muammar Gadhafi of Libya. As the French authors Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquie have pointed out, Gadhafi's Libya in 1998 asked Interpol to issue an arrest warrant for Osama bin Laden. They argue that bin Laden and al Qaeda elements were collaborating with the British MI5 in an anti-Gadhafi assassination plot.\(^90\)

As I detail in the next chapters, jihadi Muslims connected to al Qaeda continued to be used for Western causes throughout the 1990s. In the months before the 1993 coup by strongman Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan, allegedly paid for in part by Western oil companies, hundreds of jihadists were recruited in Afghanistan by Hekmatyar and shipped to Azerbaijan on an airline set up by CIA veteran Ed Dearborn.\(^91\) Jihadiis also took part in two Balkan campaigns in the 1990s, on the same side as the United States and NATO. In Bosnia in the mid-1990s NATO and al Qaeda were on the same side, although it is not clear how closely they collaborated directly with each other.

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or UCK), directly supported and politically empowered by NATO in 1998, had in the same year been listed by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist organization supported in part by the heroin traffic as well as loans from Islamic individuals, among them allegedly Osama bin Laden.\(^92\) The closeness of the KLA to al Qaeda was acknowledged in the western press after Afghan-connected KLA guerrillas proceeded in 2001 to conduct guerrilla warfare in Macedonia. Press accounts included an Interpol report alleging that one of bin Laden's senior lieutenants, Muhammed al-Zawahiri, was the commander of an elite KLA unit operating in Kosovo in 1999.\(^93\) Al-Zawahiri later supplied the guerrillas in Macedonia, along with Ramush Haradinaj, a former KLA commander. Haradinaj, today an indicted war criminal, was the key U.S. military and intelligence asset in Kosovo during the civil war and the NATO bombing campaign that followed.\(^94\) The London \textit{Sunday Times} reported that "American intelligence agents have admitted they helped to train the Kosovo Liberation Army before NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia."\(^95\)

Thus there have been at least two decades of collaboration by the United States and CIA with Islamist elements who made no secret of their hostility toward America. It is striking that this collaboration continued even after bin Laden in 1996 issued the first of his fatwas declaring the United States to be an enemy. It came long after the identification of the 1993 World Trade Center bombers Ramzi Yousef and Mahmud Abouhalima, who had trained in Afghanistan.\(^96\)

To repeat: The story of CIA’s involvement shows how its covert powers are governed by secret decision-making processes that are far too restricted to cope wisely with today's complex world. It is these powers, rather than the individuals who compose CIA, that are the source of the problem. CIA officers opposed the decision, backed by Casey against his advisers, to send Islamist terrorists across the Amu Darya to conduct raids in the Soviet Union.\(^97\) And CIA officers voiced concern about the decision to equip the mujahideen in Afghanistan with Stinger missiles.\(^98\)

Journalist George Crile has written that the Democratic congressman Charlie Wilson was almost single-handedly responsible for converting the CIA Afghan operation from assisted harassment into a full-fledged anti-Soviet offensive war. His book, \textit{Charlie Wilson's War}, is an object lesson in how inadequate analysis and understanding of the CIA secrecy problem can lead to bad politics. Inspired by Arthur Schlesinger's anti-Nixon book, \textit{The Imperial Presidency}, the reforms of the Church Committee subjected CIA to increased congressional review and control through such devices as beefed-up intelligence committees in both houses. The intention was to restrain CIA through an enlarged network of checks and balances.

As the corrupting environment of secrecy was not challenged, however, the result of these reforms was just the opposite: a door opened still wider for unrestrained boondoggle. Backed by lobbyists for the defense industries, Israel, and Egypt, Wilson was able to force on CIA hundreds of millions of dollars in weapons programs it had not asked for. From his position in the House Intelligence Committee, Wilson even put an extra $200 million into the CIA's Afghan pipeline in 1991, after the Russians had withdrawn from Afghanistan. This was against the unanimous agreement of the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, Secretary of State Baker, and the Bush White House that it was time to cut off aid altogether.\(^99\)
Pakistan, Al Qaeda, And 9/11: Was Pakistan's ISI Involved In 9/11?

In October 2001, shortly after the catastrophic events of 9/11, U.S. and British newspapers briefly alleged that the paymaster for the 9/11 attacks was a possible agent of the Pakistani intelligence service ISI, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh (or Sheikh Syed). There was even a brief period in which it was alleged that the money had been paid at the direction of the then ISI chief, Lieutenant-General Mahmoud Ahmad.

The London Guardian reported on October 1, 2001, that "U.S. investigators believe they have found the 'smoking gun' linking Osama bin Laden to the September 11 terrorist attacks... . The man at the centre of the financial web is believed to be Sheikh Saeed, also known as Mustafa Mohamed Ahmad, who worked as a financial manager for Bin Laden when the Saudi exile was based in Sudan, and is still a trusted paymaster in Bin Laden's al-Qaida organization."101 This story was corroborated by CNN on October 6, citing a "senior-level U.S. government source" who noted that "Sheik Syed" had been liberated from an Indian prison as a result of an airplane hijacking in December 1999.

The man liberated in this way was Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, a notorious kidnapper raised in England and widely reported as a probable agent of the ISI.102 One newspaper, the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, suggested he may have been a double agent, recruited inside al Qaeda and the ISI by CIA.103 Others have since argued that Saeed Sheikh worked for both the United States and Britain, since "both American and British governments have studiously avoided taking any action against Sheikh despite the fact that he is a known terrorist who has targeted U.S. and UK citizens."104

Subsequent newspaper stories reported on the undoubted relationship of Saeed Sheikh to the ISI, to FBI claims that he wired $100,000 to 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta's bank account,105 to a CNN report that these funds came from Pakistan,106 and to the uncontested statement that (as later stated in the indictment of the so-called twentieth hijacker Zacarias Moussaoui) "on September 11, 2001, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi left the U.A.E. for Pakistan."107

The most sensational charge, alluded to earlier, came from Indian intelligence sources: that Saeed Sheikh had wired the money to Atta at the direction of Lieutenant-General Mahmoud Ahmad, then director of the ISI.108

All these important and alarming charges are ignored in the 9/11 Commission Report, in which the Saeed Sheikh born in London is not mentioned.109 Instead, the report assured its readers in a carefully drafted comment that "we have seen no evidence that any foreign government—or foreign government official—supplied any funding."110 It was later reported, however, that "the Pakistan foreign office had paid tens of thousands of dollars to lobbyists in the U.S. to get anti-Pakistan references dropped from the 9/11 inquiry commission report."111

The U.S. government and the mainstream media's decisions to drop the Saeed Sheikh story in October 2001 were clearly political. On September 20, 2001, President Bush delivered his memorable ultimatum to "every nation, in every region. . . . Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." There was probably no leader for which the choice was more difficult, or the outcome more unpredictable, than General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan. But on October 7, Musharraf fired his pro-Taliban ISI chief, General Mahmoud Ahmad, along with two other ISI leaders.112 As the historian John Newman, a former U.S. Army Intelligence analyst, has commented: "The stakes in Pakistan were very high. As Anthony Zinni explained to CBS on 60 Minutes, 'Musharraf may be America's last hope in Pakistan, and if he fails the fundamentalists will get hold of the Islamic bomb.' Musharraf was also vital to the war effort, and was the key to neutralizing Islamists and rounding up Al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan."113

A number of books, in reporting the Saeed Sheikh story, have focused on the fact that General Ahmad was in Washington on 9/11, meeting with such senior U.S. officials as CIA director George Tenet.114 In my opinion the mystery of 9/11 must be unraveled at a deeper level, the ongoing groups inside and outside governments, in both Pakistan and America, which have continued to use groups like al Qaeda and individuals like Ahmad, for their own policy purposes. I examine these ongoing relationships further in the chapters that follow. They are far too complex to be reduced to two or three individuals. The ongoing collaboration of the ISI and CIA in promoting terrorist violence has created a complex conspiratorial milieu, in which governments now have a huge stake in preventing the
emergence of the truth. That U.S. and British intelligence may have had an agent—Saeed Sheikh—at a high level in al Qaeda was only one indication of that milieu; Ali Mohamed was another.

**Pakistan, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and America**

The events of 9/11 set the United States at war with its former proteges, both in the Taliban and in al Qaeda. In the months after the September attacks, the United States launched bombs and missiles in futile efforts to assassinate two top al Qaeda allies: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, once the main recipient of CIA weaponry, and his disciple Jalaluddin Haqqani, now no longer "the CIA's favorite commander" but the Taliban military chief and the third U.S. target after Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar of the Taliban.115

Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh has claimed that in November 2001, as the Taliban defenses at Kunduz were crumbling, Pakistan evacuated its fighters "in a series of night time airlifts that were approved by the Bush Administration" and that "an unknown number of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters managed to join in the exodus." According to Indian intelligence, these al Qaeda fighters included Uzbek, Arab, and Chechen jihadi militants, some of whom probably became active in Kashmir.116 According to Hersh, "Some C.I.A. analysts believe that bin Laden eluded American capture inside Afghanistan with help from elements of the Pakistani intelligence service."117

Immediately thereafter the world's largest concentration of active international jihadi militants was probably in or near Kashmir. In June 2002., Pakistani national police sources estimated "that some 10,000 Afghan Taliban cadres and followers and about 5,000 al Qaida fighters" were hiding in Pakistan, "with the full support of intelligence authorities, as well as religious and tribal groups," according to one source.118 This claim would corroborate that of Yossef Bodansky, director of the U.S. Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare: "The ISI actively assists bin Laden in the expansion of an Islamist infrastructure in India."119 Others have alleged ISI collaboration with al Qaeda in financing and arming the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Central Asia, supported also by the drug traffic.120

Also pertinent are the reports that journalist Daniel Pearl's researches in Pakistan "may have strayed into areas involving Pakistan's secret intelligence organizations."121 One of his lead contacts was Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, the suspected paymaster of the 9/11 bombings.122 Another was "Khalid Khawaja, a Muslim militant and a onetime agent with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) who counts among his very best friends Osama bin Laden."123 Former CIA officer Robert Baer has claimed that he had been collaborating with Pearl in the ill-fated Pakistan investigation and that the true target had not been the eccentric shoe-bomber Richard Reid but Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, "one of the masterminds" of 9/11 and (until his seizure in 2003) "the operational chief of al Qaida."124

I am surprised that so few journalists have noted how well 9/11 and its consequences have served the purposes of Islamist extremists in the ISI. The ISI owes its strength in Pakistan chiefly to past inputs of U.S. support. The current crisis has cast Musharraf anew in the role of Zia before him. Pakistani debts and nuclear weapons development are alike forgiven. The U.S. arms pipeline is reopened. ISI's extracurricular activities are again given a boost by a new wave of needed heroin from Afghanistan. That Musharraf has been forced, albeit reluctantly, to play a role as a U.S. ally is just what Islamists like ex-ISI chief General Hamid Gul desire: to polarize the country and mobilize Islamists more militantly against the infidel status quo. According to some reports, they were initially successful. As the Guardian reported in 2002: "All the evidence suggests Pakistan's many-headed terrorism and security problems are if anything worsening as the religious parties agitate, assassination plots brew, and public opinion, according to one poll, swings against extradition of terror suspects to the U.S."125

It is not paradoxical that the ISI could have contributed to the demise of its own creation, the Taliban. The Taliban government in Afghanistan had become, from a Pakistani perspective, a disaster. What had been intended to end conflict and the refugee problem, stabilize government, and provide strategic depth to Pakistan in its struggle against India had by 2001 failed in every way. The secularists in the ISI found their country being drawn into conflict with the governments they had
hoped to trade with, while India and its allies were increasingly influential with the Northern Alliance. From the Islamist perspective the cadres of militants who had been trained for guerrilla war in the Central Asian Republics were instead being expended in bloody pitched support battles for which they were ill-suited and that had no prospect of ending soon. As the *Washington Times* observed on June 17, 2002: "For Pakistani extremists, the loss of Afghanistan was no more than the destruction of an outpost in a global battlefield. Pakistan has now taken Afghanistan's place. Al Qaida's underground in Pakistan emerged unscathed from Operation Enduring Freedom across the 1,300-mile border."126

From afar it is easy to see the lasting damage that CIA and ISI schemes have done to the causes of political and religious moderation, not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan. No external enemy has done as much to weaken and threaten the values that should join this region to the rest of the democratic world. We in America need now to turn our gaze toward our own country. We should not be surprised that CIA's special powers, having done so much to impose brutes, criminals, and terrorists on other parts of the world, have weakened the cause of decency and democracy at home as well.

The erosions of American civil liberties since 9/11 cannot be just blamed on the Bush administration. They are the outcome of a tension, between the public state and covert notions of security, that has been deforming U.S. politics since the special powers assumed at the outset of the Cold War. Many civilians thought that the disaster of U.S. intervention in Vietnam had resolved this crisis and resulted in reforms that would restore constitutional priorities. But the other camp, the proponents of the deep state who agreed with Oliver North that the Vietnam War was lost in Washington, were waiting all along to neutralize those reforms.

9/11 was a victorious moment for the proponents of the deep state. And prominent in this camp, for at least two decades, have been Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld.
Glossary of Open Politics

archival history A chronological record of events, as reconstructed by archival historians from public records; as opposed to deep history, which is a chronology of events concerning which the public records are often either falsified or nonexistent.

cabal A network, often of cliques, operating within or across a broad social and bureaucratic base with an agenda not widely known or shared. According to many dictionary definitions, a cabal is a group of persons secretly united to bring about a change or overthrow of government. But in the deep state cabals can also operate within the status quo to sustain top-down rule, including interventions from the overworld.

clique A small group of like-minded people, operating independently within a larger social organization. Before the Iraq War the neocons in the Bush administration represented a clique; the faction preparing secretly for war (which included both neocons and veterans of the international petroleum industry, like Dick Cheney and Condoleezza Rice) represented a larger and more widespread cabal.

closed power, or top-down power Power derived from the overworld, as opposed to democratically responsive open power. See power.

continuity of government (COG) A term of art for secret arrangements for command and control in the event of an emergency.

depth history See archival history.

depth politics All those political practices and arrangements, deliberate or not, that are usually repressed in public discourse rather than acknowledged.

depth state A term from Turkey, where it is used to refer to a closed network said to be more powerful than the public state. The depth state engages in false-flag violence, is organized by the military and intelligence apparatus, and involves their links to organized crime. See also dual state and state.

dual power See power.

dual state A state in which one can distinguish between a public state and a top-down deep state. Most developed states exhibit this duality, but to varying degrees. In America the duality of the state has become more and more acute since World War II.

globalization The trend toward a more unified world at two levels: (1) top-down globalization, a system imposed from above on peoples and cultures; and (2) bottom-up globalization, a geographic expansion of people-to-people contacts producing a more international civil society and community. Top-down globalization, if not balanced by bottom-up globalization, will result in increasing polarization.

Islamism A political Muslim movement with origins in the late nineteenth century, dedicated to jihad, or struggle for the political unification and purification of Islam, and restoration of its lost territories such as Spain. Often called Islamic fundamentalism but its relation to the fundamentals of Islam is problematic. Its main sources are Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and Deobandism in the Indian subcontinent.
**meta-group** A private group collaborating with and capable of modifying governmental policy, particularly (but not exclusively) with respect to the international drug traffic. Over time meta-groups have tended to become more powerful, more highly organized, and more independent of their government connections.

**milieu** A location (not necessarily geographical) where private deals can be made. Relatively unimportant to proceedings and institutions of the public state, restricted milieus are of greater relevance to operations of the deep state.

**open, public, cooperative, or participatory power.** See power, soft power.

**order** There are two clusters of dictionary definitions of order, both relevant: (1) top-down or coercive order, meaning "a command or direction" (or their results); and (2) public or participatory order, meaning "a condition of arrangement among component parts, such that proper functioning or appearance is achieved."

**overworld** That realm of wealthy or privileged society that, although not formally authorized or institutionalized, is the scene of successful influence of government by private power. It includes both (1) those whose influence is through their wealth, administered personally or more typically through tax-free foundations and their sponsored projects, and (2) the first group's representatives. The term should be distinguished from Frederick Lundberg's "superrich," the sixty wealthiest families that he wrongly predicted in his 1967 book Sixty Families would continue to dominate America both as a class and as a "government of money." The recent Forbes annual lists of the four hundred richest Americans show that Lundberg's prediction was wrong on both counts: his richest inheritors of 1967 are mostly not the richest today, and today's richest are not necessarily those projecting their wealth into political power. The overworld is not a class but a category.

As a rule it is wrong to think of overworld influence institutionally, as exercised through the Bilderberg Society, the Trilateral Commission, or the Council on Foreign Relations. However, there are less known, usually secret, cabals (such as the Pinay Circle and the Safari Club) that flourish in these overworld milieus.

**parallel government** (or shadow government) A second government established in times of crisis to override or even replace the official government of the public state.

**paranoia** The irrational drive toward dominance that is motivated not by rational self-interest but by fear of being surpassed by a competitor. A paradox of civilization is that, as relative power increases (along with expansion and exposure), so does paranoia. The dominance over the public state by the deep state is based on (and also generates) paranoia. The paradox that power increases paranoia is seen within states as well as between them. It is not restricted to so-called totalitarian states.

**paranoia, bureaucratic** The dominance of bureaucratic policy planning by worst-case scenarios, calling for maximized bureaucratic responses and budgets. This leads to the paranoid style in bureaucratic politics.

**parapolitics** This term has two definitions: (1) "a system or practice of politics in which accountability is consciously diminished,"¹ and (2) the intellectual study of parapolitical interactions between public states and other forms of organized violence (or parastates): covert agencies, mafias, and so on.²

**parastates** Structurally organized violence (in the form of covert agencies, mafias, revolutionary movements, and so on) with some but not all of the recognizable features of a state.
There are two definitions of power, both relevant: (1) top-down, coercive, or closed power, meaning "the ability or official capacity to exercise control; authority"; and (2) public, cooperative, or open power, meaning "the might of a nation, political organization, or similar group." This notion of dual power is reflected in Gandhi's distinction between duragraha (coercive force, "obtained by the fear of punishment") and satyagraha (obtained "by acts of love").

Jonathan Schell paraphrases this as the distinction between coercive and cooperative power: "Power is cooperative when it springs from action in concert of people who willingly agree with one another and is coercive when it springs from the threat or use of force. Both kinds of power are real... Yet the two are antithetical." This antithesis is embodied in the tension in the dual state between the deep state and the public state. The tension between top-down and public power exists to some degree in all developed states. It becomes more acute with increased income disparity: polarization of wealth or economic power is inevitably accompanied by polarization of political power.

prevailable will of the people That potential for solidarity that, instead of being checked by top-down repression, can actually be awakened and reinforced by it. It thus becomes the emerging sanction for a generally accepted social or political change. The more common term "will of the people," a refurbishing of Rousseau's "general will," is often invoked as the ultimate sanction of a generally accepted decision. However, even if not a total abstraction, the term has little or no meaning at the time of a major controversy; the "public will" must be established by events, not passively divined in advance of them. The "will of the majority" is an even more dangerous phrase; the opinions of majorities are often superficial and fickle, and destined not to prevail. (The Vietnam and Iraq wars are examples where the momentary will of the majority proved not to be the prevailable will.) The prevailable will can be said to be latent in a political crisis but not established or proven until its outcome. In the case of abolishing slavery in America, for example, the resolution took many decades, but it is hard to imagine any other prevailable outcome.

realism There are two prevailing and conflicting notions of political realism: (1) realpolitlk, defined as "a usually expansionist national policy, having as its sole principle the advancement of the national interest"; and (2) what I call visionary realism, a vision of a public order conforming to the prevailable will of the people. I consider the latter more realistic than the former, because it can see more clearly the dialectical consequences of expansion and overstretch.

second-level strategy A strategy of first strengthening civil society as a condition for social change.

security state See state.

soft power versus open power Soft power, as defined by Joseph Nye, works (in distinction to military and economic superiority) by persuasion; it is an "ability ... that shapes the preferences of others" that "tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as an attractive culture, ideology, and institutions." Soft power or soft politics puts more emphasis on a persuasive technique; open power or open politics, on a participatory process or result.

state There are two definitions, both relevant, both deriving ultimately from Machiavelli. What is being discussed here are dictionary definitions, which I culled and combined from a number of dictionaries: (1) a system of organized power controlling a society; and (2) a politically organized body of people under a single government. These correspond to two overlapping systems of state institutions: the deep state (or security state) and the public state. The second interacts with and is responsive to civil society, especially in a democracy; the first is immune to shifts in public opinion.

Thus the deep state is expanded by covert operations; the public state is reduced by them. Following the same distinction as Hans Morgenthau in his discussion of the dual state, Ola Tunander talks of a "democratic state" and a "security state." His definitions focus more on the respective
institutions of the dual state; mine, on their social grounding and relationship to the power of the overworld.

Deep state and security state are not quite identical. By the deep state I mean agencies like CIA, with little or no significant public constituency outside government. By the security state I mean above all the military, an organization large enough to have a limited constituency and even in certain regions to constitute an element of local civil society. The two respond to different segments of the overworld and thus sometimes compete with each other.
Endnotes

Chapter 1. Introduction: Wealth, Empire, Cabals, and the Public State

6. Phillips, *American Theocracy*, 268. Phillips quotes from the British journalist Eamonn Fingleton, who deplores "financialism" as "the increasing tendency by the financial sector to invent gratuitous work for itself that does nothing to address society’s real needs but simply creates jobs for financial professionals." Time-Warner president Richard Parsons is quoted in the *New Yorker* as saying: "We don’t make things any more in this country. Look at the derivatives business. It’s just people trading money and taking a piece for their effort" (Ken Auletta, "The Raid: How Carl Icahn Came Up Short," *New Yorker*, March 20, 2006, 134).
9. By "overworld" I mean the milieu of both (1) those who exert influence through their wealth, administered personally or more typically through tax-free foundations and their sponsored projects, and (2) the representatives of this group. The term should be distinguished from popular historian Frederick Lundberg's "superrich," the sixty wealthiest families that he wrongly predicted would continue to dominate America both as a class and as a "government of money" (Frederick Lundberg, *Sixty Families* [New York: Vanguard, 1937]). The recent *Forbes* annual list of the four hundred richest Americans shows that Lundberg's prediction was wrong on both counts: his richest inheritors of 1937 are mostly not the richest today, and today's richest are not necessarily projecting their wealth into political power. The overworld today is less a class than a category and a milieu. Especially since the Civil War, the northern U.S. establishment has continuously been opposed by an antiestablishment overworld, rooted in the South and associated not just with wealth but also with land ownership and the military.
10. The two terms overlap but are not quite identical. By the "deep state," I mean primarily agencies like CIA, with little or no significant constituency outside of government. By the "security state," I mean more specifically the deep state’s resources in the military, an organization large enough to have a limited constituency, and even in certain regions to constitute an element of local civil society. The two milieus respond to different segments of the overworld and thus sometimes compete with each other.
11. There are two relevant definitions of the "state," both deriving from the Italian political philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli: (1) a system of organized power controlling a society; and (2) a politically organized body of people under a single government. These correspond to two overlapping systems of state institutions. The first I call the "deep state"; the second, the "public state."
12. For more on the Endgame program, see chapter 14 in this book.
13. In this book I focus on the American responsibility for al Qaeda and related phenomena. Other governments and their intelligence agencies, notably Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, also played an important role. Undoubtedly a major cause of Islamism in the world today is the rise of Wahhabism around the world as a result of direct Saudi subventions of overseas mosques (originally with the approval and support of CIA and U.S. oil companies). But the narrative in this book focuses on processes that Americans can most easily do something about.


21. This is the story richly documented in Phillips, Democracy and Wealth, a book that should be read in every American college and university.

22. The paradox that power increases paranoia is seen within states as well as among them. It is not restricted to so-called totalitarian states. Even in the relatively open and peaceful country Thailand, for example, we saw Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's increase in power produce both increased opposition and increased paranoid fear of opposition. This tension led in 2006 to a royally backed military coup.

23. The role of secrecy in Athens was not marked, apart from the treacherous machinations of Alcibiades with Sparta. For the role in the Roman empire of agentes in rebus, government agents whose duties ranged from postal inspection and tax collection to espionage and secret police work, see J. S. Reid, "Reorganization of the Empire," in Cambridge Medieval History, edited by H. M. Gwatkin and Rev. J. P. Whitney (New York: Macmillan Company, 1911), vol. 1, 36-38; also see Peter Dale Scott, "Deep Politics: Some Further Thoughts," http://roswell.fortunecity.com/angelic/96/pdscot~1.html.

24. In Porter, Perils of Dominance, 4: "In 1955, the index of U.S. military power was forty times greater than the index of Soviet power, and a decade later . . . still more than nine times greater. . . . This disparity . . .was far greater than any other disparity ... since the modern state system came into existence in the seventeenth century."


32. Draper, Very Thin Line, 578, 579.


35. See especially chapter 2 in this book for details relating to Pakistan, chapter 5 for Iran, and chapter 7 for Afghanistan.

36. Perhaps the most visible example, not analyzed in this book, is the Federal Reserve Board, whose governors represent both the public state and the private banking community. The Fed is in many ways a symbol for the convergence between private and public power in other aspects of the American polity.

37. CNN Special Assignment, "Investigative Report into the National Program Office (NPO) and the Continuity of Government (COG)," November 17, 1991.

38. Simpson, Blowback, 42-43. The other two men, Generals Walter Bedell Smith and Edwin Sibert, had risen through the ranks to become senior army officers.


41. Hersh, *Old Boys*, 172. Journalist Joseph Trento transmits the rumor in Washington that at the time Duties "was now running a private intelligence service out of an office at 44 Wall Street, using some of the biggest names in American business" (Trento, *Prelude to Terror*, 1). I have not found documentation for this claim, however. The closest might be Dulles's overseas work in 1949 as legal adviser to Overseas Consultants, Inc., whose "most promising venture was the design of a long-range development program [for] Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, shah of Iran" (Grose, *Gentleman Spy*, 195).

42. Helms with Hood, *Look over My Shoulder*, 83. The following anecdote (in Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper*, 141) illustrates Dulles's easy relationships within the overworld: "On 21 January 1953, Allen Dulles, insecure about his future in the CIA under the newly elected Eisenhower, had met his friend David Rockefeller for lunch. Rockefeller hinted heavily that if Dulles decided to leave the Agency, he could reasonably expect to be invited to become president of the Ford Foundation. Dulles need not have feared for his future. Two days after this lunch, the *New York Times* broke the story that Allen Dulles was to become Director of Central Intelligence."

43. Helms with Hood, *Look over My Shoulder*, 81-83; cf. Hersh, *Old Boys*, 185. The six were Kingman Douglass, managing partner of Dillon Read; Robert Lovett of Brown Brothers Harriman; William H. Jackson and Frank Wisner of Carter, Ledyard and Milburn; Paul Nitze of Dillon Read; and former director of Central Intelligence Admiral Sidney Souers, who in 1946 retired to become a St. Louis investment banker.

44. Helms with Hood, *Look over My Shoulder*, 99; Hersh, *Old Boys*, 133. The other two lawyers were William H. Jackson and Mathias Correa.

45. Hersh, *Old Boys*, 133.

46. Scott, *Drugs, Oil, and War*, 187, 200-201. The seven deputy directors included William H. Jackson and Frank Wisner of Carter, Ledyard and Milburn, both of whom were listed in the New York Social Register.


48. David Wise, a veteran intelligence reporter, "Why the Spooks Shouldn't Run Wars," *Time*, February 3, 2003. The 1947 act, which created both the National Security Council and CIA to advise it, also empowered CIA to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence ... as the National Security may from time to time direct" (Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* [New York: Knopf, 1974], 8).

49. NSC 10-2, which authorized OPC, provided it with a secret charter going far beyond the CIA's statutory responsibility for intelligence, including "subversion of hostile states...assistance to underground resistance and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world" (Helms with Hood, *Look over My Shoulder*, 113).


52. Grose, *Gentleman Spy*, 268-69, 292-93 (Kennan), 290-95 (Dulles). Kennan initially launched his doctrine of "containment" in a State Department cable from Moscow, then at a Council on Foreign Relations meeting, and still later, writing as "X," in the CFR journal *Foreign Affairs*.

53. Hersh, *Old Boys*, 215-16. In private practice Dulles was at Sullivan and Cromwell, Wisner at Carter, Ledyard, and Milburn. Both firms represented various Rockefeller and Standard Oil interests. According to Trento (*Secret History of the CIA*, 44-47): "Dulles arranged the job for Wisner, who quickly turned it into an intelligence power base.... By late 1947, Wisner, in an underhanded way, wielded vast power in the State Department bureaucracy. He never asked permission to conduct his operations. Rather, he played a deceptive double game in which he informed either Secretary of State George Marshall or Secretary of Defense James Forrestal that the other secretary had approved his operation. Then he went ahead and carried it out. ... The OPC's employees were largely handpicked by Wisner.... Under the guise of refugee administration, Wisner ran his covert operations. Dulles ran Wisner from his Sullivan and Cromwell law offices." A secret Dulles-Wisner connection at this time through "frequent meetings and phone calls" is acknowledged by Grose (*Gentleman Spy*, 301).

54. The OPC officer overseeing this project in Italy was Carmel Offie (Rowse, "Gladio," 21).

55. Ganser, NATO's *Secret Armies*.


61. See Scott, *Drugs, Oil, and War*. 
62. Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 7, 60-61,198,207; citing Penny Lernoux, In Banks We Trust (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor / Doubleday, 1984), 84.
63. Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War.
65. Fineman, Special Relationship, 179; Brown, Last Hero, 811-15.
67. McCoy, Politics of Heroin, 122; Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 40.
68. McCoy, Politics of Heroin, 16; Emdad-ul Haq, Drugs in South Asia, 187.
70. Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 45-46; Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind, 150-51.
71. In addition, America's own "war on drugs" has had a disastrous impact on the domestic security of ordinary U.S. citizens, devastating both inner cities and affluent suburbs with family tragedies and increased crime rates.
72. McCoy, Politics of Heroin, 178.
75. See Blum, Killing Hope, 64-71; Yergin, Prize, 450-78.
76. Shoup and Minter, Imperial Brain Trust. 196. CFR member Adolf Berle recorded in his diary how the 1954 overthrow in Guatemala was endorsed back in October 1951 at a CFR meeting. He added: "I am arranging to see Nelson Rockefeller, who knows the situation and can work a little with General Eisenhower on it."
77. In contrast, the governments elected with CIA help in France and Italy were able to survive because they were conformable to a prevailing will in those countries. I explore further what I mean by "prevailing will" in chapter 2.
78. This can be compared to the Soviet overreaches in Hungary in 1956 and again in Czechoslovakia in 1968. These attempts to preserve regimes that lacked the support of a prevailing will among their people doomed the chances, which until then had seemed quite possible, of a democratic Communist victory in Western Europe.
83. For example, the largest shareholder in General Dynamics was Henry Crown, said to have invested profits from figures allied with the Chicago mob (Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK, 155). Likewise, no one has ever satisfactorily explained the involvement in the affairs of military-industrial magnate Howard Hughes with both CIA and its sometime asset Robert Maheu, longtime friend of mafia figure John Rosselli (Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, Empire: The Life, Legend, and Madness of Howard Hughes [New York: W. W. Norton, 1979], 281-87).
84. In language not declassified until 1976, this committee concluded: "It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of 'fair play' must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand, and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy" (Church Committee Report, Book 4, 54). As a Canadian Foreign Service officer in the late 1950s, I was able to observe the new ruthlessness in a breed of
foreign policy officials, skilled in affecting and exploiting bureaucratic paranoia, who were less interested in knowing about the world outside the United States than in knowing how to manipulate power both abroad and at home.

85. Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 4, 11, 40.
86. Church Committee Report, Book 1, 192.
88. Church Committee Report, Book 1, 198.
89. Church Committee Report, Book 1, 189-90.
90. More precisely, a powerful antiglobal force of domestic oil independents—such as the Hunts, Murchisons, and Basses in Texas—also became caught up in the increasing search for fossil fuels overseas.
93. "Full-spectrum dominance" is the key term in Joint Vision 2020, the May 2000 U.S. Department of Defense blueprint for the future: "The ultimate goal of our military force is to accomplish the objects directed by the National Command Authorities. For the joint force of the future, this goal will be achieved through full-spectrum dominance—the ability of U.S. forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations" (http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jv2020.doc).
96. Sheila Heslin, testimony before the Senate Hearings into Illegal Fund-Raising Activities, September 17, 1997, reported in Rashid, Taliban, 174.
103. Lapham, "Tentacles of Rage," 34.
104. ABC News, May 2, 2002, quoted in Phillips, American Theocracy, 244-45. Tim LaHaye, founder and first president of the Council for National Policy, was also a member of the executive board of Moral Majority.
107. Parry, Lost History, 5-22.
111. "IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS; North's Testimony," New York Times, July 14, 1987; Gelbspan, Break-ins, Death Threats, and the FBI, 184. Congressman Jack Brooks, who had asked North the question, was
referring to the article by Alfonso Chardy in the Miami Herald on July 5, 1987. It "revealed Oliver North's involvement in plans for the Federal Emergency Management Agency to take over federal, state and local functions during an ill-defined national emergency."

113. Bamford, Pretext for War, 74; cf. Clarke, Against All Enemies, 8-9.
114. Bamford, Pretext for War, 72; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 138.
115. Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 209-13. The 1992 Defense Planning Guidance was redrafted after the document was leaked and raised considerable controversy, particularly for its ambition of discouraging all challenges through unmatched military strength.
116. Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding America's Defenses, 51 (63). That the PNAC report said this does not of course implicate the authors in the planning of 9/11. But it is important as a symptom of a widely accepted truism, that it would take something like a Pearl Harbor to get America to accept an aggressive war. See, for example, Brzezinski, Grand Chessboard, 24-25.

Chapter 4
Brzezinski, Oil, and Afghanistan


1. Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect, 450. These attacks were made "in numerous speeches authored partly by Zbigniew Brzezinski."
2. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, 235.
3. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, 263.
4. By contrast, the CPD provided thirty-three officials of the Reagan administration, including William Casey, Richard Allen, Jeane Kirkpatrick, John Lehman, George Shultz, and Richard Perle. Reagan himself was a member in 1979.
5. Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn, 103.
7. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, 244-45.
asked to help with the project said privately during its early stages that they hoped to create a document that would scare the Carter Administration into greater respect for the Soviet menace."


13. Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 177. Brzezinski argued against those who wished "to consider reducing our forces" by pointing to "the vulnerability of the oil-rich region around the Persian Gulf."

14. From Sanders, *Peddlers of Crisis*, 236: "On December 12, 1979 ... the President, in a speech before the Business Council, committed the nation to an average real increase in defense spending of 5 percent for the next 5 years. In 1976, candidate Carter promised to cut defense spending by $5 to $7 billion."


17. For example, see Memo to President Carter from Zbigniew Brzezinski, December 26, 1979, http://www.eurolegal.org/neococonwars/interafghan.htm: "With Iran destabilized, there will be no firm bulwark in Southwest Asia against the Soviet drive to the Indian Ocean."


24. My personal suspicion is that the trilateralist ideology, with its rhetoric about North-South issues and diminishing poverty in the third world, was at least in part designed to take control of the Democratic Party away from the McGovernites, at the time that Nelson Rockefeller was losing control of the Republican Party to Ronald Reagan. Once Carter was in power, the trilateralist ideology became less and less relevant.


29. For Saudi agreement with the United States to secure denomination in U.S. dollars for OPEC oil sales, see Scott, *Drugs, Oil, and War*, 41-42; Spiro, *Hidden Hand of American Hegemony*, x, 103-12. The agreement proved a long-term solution to the crisis of a dollar weakening so rapidly that there was a threat to the global trading system. From "The Decline of U.S. Power: The New Debate over Guns and Butter," *Business Week*, March 12, 1979: "The dollar's decline proved so rapid in late 1978 that an impending crash of the world's financial system pushed the Federal Reserve on Nov. 1 into raising interest rates to defend the currency. This was perhaps one of the most important events in the recent history of the country: The international position of the dollar suddenly became a burden adversely affecting domestic policy rather than an advantage helping it."


34. The creation of FEMA was authorized by President Carter's Executive Order 12148, dated July 20, 1979, and retroactively made effective July 15. According to critics, Executive Order 12148 became law simply by its publication in the Federal Registry. In other words Congress was bypassed for FEMA's authorization as well as its funding.


in 1979, but the organization was still focused primarily on civil defense, with a secondary mission of natural and man-made disasters starting to emerge. In December, 1980, FEMA published a pamphlet, War Survival Focus, drawn from a speech given by John W. Macy, Jr., the director of FEMA, to the American Civil Defense Association on October 23, 1980. In his speech, Macy said, 'Clearly, the Congress, the administration, and the American public have shown a new consensus in 1980 favoring greater protective measures for the United States’ (3). Macy went on to say, 'An important turning point, again reflecting new congressional support for civil defense, is almost completed action on the hill toward the appropriation of $120 million for civil defense purposes in the current fiscal year 1981’ (5). 'The leadership of the Federal Emergency Management Agency will be moving quickly to deploy an enhanced Civil Defense program providing protection against both peacetime and wartime crises, but focusing especially on counterforce areas’ (5). In an 18 page speech, Macy devotes only one paragraph to FEMA’s natural disaster capabilities, preferring to center his speech around the country’s nuclear, biological, and terrorist threats instead."


38. See especially Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup [his daughter], The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1983); discussion in Dreyfuss, Devil’s Game, 252.

39. Dreyfuss, Devil’s Game, 256.


41. Coll, Ghost Wars, 46.


47. National Security Archive, Interview with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, June 13) 1997; cf. Gates, From the Shadows, 90-96. Although Brzezinski’s primary focus appears to have been Eastern Europe, Gates clarifies that in response to Brzezinski’s initiative CIA had forwarded to the White House special coordinating committee "a covert program targeting Soviet Muslims" (Gates, From the Shadows, 92).

48. Gates, From the Shadows, 91-92. Brzezinski later pointed to the Ukraine as "a geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire" (Brzezinski, Grand Chessboard, 46). Brzezinski, however, fails to mention the Ukraine in his White House memoir, Power and Principle.

49. It is indisputable that the IIRO was distributing Korans in such former Soviet republics as Tajikistan (Baer, Sleeping with the Devil, 144, 141, 140). According to London’s The Tablet (July 3, 2004), "Osama bin Laden first saw action in Afghanistan fighting under Abd al-Rab al-Rasul Sayyaf," whom earlier the Saudis picked to administer the Central Asian Koran project. In the 1990s the IIRO’s Philippines regional director was Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, said to be Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law. Indisputably, Khalifa used IIRO funds to support the terrorist Abu Sayyaf organization, regarded as an affiliate of al Qaeda (Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge, 235).

50. Yousaf and Adkin, Bear Trap, 193; Rashid, Jihad, 223. Arabic Korans came from Saudi Arabia. In addition, "the CIA commissioned an Uzbek exile living in Germany to produce translations of the Koran in the Uzbek language. . . . About five thousand books [crossed] the Soviet border by early 1985" (Coll, Ghost Wars, 104).

51. "The Crisis of Crescent," Time, January 15, 1979. In this book I focus on U.S. complicity in Saudi-financed campaigns to promote Wahhabi fundamentalism throughout the Muslim world. We must however recognize that the primary source for this state-promoted Wahhabism is in Saudi Arabia itself.

52. Texas oilmen, in conjunction with the U.S. Army Intelligence Reserve, had been researching this possibility since the 1960s. Chevron bought into the rich Tengiz oilfield of Kazakhstan in the late 1980s, before the break-up of the Soviet Union (Seymour M. Hersh, "The Price of Oil: What Was Mobil up to in Kazakhstan and Russia?" New Yorker, July 9, 2001, 48-65, http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/mobil.html).

Ghost Wars, Coll writes that in the light of Brzezinski's contemporary memos, "very worried that the Soviets would prevail," "any claim that Brzezinski lured the Soviets into Afghanistan warrants deep skepticism" (Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 581n). I would respond that in his determined drive to reduce Soviet influence in the world, Brzezinski in his memos consistently exaggerated the Soviet menace beyond what saner heads at the time were estimating. We should not assume that he believed what he wrote.

54. Anonymous [Mike Scheuer], *Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2004), 25. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Golden Crescent, which was not part of the American drug picture until 1979, was supplying 60 percent of U.S. heroin by 1980 (in McCoy, *Politics of Heroin*, 472).


56. Carter and Brzezinski initiated the movement to the mujahideen of captured Soviet arms from Egypt, which was renegotiated after Sadat's death by Casey (Persico, *Casey*, 225).

57. Haq identified himself as a Brzezinski contact when in a 1989 interview he had pressured Brzezinski to back the ISI's clients in Afghanistan: "I told Brzezinski you screwed up in Vietnam and Korea; you better get it right this time" (Scott, *Drugs, Oil, and War*, 48, citing Lamb, *Waiting for Allah*, 222).


61. Scott, *Drugs, Oil, and War*, 57, quoting Gates, *From the Shadows*, 144, 146.


63. Scott, *Drugs, Oil, and War*, 46, 49; McCoy, *Politics of Heroin*, 475-78.

64. Brzezinski, for example, writes that "I pushed a decision through the SCC to be more sympathetic to those Afghans who were determined to preserve their country's independence" (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 417). On the same page he writes that "I also consulted with the Saudis and the Egyptians regarding the fighting in Afghanistan." He is silent about the early, decisive, and ill-fated contact with Pakistan.


including 100,000 Army troops, 50,000 Marines, and additional Air Force and Navy personnel" (Lawrence E.

94. Yergin, Power and Principle, 520; Cooley, Unholy Wars, 17.


86. Gaddis, Cold War, 208; cf. Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 35-36.

85. Marsden, Taliban, 24.


83. Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 16.

82. Little, American Orientalism, 223; Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 17, 23-18.


80. Hammbnd, Red Flag over Afghanistan, 49-55. See the assessment by former CIA deputy director for intelligence Douglas MacEachin, "Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Intelligence Community's Record," http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/afghanistan/Link5: "From Washington's perspective, the Soviets' obvious motivation to ... re-establish a more compliant client regime led naturally to suspicions that Moscow had engineered the government takeover. The fact that the USSR was the first state to formally recognize the new government reinforced this view. U.S. embassy officers also had reported seeing Soviet advisors mingling with some of the Afghan military units carrying out the operations. U.S. intelligence assessments, however, said there was no evidence the Soviets had been involved in launching the coup, although Moscow had moved quickly to exploit the situation once it began. The assessments said that the more fervent Soviet ideologues and military officials probably saw the developments as offering an opportunity to create another allied Communist regime on the borders of the USSR." Cf. Sam Vaknin, "Afghan Myths: An Interview with Anssi Kullberg [of Finnish Intelligence]," http://www.usamemorial.org/sept11078.htm. General Vladimir Kruchkov, then deputy head of the KGB, later told CNN: "Brezhnev and the Politburo tried to talk sense into Kabul. We couldn't understand how they could build socialism in just five years. We said, 'You can't do that. We've been building socialism for sixty years and we're still not finished.' But they thought it was us that had got it wrong. Naivete was coming out of their every orifice. It was in their every word" ("Encore Presentation: Soldiers of God," CNN.com, September 29, 2001, http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/29/cp.00.html). Even the small Maoist party in Afghanistan attacked the 1978 coup, with some justification, as bourgeois.

89. The Soviet Union also attempted to make contact with the former Afghan king, Mohammad Zahir Shah, exiled in Rome, to find a political solution (Michael T. Kaufman, New York Times, August 14, 1979).

90. Little, American Orientalism, 150.

91. Marsden, Taliban, 26.

92. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 420; Cooley, Unholy Wars, 29 (Brzezinski).


94. Yergin, Prize, 702; Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 30.

95. From Asian studies scholar Lawrence E. Grinter: "Concurrent with Mr. Carter's pronouncement came an intensified search by Defense and State Department officials for new military arrangements with Kenya, Somalia, Oman, Egypt, and Pakistan. Diego Garcia, the British territory in the Indian Ocean, also received new attention. On 1 March 1980, the United States Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was formally established by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Its primary mission was subsequently focused exclusively on deployment to the Middle East and Southwest Asia. By early 1981, when Ronald Reagan took office as President, the RDJTF was estimated to have grown to more than 200,000 CONUS-based forces, including 100,000 Army troops, 50,000 Marines, and additional Air Force and Navy personnel" (Lawrence E.
Chapter 7
Afghanistan and the Origins of Al Qaeda

Epigraphs: Clark Clifford [a drafter of the 1947 National Security Act], Church Committee Hearings, December 5, 1975, 51, quoted in Church Committee Report, Book 1, 153. The Afghan exile is quoted in Coll, Ghost Wars, 182.

3. Consider, for example, the fate of state department officer Edmund McWilliams, who warned in a twenty-eight-paragraph cable against the U.S. and ISI policy of favoring the Islamist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The result was to provoke the wrath of the embassy's three most powerful figures, who arranged for McWilliams to be relieved from his post and transferred abruptly back to Washington (Coll, Ghost Wars, 180-84, 198-99). In 1998, McWilliams belatedly received the American Foreign Service Association's Christian Herter Award for creative dissent by a senior foreign service officer.
4. Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan; Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War; and Coll, Ghost Wars.
7. Beaty and Gwynne, Outlaw Bank, 301. The two authors wrote in Time (“Cover Story: The Dirtiest Bank of All,” July 29, 1991) "of a clandestine division of the bank called the 'black network,' which functions as a global intelligence operation and a Mafia-like enforcement squad. Operating primarily out of the bank's offices in Karachi, Pakistan, the 1,500-employee black network has used sophisticated spy equipment and techniques, along with bribery, extortion, kidnapping and even, by some accounts, murder. The black network—so named by its own members—stops at almost nothing to further the bank's aims the world over.... The black network, which is still functioning, operates a lucrative arms-trade business and transports drugs and gold."
10. In a preface Brown congratulated Kerry for having had the courage to produce the report, when so many of his own party had enjoyed BCCI patronage. That patronage extended even to the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee, which was cochaired by Kerry and by David L. Paul of the notorious S&L CenTrust Savings Bank of Miami. CenTrust's major stockholder and close associate of Paul was Ghaith Pharaon of BCCI (Truell and Gurwin, False Profits, 71-71).
11. McCoy, Politics of Heroin; Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 33, 43-46.
13. The responsibility of al Qaeda for the shoot-down of the Black Hawks was affirmed in June 2004 by the 9/11 Commission, Staff Statement #15, "Overview of the Enemy," 4. This conclusion has been considerably debated but was reaffirmed by the FBI agent who investigated the matter, Mary Deborah Doran. See Wright, Looming Tower, 188-89, 411.


17. Lance, Triple Cross, 141-43. Saif al-Masry, a member of al Qaeda's shura, or ruling council, also fought in Somalia. Mohamed's confession rebuts Burke, Al-Qaeda, 148-49: "Given the number of 'Arab Afghan' veterans in east Africa at the time, there seems to me to be no particular reason why it would have to be bin Laden's fighters, or even Islamic Jihad's, who transferred their skills to the Somalis."

18. Lance Williams and Erin McCormick, "Al Qaeda Terrorist Worked with FBI," San Francisco Chronicle, November 4, 2001: "The CIA ... warned other U.S. government agencies about Mohamed and urged them to detain him if possible, the official said. The next year, in 1985, Mohamed managed to get a visa to enter the United States. One year later, he enlisted as a regular soldier in the U.S. Army at the age of 34, unusually old for a recruit. He was assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command in Fort Bragg, the home of the Green Berets and the Delta Force, the elite counterterrorism squad.... In 1993, he trained Somali clansmen in the months leading up to a furious gun battle that took the lives of 18 U.S. soldiers."


20. See note z, this chapter. Michael Springman, the former head of the American visa bureau in Jeddah, told the BBC that since 1987 CIA had been illicitly issuing visas to unqualified applicants from the Middle East and bringing them to the United States for training in terrorism for the Afghan war in collaboration with bin Laden. Rashid, Taliban, 19-29.

21. Rashid, Taliban, 84-85. Like many authors Crile has explained that CIA backed Hekmatyar because he "was the darling of Zia and the Pakistan intelligence service" (Crile, Charlie Wilson's War, zzz). But according to Coll, CIA officials "concluded independently that [Hekmatyar] was the most efficient at killing Soviets." Coll also makes it clear that ISI support for Hekmatyar was firmly endorsed by Milt Bearden, the Pakistan CIA station chief, and that Edmund McWilliams, a vigorous State Department opponent of Hekmatyar, was for his objections hustled out of the Islamabad embassy by Bearden and U.S. ambassador Robert Oakley (Coll, Ghost Wars, 120, 195-202).

22. Burke, Al-Qaeda, 72-86. "Throughout the 1980s, the 'Arab Afghans' or 'Afghan Arabs' called themselves 'Anssar,' or 'supporters' in Arabic. Anssar was first used to describe a group of Muslims that supported the Prophet Muhammad against his enemies more than 1,400 years ago. Bin Laden's organization used the name until early 1990, when it was changed to al Qaeda, which means 'the base'" (Jalal Ghazi, "'Arab Afghan" Prophet Muhammad against his enemies more than 1,400 years ago. Bin Laden's organization used the name "Anssar," or 'supporters' in Arabic. Anssar was first used to describe a group of Muslims that supported the Prophet Muhammad against his enemies more than 1,400 years ago. Bin Laden's organization used the name until early 1990, when it was changed to al Qaeda, which means 'the base'" (Jalal Ghazi, "'Arab Afghan"

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24. Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 61, emphasis added.


27. Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 62.

28. Rashid, Taliban, 84-85; Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind, 57.


30. Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 163.

31. Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 162, quoting Congressman Wilson. Hekmatyar talked to British journalist and author Dilip Hiro of "rolling back communism by freeing the Muslim lands of Bukhara, Tashkent, and Dyushanbe" (Hiro, Holy Wars, 259, quoted in Dreyfuss, Devil's Game, 268).

32. This claim, widely repeated overseas but not in the United States, was challenged in June 2004 by the 9/11 Commission Report (171) and its Staff Report #15, "Overview of the Enemy," 10: "No persuasive evidence exists that al Qaeda relied on the drug trade as an important source of revenue, or funded itself by trafficking in diamonds from African states engaged in civil wars." But Pakistani journalist and author Ahmed Rashid heard from officials in Washington that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which had earlier gravitated to the Taliban, had by 2000 become a "virtual partner in Al Qaeda's global jihad," providing "drug smuggling, military training, and support for Al Qaeda to extend its cells into Central Asia" (Rashid, Jihad, 173; cf. 45, 165). Ralf Mutschke, assistant director of the Criminal Intelligence Directorate of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), testified to the U.S. Congress in 2000 that "according to some estimations IMU may be responsible for 70% of the total amount of heroin and opium transiting through the area" (Mutschke, "The Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drugs Trafficking, and Terrorism," written testimony

33. B. Raman, "Musharraf, Viewed through Moscow's Eyes," Asia Times Online, December 10, 2002: 
"Moscow has reasons to be concerned about the reappearance of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hizb-e-Islami in Afghanistan and over the possibility of its teaming up with remnants of the Talibian and al Qaeda against allied troops in Afghanistan and the Hamid Karzai regime. There are strong grounds for believing that Pakistan's ISI, or at least sections of it, have been helping Hekmatyar, their blue-eyed mujahid of the 1980s."

34. Rahul Bedi, "Washington's Pakistani Allies: Killers and Drug Dealers," Sydney Morning Herald, September 27, 2001: 
"Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistan's northern tribal belt and adjoining Afghanistan were a vital offshoot of the ISI-CIA co-operation. It succeeded in turning some of the Soviet troops into addicts. Heroin sales in Europe and the U.S., carried out through an elaborate web of deception, transport networks, couriers and payoffs, offset the cost of the decade-long war in Afghanistan."

35. Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War.
36. Coll, Ghost Wars, 156-57.
37. Rashid, Taliban, 131.
40. 9/11 Commission Report, 56.
42. Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge, 41-42.
43. Coll, Ghost Wars, 157 (host); Crile, Charlie Wilson's War, 521 (bags of money).
44. Burke, Al-Qaeda, 59.
46. Cooley, Unholy Wars, 41.
47. Coll, Ghost Wars, 103; cf. 161-62.
49. Cooley, Unholy Wars, 128-29; Beaty and Gwynne, Outlaw Bank, 305-6.
51. Maureen Orth, "Afghanistan's Deadly Habit," Vanity Fair (March 2002): 170-71. A Tajik sociologist added that she knew "drugs were massively distributed at that time" and that she often heard how Russian soldiers were "invited to taste."
53. Raman, "Assassination of Haji Abdul Qadeer in Kabul."
54. Smucker's journalistic credibility on other matters has been challenged. On August 6, 1998, Smucker reported in the Washington Times concerning a mass grave of Serbsians in Orahovac, Kosovo; many journalists reported the story, which was soon retracted. In June 2003 the Monitor had to apologize for a story by Smucker (April 25, 2003) that claimed the antiwar British MP George Galloway had been funded for eleven years by Saddam Hussein. The documents obtained by Smucker from an Iraqi general were soon shown to be forgeries (Cliff Kincaid, "Christian Science Monitor Apologizes," Media Monitor, Accuracy in Media.org, July 9, 2003, http://www.aim.org/media_monitor/A312_0_2_0_C/). Despite this, I consider Smucker's book to be one of the best on America's Afghan campaign of 2001.
55. Smucker, Al Qaeda's Great Escape, 9. This decision by British and American officials (the latter almost certainly CIA) may have contributed to bin Laden's escape from Tora Bora in December 2001. Cf. CNN, "Afghan Official Believes bin Laden in Pakistan," December 29, 2001: "Abdullah Tawheed, a deputy head of intelligence in Afghanistan, says he has received 'reliable information' that the terrorist leader paid a 'large amount' of money to buy his way out of Afghanistan. Tawheed named Haji Zaman—a well-known independent military commander—as the man responsible for taking bin Laden across the border to Pakistan. Ironically, Haji Zaman had recently been fighting against bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization. But Tawheed says he believes Haji Zaman was apparently persuaded—by money—to help the terrorist leader."

57. Steve Coll, "Anatomy of a Victory: CIA’s Covert Afghan War," Washington Post, July 19, 1991. Some CIA officials were less opposed. Charles Cogan, who oversaw the Afghan operation from Washington, later told Australian television: "Our main mission was to do as much damage as possible to the Soviets. We didn't really have the resources or the time to devote to an investigation of the drug trade. I don't think that we need to apologize for this" (quoted in McCoy, Politics of Heroin, 486).


59. Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 159. The original plan "was to utilize Afghans belonging to the same ethnic groups that were dominant in adjacent parts of Central Asia, especially Uzbeks and Tajiks." But at some point Arab Afghans also became involved.

60. Schweizer, Victory, 29.


62. Youasf and Adkin, Bear Trap, 189.

63. Rashid, Taliban, 119.

64. Emdad-ul Haq, Drugs in South Asia, 189.

65. It is indisputable that the IIRO with Sayyaf's assistance were distributing Korans in former Soviet republics like Tajikistan. Baer, Sleeping with the Devil, 144, 141, 140. For more on the United States and bin Laden family connections to the IIRO, see Brisard and Dasquie, Forbidden Truth, 83-86.

66. Youasf and Adkin, Bear Trap, 193; Rashid, Jihad, 223; and Coll, Ghost Wars, 90, 104.


68. Allix, La petite cuillere, 100.

69. Burke, Al-Qaeda, 168.

70. Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind, 20.

71. The general consensus is that Hekmatyar was the principal drug trafficker among mujahideen leaders. However, John Cooley transmits the Soviet assessment that the "real 'king of heroin’" was Pir Sayyaf Ahmed Gailani (Cooley, Unholy Wars, 132.). Gailani was used by the ISI to counter the influence of the Northern Alliance in the first postwar Hamid Karzai government of 2001 (Benjamin Soskis, "Circle Game," New Republic, November 12, 2001).

72. Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 191-93. The principal of these "bleeders" at the time was Richard Perle (Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 191-99, 207).

73. Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 194-95.

74. Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 6; cf. 268.

75. Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 197.

76. Bamford, Pretext for War, 178.

77. Ahmed Rashid, "Afghanistan Heroin Set to Flood West," Independent (London), March 25, 1990. In early 1988 the State Department negotiators had been preparing to accept an end to CIA assistance. They then reversed themselves and held out for a matching of Soviet and CIA support to the two factions. Apparently the policy shift was motivated by an unscripted remark by Reagan to a television interviewer (Coll, Ghost Wars, 176-77).

78. Coll, Ghost Wars, 225-26; 226.

79. Coll, Ghost Wars, 225.

80. Coll, Ghost Wars, 181.

81. Coll, Ghost Wars, 211-12, 226-27, 231. The CIA station chief in Islamabad "met face-to-face with Hekmatyar” and helped organize supplies to his forces. As late as 1989, Azzam and bin Laden are said to have received a consignment of U.S. sniper rifles.


83. In addition, Milton Bearden, CIA station chief in Islamabad, had contempt for the Westernized Afghan rebel leaders and encouraged ISI chief Hamid Gul in his policy of giving the Stingers and other support chiefly “to Hekmatyar and other Islamists” (Coll, Ghost Wars, 175).


85. Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 198.

87. During testimony in court regarding the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, al Qaeda defector Essam al-Ridi said bin Laden took $230,000 and transferred it to Arizona to acquire a plane that was supposed to fly Stinger missiles from Pakistan to Sudan. It is hard to imagine how a plane-load of Stingers could leave Pakistan without ISI knowledge.


90. Brisard and Dasquie, *Forbidden Truth*, 97-102, 155-59. A leader in the plot was Anas al-Liby, who was later given political asylum in Great Britain despite suspicions that he was a high-level al Qaeda operative. He was trained in terrorism by the triple agent Ali Mohamed, while Mohamed was still on the payroll of the U.S. Army (Lance, *Triple Cross*, 104; see also chapter 9 in this book).


93. *Halifax Herald*, October 19, 2001. Cf. Bodansky, *Bin Laden*, 298: "In late 1998, despite the growing pressure from U.S. intelligence and its local allies ... a new network made up of bin Laden's supporters was being established in Albania under the cover of various Muslim charity organizations.... Bin Laden's Arab 'Afghans' also have assumed a dominant role in training the Kosovo Liberation Army." Bodansky adds that by mid-March 1999 the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) included "many elements controlled and/or sponsored by the U.S., German, British, and Croatian intelligence services.... In early April [1999] the UCK began actively cooperating with the NATO bombing — selecting and designating targets for NATO aircraft as well as escorting U.S. and British special forces detachments into Yugoslavia" (397-98). Cf. also Scott Taylor, "Bin Laden's Balkan Connections," *Ottawa Citizen*, December 15, 2001, http://www.unitedmacedonians.org/newspaper/nd01/ottawa.htm.


96. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 136-37. Mir Aimal Kasi, the Pakistani who killed two CIA employees at CIA headquarters in January 1993, had also been with the mujahideen in Afghanistan and returned there after the killings (Jeff Stein, "Convicted Assassin: 'I Wanted to Shoot the CIA Director'"

97. CIA deputy director for operations John McMahon in particular was concerned that escalation in Afghanistan might induce the Soviet Union to retaliate against Pakistan. Cf. Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War*, 251, 417, and passim.


99. Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War*, 517-19: As the sum was matched by an equal contribution from Saudi Arabia, "that meant another $400 million for the mujahideen."


102. For example, Daniel Klaidman, "Federal Grand Jury Set to Indict Sheikh," *Newsweek*, March 13, 2002: U.S. officials suspect "that Sheikh has been a 'protected asset,' of Pakistan's shadowy spy service, the Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI." The story was enhanced by Indian intelligence sources with a more sensational claim: that Saeed Sheikh had wired the money to hijacker Mohamed Atta at the direction of Lieutenant-General Mahmoud Ahmad, the director of the ISI at the time (*Wall Street Journal*, October 10, 2001). Indian sources later downplayed this anti-Pakistani allegation by suggesting that the money came instead from a ransom paid to another terrorist, Aftab Ansari in Dubai, when a Kolkata businessman, Partha Roy Burman, was kidnapped in July 2001 (B. Muralidhar Reddy, "Omar Sheikh Arrested, Says Pearl Is Alive," *The Hindu*, February 13, 2002).
103. "Did Pearl Die Because Pakistan Deceived CIA?" Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, March 3, 2002, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_20141.html: "There are many in Musharraf's government who believe that Saeed Sheikh's power comes not from the ISI, but from his connections with our own CIA. The theory is that with such intense pressure to locate bin Laden, Saeed Sheikh was bought and paid for."

104. Ahmed, War on Truth, 142; cf. John Newman, "Omissions and Errors in the Commission's Final Report: Rep. McKinney 9/11 Congressional Briefing," August 18, 2005, http://911readingroom.org/bib/whole_document.php?article_id=422; Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 225: "It is believed in some quarters that while Omar Sheikh was at the LSE [London School of Economics] he was recruited by the British intelligence agency MI6. It is said that MI6 persuaded him to take an active part in demonstrations against Serbian aggression in Bosnia and even sent him to Kosovo to join the jihad. At some point he probably became a rogue or double agent."


106. "Sources: Suspected Terrorist Leader Was Wired Funds through Pakistan," CNN, October 1, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/10/01/inv.pakistan.funds/: "As much as $100,000 was wired in the past year from Pakistan to Mohamed Atta." Subsequent developments lent weight to the Pakistani connection, such as the arrest of Atta's alleged controls, Ramzi Binalshibib and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, in Pakistan.


110. 9/11 Commission Report, 172.

111. "Pakistan Weekly Spills 9/11 Beans," Telegraph (Calcutta), March 13, 2006, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1060313/asp/nation/story_5962372.asp. The Telegraph story cited the Friday Times, a Pakistani weekly, which claimed the story was based on "disclosures made by foreign service officials to the Public Accounts Committee at a secret meeting in Islamabad."

112. Kamran Khan and Molly Moore, "Leader Purges Top Ranks of Military, Spy Services," Washington Post, October 8, 2001; Thompson, Terror Timeline, 260-61. It was widely reported that Mahmoud was let go for being too sympathetic to the Taliban (for example, Alan Sipress and Vernon Loeb, "CIA's Stealth War Centers on Eroding Taliban Loyalty and Aiding Opposition," Washington Post, October 10, 2001).


115. Crile, Charlie Wilson's War, 521. However, the United States did not attack Haqqani until after CIA had failed in a major attempt to persuade him to change sides (Syed Saleem Shahzad, "U.S. Explores Its Afghanistan Exit Options," Asia Times Online, October 15, 2003, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/EJ15Ag01.html).

116. One who escaped was Tahir Yuldashev, the number two Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) leader at this time, who is now said to lead a new and larger clandestine Islamic Movement of Turkestan (or Central Asia). According to the U.S. private research firm Stratfor, the movement is headquartered in Badakhshan, northeastern Afghanistan, close to the mountainous Pakistani border. The number one IMU leader, Namangani, was reportedly injured at Kunduz and is supposed by most to have died later at Mazar-i-Sharif.


120. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 90-93.

122. Sheikh Saeed, who assisted Pearl in setting up interviews in Pakistan, was later convicted of masterminding his kidnap (Steve LeVine, "Killing of Pearl Fit into Pakistani Web of Radical Islam," Wall Street Journal, January 23, 2003; Thompson, Terror Timeline, 264).


124. "Pearl Tracked al Qaida," UPI, September 30, 2002. Baer's claim was disputed by a spokesman for the Wall Street Journal, but CNN confirmed on January 31, 2003 that Pearl was hunting for an al Qaeda cell in Pakistan that included Reid and was headed by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Mohammed, whose role as a mastermind is not disputed, is apparently a Kuwaiti-born Pakistani (Richard Leiby, "Looking Back and Seeing the Future of Terror," Washington Post, September 10, 2003). In March 2007, "Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the suspected planner of the Sept. 11 attacks, admitted during a military tribunal... that he personally killed Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, according to a revised transcript of the hearing that confirmed long-held suspicions about his role in the slaying" (Peter Spiegel, "Al-Qaida Operative Says He Beheaded Pearl," Baltimore Sun, March 16, 2007).
