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Chapter 8

More often than not when conversation turns to politics and politicians, discussion focuses on personalities. There is a certain fascination with analyzing political leaders. As a result, biographies on current political figures become best-sellers and the triumphs as well as the tragedies of political leaders become newspaper headlines. A major reason for our curiosity about the personal characteristics of such leaders is the realization that their preferences, the things they believe in and work for, and the ways they go about making decisions can influence our lives.

But how can we learn about the personalities and, in particular, the leadership styles of political leaders in more than a cursory fashion? It is hard to conceive of giving people like Tony Blair, Saddam Hussein, or Boris Yeltsin a battery of psychological tests or having them submit to a series of clinical interviews. Not only would they not have time for, or tolerate, such procedures, they would be wary that the results, if made public, might prove politically damaging to them.

One way of learning more about political leaders that does not require their cooperation is by examining what they say. Only movie stars, hit rock groups, and athletes probably leave more traces of their behavior in the public arena than politicians. U.S. presidents' movements and statements, for example, are generally recorded by the mass media; little of what a U.S. president does escapes notice. Such materials provide a basis for assessment.

By analyzing the content of what political leaders say, we can begin to learn something about the images they display in public, even when such individuals are unavailable for the more usual assessment techniques. To illustrate how political leaders' statements can be studied to learn more about them, the rest of this chapter will present a technique for using such material to assess leadership style.

Focusing on Spontaneous Material

Two major types of statements are readily available for most political leaders in the latter part of the twentieth century—speeches and interviews with the media. Some caution must be exercised in examining speeches to assess what a leader is like since such materials are generally written for him or her by speech writers or staff members. But care and thought have generally gone into what is said and how it is said. Interviews with the media, however, are a more spontaneous type of material. During the give-and-take of a question-and-answer period, leaders must respond quickly without props or aid. What they are like can influence the nature of the response and how it is worded. Although there is often some preparation of a political leader prior to an interview with the press (for example, consideration of what questions might be asked and, if asked, how they should be answered), during the interview leaders are on their own; their responses are relatively spontaneous.

Because of the interest here in assessing the personality characteristics of the political leader and, in turn, his or her leadership style, interviews are the material of preference. In the interview, political leaders are less in control of what they say and, even though still in a public

setting, more likely to evidence what they, themselves, are like than is often possible when giving a speech. (For research exploring the differences between speeches and interviews in the assessment of personality at a distance, see, e.g., Hermann 1977, 1980a, 1986b; Winter et al. 1991a; Schafer, forthcoming). The trait analysis described in what follows uses as its unit of analysis the interview response. Interviews are decomposed into individual responses and the question that elicited the response.

Leaders' interviews with the media are available in a wide variety of sources. Interviews with political figures located in governments outside the United States are collected in the *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report*, which is distributed through World News Connection, and are reported by other governments' information agencies on their Web sites. Interviews with political elites who reside within the United States are often found in such newspapers as the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*, as well as in weekly news magazines and as recorded from weekly television news programs. Presidential press conferences and other interviews with the presidents can be found in each one's *Presidential Papers*.

It is particularly important in collecting interview materials that one locate verbatim responses—that, indeed, the full text as spoken by the leader is available. At times, newspapers and magazines will survey or edit interviews with leaders, making it difficult to know how representative the reported material is of what was said. We are not interested in what the particular media outlet believes will sell newspapers or magazines but in how the leaders presented themselves in that setting.

In the course of my completing profiles of the leadership styles of some 122 political leaders, it has become evident that the analyst can develop an adequate assessment of leadership style based on fifty interview responses of one hundred words or more in length. Confidence in one's profile, of course, increases the number of interview responses the analyst can assess, but any profile will suffer if it is determined on fewer than fifty responses. To ensure that the description of leadership style is not context-specific, the fifty interview responses that are analyzed should span the leader's tenure in office, as well as have occurred in different types of interview settings, and should focus on a variety of topics. Collecting and categorizing interview responses by time, audience, and topic provide a means for assessing how stable the traits composing leadership style are. Such data indicate how relatively sensitive or insensitive to the context a particular leader is.

It is also possible to classify interviews on their degree of spontaneity, facilitating the analyst's gaining some insight into the differences between a leader's public and private selves. The least spontaneous interviews are those where the political figure calls interviewers into his or her office to present a plan or to report on what is happening, or where the political leader asks reporters to submit questions ahead of time and preselects those to answer, planning the responses. The most spontaneous interviews are those where the leader is caught by the press in an unplanned encounter, for example, leaving a meeting, getting on or off a plane, in the corridors of a building, or where there is a recording of a meeting between the leader and advisers. By differentiating the interview responses on degree of spontaneity as well as context, one can gain information not only about the stability of a leader's profile but also about what he or she is particularly sensitive to if there is a lack of stability.

Leadership Style

As the world grows more complex and an increasing number of agencies, organizations, and people participate in policy-making, both at the domestic and international levels, political leaders face several dilemmas in affecting policy, such as how to maintain control over policy while still delegating authority (or having it delegated for them) to other actors in the government and how to shape the policy agenda when situations are being defined and problems as well as

opportunities are being perceived and structured by others in the political system. The particular leadership style that leaders adopt can affect the manner in which they deal with these dilemmas and, in turn, the nature of the decision-making process. Barber (1977) has argued that leadership style often results from those behaviors that were useful in securing the leader's first political success; these actions become reinforced across time as the leader relies on them to achieve the second, third, and so forth successes. The term *leadership style* means the ways in which leaders relate to those around them — whether constituents, advisers, or other leaders — and how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions.

In assessing the individual differences of 122 national leaders across the past two decades (e.g., Hermann 1980a, 1980b, 1984a, 1987b, 1988b, 1993; Hermann and Hermann 1989; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998), I have uncovered a set of leadership styles that appears to guide how presidents, prime ministers, kings, and dictators interact with those they lead or with whom they share power. These leadership styles are built around the answers to three questions: (1) How do leaders react to political constraints in their environment — do they respect or challenge such constraints? (2) How open are leaders to incoming information — do they selectively use information or are they open to information directing their response? (3) What are the leaders' reasons for seeking their positions—are they driven by an internal focus of attention within themselves or by the relationships that can be formed with salient constituents? The answers to these three queries suggest whether the leader is going to be generally sensitive or insensitive to the political context and the degree to which he or she will want to control what happens or be an agent for the viewpoints of others. These answers combine to suggest a particular leadership style. Let us examine each of the questions in more detail and then discuss their combination.

In considering leaders' responsiveness to political constraints, we are interested in how important it is for them to exert control and influence over the environment in which they find themselves, and the constraints that environment poses, as opposed to being adaptable to the situation and remaining open to responding to the demands of domestic and international constituencies and circumstances. Research has shown that leaders who are predisposed to challenge constraints are more intent on meeting a situation head-on, achieving quick resolution to an issue, being decisive, and dealing forcefully with the problem of the moment (e.g., Driver 1977; Hermann 1984a; Tetlock 1991; Suedfeld 1992a). Their personal characteristics are highly predictive of their responses to events (e.g., Suedfeld and Rank 1976; Driver 1977; Hermann 1984a) because constraints are viewed as obstacles but not insurmountable ones. To facilitate maintaining direction over events, such leaders work to bring policy-making under their control (e.g., Hermann and Preston 1994; Hermann and Kegley 1995; Kowert and Hermann 1997). Leaders who are more responsive to the context have been found to be more empathetic to their surroundings; interested in how relevant constituents are viewing events and in seeking their support; more open to bargaining, trade-offs, and compromise; and more likely to focus on events on a case-by-case basis (e.g., Driver 1977; Ziller et al. 1977; Hermann 1984a, 1987; Tetlock 1991; Suedfeld 1992; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998). Because constraints set the parameters for action for such leaders, their personal characteristics suggest the degree of support and closure they will need from the environment before making a decision and where that support will be sought (e.g., Driver 1977; Hermann 1984a; Winter et al. 1991a). Flexibility, political timing, and consensus building are viewed as important leadership tools (e.g., Stoessinger 1979; Snyder 1987; Hermann 1995)-

In examining the decision making of American presidents, George (1980) observed that the kinds of information they wanted in making a decision was shaped by whether they came with a well-formulated vision or agenda that framed how data were perceived and interpreted or were interested in studying the situation before choosing a response. Presidents with an agenda sought information that reinforced a particular point of view and sought people around them who were supportive of these predispositions. Presidents more focused on what was happening

politically in the current context wanted to know what was doable and feasible at this point in time and were interested in expert opinion or advice from those highly attuned to important constituencies. Leaders who are less open to information have been found to act as advocates, intent on finding information that supports their definition of the situation and overlooking evidence that is disconfirmatory; their attention is focused on persuading others of their position (see, e.g., Axelrod 1976; Jonsson 1982; Fazio 1986; Lau and Sears 1986; Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann 1989; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998). Leaders who are more open to information are reported to be cue takers, both defining the problem and identifying a position by checking what important others are advocating and doing. Such leaders are interested in information that is both discrepant and supportive of the options on the table at the moment, seeking political insights into who is supporting what and with what degree of intensity (e.g., Axelrod 1976; Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann 1989; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998).

Leaders' motivations define the manner in which they "orient [themselves] toward life—not for the moment, but enduringly" (Barber 1977, 8). Motives shape their character—what is important in their lives and what drives them to act. A survey of the literature exploring motivation in political leaders suggests that a variety of needs and incentives push persons into assuming leadership positions in politics (see, e.g., Barber 1965; Woshinsky 1973; McClelland 1975; Winter and Stewart 1977a; Walker 1983; Payne et al. 1984; Snare 1992a; Winter 1992). Examination of the list that results, however, indicates that political leaders are driven, in general, either by an internal focus—a particular problem or cause, an ideology, a specific set of interests—or by the desire for a certain kind of feedback from those in their environment—acceptance, approval, power, support, status, acclaim. In one case, they are driven internally and pushed to act by ideas and images they believe and advocate. In the other instance, leaders are motivated by a desired relationship with important others and, thus, pulled by forces outside themselves into action. For those for whom solving problems and achieving causes is highly salient, mobilization and effectiveness feature prominently in movement toward their goal; for those motivated by their relationships with others, persuasion and marketing are central to achieving their goal.

Knowledge about how leaders react to constraints, process information, and are motivated to deal with their political environment provides us with data on their leadership style. Table 8.1 indicates the leadership styles that result when these three dimensions are interrelated. A more detailed description of these various leadership styles and the ways that the three factors interrelate can be found in Hermann, Preston, and Young 1996. The empirical relationships between these particular leadership styles and political behavior have been explored by Hermann (1980a, 1984a, 1995); Hermann and Hermann (1989); Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann (1989); Hermann and Preston (1994); and Kaarbo and Hermann (1998).

Using Trait Analysis to Assess Leadership Style

Seven traits have been found to be particularly useful in assessing leadership style: (1) the belief that one can influence or control what happens, (2) the need for power and influence, (3) conceptual complexity (the ability to differentiate things and people in one's environment), (4) self-confidence, (5) the tendency to focus on problem solving and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others' ideas and sensitivities, (6) general distrust or suspiciousness of others, and (7) the intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias. Based on previous research linking leaders' personal characteristics to their political behavior (e.g., Dmckman 1968; Byars 1973; McClelland 1975; Lefcourt 1976; Driver 1977; Hermann and Kogan 1977; Ziller et al. 1977; Hermarin 1980b, 1984a, 1987b; Bass 1981; Walker 1983; Snyder 1987; Hermann and Hermann 1989; Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann 1989; Winter et al. 1991; Suedfeld 1992; Winter 1992; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998), these seven traits provide information that is relevant to assessing how political leaders respond to the

constraints in their environment, how they process information, and what motivates them to action. Knowledge about the degree to which leaders believe that they can influence what happens and their need for power suggests whether they will challenge or respect the constraints that they perceive in any setting in which they find themselves. Assessing leaders' conceptual complexity and self-confidence helps us determine how open they will be to information. And measuring the extent of their in-group bias, general distrust of others, and tendency to prefer problem-solving functions to those involving group maintenance assists us in learning what motivates leaders. In what follows, we will describe how each trait can be determined through content analysis of leaders' interview responses, as well as indicate what scores on the various traits mean for leadership style, both singly and in combination.

In this trait analysis, an assumption is made that the more frequently leaders use certain words and phrases in their interview responses, the more salient such content is to them. In effect, the trait analysis is quantitative in nature and employs frequency counts. At issue is what percentage of the time in responding to interviewers' questions when leaders could exhibit particular words and phrases are they, indeed, used. The percentages that result for one leader can currently be compared to those for 87 heads of state from around the world or to those for 122 political leaders filling a range of positions in governments in countries in the Middle East, Africa, the former Soviet Union, and Western industrialized democracies. Through such comparisons, the researcher or analyst can determine whether the particular leader is high or low on a trait. This procedure will become clearer after we describe how to code for the seven traits. Currently a computer program is being developed that will automatically code for the traits discussed here. Entitled "Profiler" (Young, forthcoming), the program will provide a researcher or analyst with the trait scores for a specific leader based on either speeches or interviews. (A more detailed description of the steps involved in doing a manual content analysis of the traits can be found in Hermann 1987c).

Let us now turn to specifying how the traits relate to the questions asked earlier concerning leadership style and how each trait can be coded.

Does the Leader Respect or Challenge Constraints?

Political leaders who are high in their belief that they can control what happens and in the need for power have been found to challenge the constraints in their environments, to push the limits of what is possible (see, e.g., McClelland 1975; Winter and Stewart 1977; Hermann 1980b; Walker 1983; Hermann and Preston 1994; Kowert and Hermann 1997; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998). These leaders are in charge, and they know what should happen. Moreover, they are skillful both directly and indirectly in getting what they want. Those leaders, however, who are low in these two traits appear to respect, or at least accede to, the constraints they perceive in their environments and to work within such parameters toward their goals. Building consensus and achieving compromise are important skills in their minds for a politician to have and to exercise. Leaders who are moderate on both these traits have the ability of moving either toward challenging or toward respecting constraints, depending on the nature of the situation; they will be driven by their other characteristics and what they believe is called for by the context.

But what if a leader is high on one trait but low to moderate on the other? Leaders who are high in the belief that they can control events but low in the need for power will take charge of what happens and challenge constraints, but they will not do as well in reading how to manipulate the people and in working behind the scenes to have the desired influence. Such leaders will not be as successful in having an impact as those high in both traits. They will be too direct and open in their use of power, signaling others on how to react without really meaning to. And what about the leaders who are low in the belief that they can control events but high in the need for power? These individuals will also challenge constraints, but they will be

more comfortable doing so behind the scenes, in an indirect fashion, rather than out in the open. Such leaders are especially good in settings where they are the "power behind the throne," where they can pull the strings but are less accountable for the result.

Table 8.2 summarizes this discussion. In previous research (e.g., Hermann 1980a, 1980b, 1984a, 1987, Hermann and Hermann 1989; Hermann and Preston 1994; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998), as noted earlier, I have collected data on the personality traits described here of 122 political leaders, some 87 of them being heads of government. The leaders in that sample span the years 1945—99 and represent all regions of the world. For this group of leaders, scores on the belief in one's own ability to control events are correlated with those on the need for power—0.17 in the sample of 87 heads of state and 0.21 for the 122 political leaders. These correlations indicate that the two characteristics are distinctive and that there will be instances where the individual being studied is high on one trait and low on the other. To put this discussion into context, let us now define the two traits in more detail.

Belief in One's Own Ability to Control Events

The belief in one's own ability to control events is a view of the world in which leaders perceive some degree of control over the situations in which they find themselves; there is a perception that individuals and governments can influence what happens. In coding for belief in control over events, the focus is on verbs or action words. We assume that, when leaders take responsibility for planning or initiating an action, they believe that they have some control over what happens. The focus here is on actions proposed or taken by the leader or by a group with whom he or she identifies. A score on this trait is determined by calculating the percentage of times the verbs in an interview response indicate that the speaker or a group with whom the speaker identifies has taken responsibility for planning or initiating an action. The overall score for any leader is the average of this percentage across the total number of interview responses being examined.

Leaders who believe that they can influence what happens in the world are generally more interested and active in the policy-making process. Those who are high in this trait will want to maintain control over decision making and implementation to ensure that things, indeed, do happen. After all, if they are not involved, something may go awry. Thus, such leaders are likely to call subordinates to check on what they are doing, to make surprise visits to places where policy is being implemented, and to be interested in meeting face-to-face with other leaders to see how far they are willing to go. Leaders high in this belief are less likely to delegate authority for tasks and are likely to initiate activities and policies rather than wait for others to make suggestions. They are often "running ideas up the flagpole to see who salutes them." In some sense this trait has aspects of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Leaders who believe that they can affect what happens are more likely to initiate and oversee activities to ensure that policies are enacted; they are more likely to take charge because they perceive they can influence events. Moreover, because such leaders are so sure they can have an impact on the world, they are less prone to compromise or to work out a deal with others. Once they decide, they exude confidence in their decision—they know what should be done.

Leaders who are low in the belief that they can control what happens tend to be more reactive to situations, waiting to see how the situation is likely to play out before acting. They are less likely to take initiatives, preferring instead to let others take the responsibility for anything too daring and out of the ordinary. Such leaders want to participate and lead in contexts where there is at least a 50 percent chance of success. They are willing to delegate authority, hoping others may have more luck than they seem to have in influencing outcomes. As a result, such leaders are also able to shift the blame when something goes wrong. Unlike their counterparts who think they can affect their external environments, these leaders do not shoulder responsibility and move on but, rather, are quick to accuse others of making it difficult for them

to act. For political leaders who do not believe they can control what happens, fear of failure may supersede and crowd out sense of timing.

Need for Power and Influence

The need for power indicates a concern for establishing, maintaining, or restoring one's power; in other words, it is the desire to control, influence, or have an impact on other persons or groups (see Winter 1973). As with coding of the previous trait, coding of the need for power focuses on verbs. Is the speaker with this proposed action attempting to establish, maintain, or restore his or her power? Some of the conditions where the need for power would be scored are when the speaker (1) proposes or engages in a strong, forceful action, such as an assault or attack, a verbal threat, an accusation, or a reprimand; (2) gives advice or assistance when it is not solicited; (3) attempts to regulate the behavior of another person or group; (4) tries to persuade, bribe, or argue with someone else so long as the concern is not to reach agreement or avoid disagreement; (5) endeavors to impress or gain fame with an action; and (6) is concerned with his or her reputation or position. Once again the focus is on actions proposed or taken by the leader or a group with whom he or she identifies. A score on the need for power is determined by calculating the percentage of times the verbs in an interview response indicate that the speaker or a group with whom the speaker identifies has engaged in one of these behaviors. The overall score for any leader is the average of this percentage across the total number of interview responses examined.

When the need for power is high, leaders work to manipulate the environment to have control and influence and to appear as a winner. They are good at sizing up situations and sensing what tactics will work to achieve their goals. Indeed, they are highly Machiavellian, often working behind the scenes to ensure that their positions prevail. Leaders high in the need for power are generally daring and charming—the dashing hero. But they have little real regard for those around them or for people in general. In effect, other people and groups are viewed as instruments for the leader's ends; guile and deceit are perceived as part of the game of politics. Such leaders set up rules to ensure conformity to their ideas—rules that can change abruptly if the leader's goals or interests change. At first followers are beguiled by leaders who are high in this motive since they are able to produce results and are charismatic, but the "bloom often leaves the rose" over time as such leaders exploit their followers and as their goals diverge from what the people want or feel they need.

Leaders high in the need for power will test the limits before adhering to a course of action, bartering and bargaining up until the last moment in order to see what is possible and what the consequences will be of pushing further toward their goals. These leaders are more skillful in such negotiations when they can interact directly with those involved; without face-to-face interaction, such leaders can misjudge the assumptions the other party is making and how far they are willing to go.

When the need for power is low, leaders have less need to be in charge; they can be one among several who have influence. It is perfectly OK with them that others receive credit for what happens. Indeed, empowering others is important for such a leader. They are willing to sacrifice their own interests for those of the group, since in their view what is good for the group is, in truth, good for them. Leaders low in the need for power enable their followers to feel strong and responsible by empowering them to act as emissaries and expand the group or the group's assets. Through this process these leaders engender high morale in their followers and a sense of team spirit and goal clarity. Such leaders also have a sense of justice. They deal with people evenhandedly based on the norms of the group; they play no favorites so people know where they stand and what will happen if they violate the norms. Their intent is to build a relationship of trust with their followers and a sense of shared responsibility and accountability for what

happens. In effect, these leaders become the agent for the group, representing their needs and interests in policy-making.

Is the Leader Open or Closed to Contextual Information?

Political leaders tend to differ on their degree of openness to contextual information based on their levels of self-confidence and conceptual complexity (see, e.g., Driver 1977; Ziller et al. 1977; Stuart and Starr 1981—82; Jonsson 1982; Hermann 1984a; Snyder 1987; Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann 1989; Tetlock 1991; Suedfeld 1992; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998). Ziller and his colleagues (1977) observed that these two traits interrelate to form a leader's self-other orientation. The self-other orientation indicates how open the leader will be to input from others in the decision-making process and from the political environment in general. Those whose scores on conceptual complexity are higher than their self-confidence scores are open and generally more pragmatic and responsive to the interests, needs, ideas, and demands of others. Such leaders are generally those who get elected in local and state elections in America. They are sensitive to situational cues and act based on what they sense is acceptable under current conditions. They appear to others to be open and to listen. These leaders are able to get others to do things because the leaders seem interested in what happens to these others and concerned about helping them. Such leaders are more likely to organize collegial decision structures that allow for a free give-and-take and, thus, to maximize the contextual information they can have about the opinions and needs of those around them. These leaders deal with problems and events on a case-by-case basis.

Leaders whose self-confidence scores are higher than their scores on conceptual complexity tend to be closed; they are ideologues, principled and driven by causes. These leaders know what is right and what should happen and set about to persuade others of the appropriateness of their course of action. Such leaders are fairly unresponsive or insensitive to cues from the environment. Instead they reinterpret the environment to fit their view of the world. Moreover, they are not above using coercive or devious tactics to ensure that their views are adopted by a group. Indeed, they are highly active on behalf of their cause, eagerly pursuing options they believe will succeed. These leaders are more likely to organize the decision-making process in a hierarchical manner to maintain control over the nature of the decision. They generally do not win any "most popular leader" contests but are usually admired for what they can do.

When the scores on these two traits are relatively equal, leaders' behavior will depend on whether the scores are high or low when compared to other leaders (for example, either the sample of 87 or 122 on which I have collected data or regional subsamples of these two groups). If both are high, leaders will be open and more strategic, focusing their attention on what is possible and feasible at any point in time. Their high self-confidence facilitates having patience in the situation and taking their time to see what will succeed. These leaders will combine the best qualities of both these characteristics—a sense of what they want to do but the capability to check the environment to see what will work. It is interesting to note that this type of leader is less likely to be elected in democratic systems (Ziller et al. 1977), perhaps because their behavior seems to the outside observer and interested constituent to be erratic and opportunistic. If one knows the goals and political contexts of such leaders, their decisions and actions become more logical. Without this knowledge, however, they may seem indecisive and chameleonlike in their behavior.

If the scores on both traits are low in comparison to other leaders, the individual is likely to be closed, reflecting the views of those around him or her, and inclined to rather easily lock onto a position that will seem likely to be successful. These are the leaders that Lasswell (1930; see also Barber 1965) observed entered into politics to compensate for their low self-esteem. They are easy targets for groups that seek someone who will tenaciously advocate for a particular

position in exchange for influence and authority, however tenuous and fleeting the assignment may be. These leaders may evidence some of the signs of narcissism, relishing the spotlight, pushing for even more extreme moves than the group may perceive are necessary, and being preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success.

Table 8.3 summarizes this discussion, suggesting some rules to follow in determining how open a leader will be to information based on his or her scores on conceptual complexity and self-confidence. Self-confidence and conceptual complexity scores are correlated 0.10 for the 87 heads of state in my sample of leaders and 0.33 for the broader set of 122 political leaders. Both correlations suggest that we will find all combinations of the trait scores among world leaders. These two traits are assessed in the following way.

Self-Confidence

Self-confidence indicates one's sense of self-importance, an individual's image of his or her ability to cope adequately with objects and persons in the environment. Indeed, self-confidence "is that component of the self system which is involved in regulating the extent to which the self system is maintained under conditions of strain such as occur during the processing of new information relative to the self (Ziller et al. 1977, 177; see also Ziller 1973). Stimuli from the environment are mediated by a person's sense of self. Since people tend to develop their self-confidence as a result of evaluating themselves in comparison with others and their experiences, this trait often becomes the frame of reference for positioning one's self in a particular context.

In coding for self-confidence, the focus is on the pronouns *my*, *myself*, *I*, *me*, and *mine*. When speakers interject these pronouns into their speech, how important do they see themselves compared to what is happening? Does the use of the pronoun reflect that the leader is instigating an activity (e.g., "I am going to . . ." or "That is my plan of action"), should be viewed as an authority figure on this issue (e.g., "If it were up to me . . ." or "Let me explain what we mean"), or is the recipient of a positive response from another person or group (e.g., "You flatter me with your praise" or "My position was accepted")? In each of these instances, there is an enhanced sense of self-worth and a show of self-confidence. A score on this trait is determined by calculating the percentage of times these personal pronouns are used in an interview response that meet the three criteria. The overall score for any leader is his or her average percentage across the total number of interview responses collected for that particular person.

Leaders whose self-confidence is high are more immune to incoming information from the environment than are those with low self-confidence. They are more generally satisfied with who they are and are not searching for more material on which to evaluate themselves and their behavior. "New information relative to the self is ... ignored or transformed in such a way as to maintain consistency in behavior" (Ziller et al. 1977, 177). Such leaders are not subject to the whims of contextual contingencies. They are neither the victims of events nor are they compelled to adapt to the nature of the situation—consistency in behavior is too important. Information is filtered and reinterpreted based on their high sense of self-worth.

Political leaders, however, who are low in self-confidence are easily buffeted by the "contextual winds." Without a well-developed sense of who they are, such leaders tend to continually seek out information from the environment in order to know what to do and how to conform to the demands of the circumstances in which they find themselves. Input from others about what they are thinking and feeling is critical to knowing how to act in any situation. Thus, the behavior of these individuals often appears highly inconsistent, matched as it is to the nature of the setting, not to the needs and desires of the individual. To compensate for feelings of inadequacy, these leaders seek to become the agents, representatives, or delegates of political groups that can help to enhance their self-confidence.

Conceptual Complexity

Conceptual complexity is the degree of differentiation that an individual shows in describing or discussing other people, places, policies, ideas, or things. The conceptually complex individual can see varying reasons for a particular position, is willing to entertain the possibility that there is ambiguity in the environment, and is flexible in reacting to objects or ideas. In the opposite manner, the conceptually simple individual tends to classify objects and ideas into good-bad, black-white, either-or dimensions; has difficulty in perceiving ambiguity in the environment; and reacts rather inflexibly to stimuli.

In coding for conceptual complexity, the focus is on particular words—words that suggest the speaker can see different dimensions in the environment as opposed to words that indicate the speaker sees only a few categories along which to classify objects and ideas. Words that are suggestive of high conceptual complexity are *approximately*, *possibility*, *trend*, and *for example*; words indicative of low conceptual complexity include *absolutely*, *without a doubt*, *certainly*, and *irreversible*. As with the other traits previously discussed, the score for conceptual complexity is the percentage of high and low complexity words in any interview response that suggest high complexity. The overall score for any leader is his or her average score across interview responses.

Political leaders who are high in conceptual complexity attend to a wider array of stimuli from their environment than do those who are low. Indeed, they have a sense that issues are more gray than black or white and seek a variety of perspectives through which to organize the situation in which they find themselves. These leaders remain highly attuned to contextual information since they do not necessarily trust their first response to an event. In the view of the conceptually complex leader, to understand a situation and plan what to do, one must gather a large array of information and seek out others' opinions on what should be done—there is always room for one more piece of data or perspective. Such leaders often take their time in making decisions and involve a large array of actors in the decision-making process. Flexibility is seen as the key to behavior.

Leaders who are low in conceptual complexity trust their intuition and often are willing to go with the option that presents itself first. Action is preferable to thinking, planning, or searching for more information. Contextual information is generally classified according to a set of stereotypes; because there is often a good fit between this categorization system and the conceptually more simple individual's orientation to politics, the world is highly ordered and structured. It is relatively easy to decide what to do since the individual's closed conceptual system evaluates and transforms information from any situation into the specified categories. Interpretation and consistency are the keys to behavior.

Is the Leader Motivated by Problems or Relationships?

In politics, the literature (e.g., Wriggins 1969; Burns 1978; Nixon 1982; Hermann 1986a; Hargrove 1989; Heifetz 1994; Bennis and Nanus 1997; Hermann and Hagan 1998) suggests that leaders have certain reasons for assuming their positions of authority that have to do with them and with the relevance of the groups (e.g., parties, juntas, ethnic groups, unions, administrations, cabinets, and governments) with whom they identify. As noted earlier, leaders are driven, in general, either by an internal focus (a problem)—a particular cause, an ideology, a specific set of interests—or by the desire for a certain kind of feedback from those in their environment (a relationship)—acceptance, power, support, acclaim. They also appear to become activated by needs to protect their own kind. Whereas leaders who are more closely identified with particular groups work to ensure such entities' survival and often perceive the political world as full of potential threats to their groups, those who are less strongly tied to a specific group view the world as posing potential opportunities for working with others for mutual

or their own benefit. Thus, in assessing motivation, we are interested in both why the leader sought office *and* their need to preserve and secure the group they are leading (and, in turn, their position).

Three traits are used to measure these two types of motivation: task focus, in-group bias, and distrust of others. Task versus interpersonal focus provides information about the leaders' reasons for seeking office; in-group bias and distrust of others assist in assessing identification with the group. Let us consider each of these traits in more detail.

Motivation for Seeking Office (task focus)

Leaders have been recognized as performing two distinct functions in groups, that of moving the group toward completion of a task (solving problems) and that of maintaining group spirit and morale (building relationships). These two functions can be represented by a continuum, with one extreme representing an emphasis on getting the task done and the other extreme an emphasis on group maintenance. Task focus suggests the relative emphasis a leader places in interactions with others on dealing with the problems that face the government as opposed to focusing on the feelings and needs of relevant and important constituents. For leaders who emphasize the problem, moving the group (nation, government, ethnic group, religious group, union, etc.) forward toward a goal is their principal purpose for assuming leadership. For those who emphasize group maintenance and establishing relationships, keeping the loyalty of constituents and morale high are the central functions of leadership. Research (e.g., Byars 1972, 1973; Hermann and Kogan 1977; Bass 1981) has suggested that charismatic leaders are those who fall in the middle of this continuum, focusing on the problem when that is appropriate to the situation at hand and on building relationships when that seems more relevant. The charismatic leader senses when the context calls for each of these functions and focuses on it at that point in time. Table 8.4 summarizes this discussion.

In coding for task focus, just like in coding for conceptual complexity, attention is directed toward counting specific words, in this case words that indicate work on a task or instrumental activity, as well as words that center around concern for another's feelings, desires, and satisfaction. Examples of the task-oriented words are *accomplishment*, *achieve(ment)*, *plan*, *position*, *proposal*, *recommendation*, and *tactic*. Illustrative of the group-maintenance types of words are *appreciation*, *amnesty*, *collaboration*, *disappoint(ment)*, *forgive(ness)*, *harm*, *liberation*, and *suffering*. The score for task focus is determined by calculating the percentage of task-oriented words relative to the total number of task-oriented and group-maintenance words in a particular interview response. The overall score is the average percentage across the interview responses examined.

Leaders with a task focus are often taskmasters, always pushing a group to work on solving the particular problem of the moment. They tend to see the world in terms of problems and the role of the group as providing solutions to these problems. These leaders view people less as individuals than as instruments. Such leaders are constantly asking for movement on a project, about what is happening in the implementation of a solution to a problem, and for options to deal with a problem. The substance, not the people involved, is the focus of attention. Leaders with a task emphasis are willing to sacrifice a high level of morale in the group for accomplishing the task. As these leaders note: "You can't keep all the people happy; leaders have to make hard decisions for the good of the group, and the people will just have to understand." These leaders seek followers who share their interest in solving problems and who will work hard to implement any decisions that are made.

Leaders with a group-maintenance or relationship focus want to keep the morale and spirit of their groups high. These leaders are generally sensitive to what the people want and need and try to provide it. They will only move the group toward its goals as fast as the members are willing to move. Camaraderie, loyalty, and commitment to the group are critical for leaders with

this emphasis. The people in the group, not what needs to be done, are the focus of attention. These leaders work to foster a sense of collegiality and of participation in their groups. Members have the feeling that they are a part of what happens and that their views are sought and listened to. For these leaders, mobilizing and empowering members are what leadership is all about. As a result, they are likely to build teams and to share leadership, often seeking out opinions about what is feasible among relevant constituencies at any point in time.

Motivation toward World (in-group bias and distrust of others)

Table 8.5 suggests how information about a leader's scores on in-group bias and distrust of others provides us with evidence concerning whether the leader is driven by the threats or problems he or she perceives in the world or by the opportunities to form cooperative relationships. There is a growing literature indicating that leaders' ways of approaching the world can affect how confrontational their country is likely to be, how likely they are to take initiatives, and when they are likely to engage in economic sanctions and military interventions (see, e.g., Levine and Campbell 1972; Driver 1977; Kelman 1983; Vasquez 1993; Snyder 1991; Hagan 1994, 1995; Hermann and Kegley 1995). Indeed, this writing has been referred to as the "statist approach" to foreign policy decision making since it focuses on how leaders' needs to protect their own kind, when shared by an administration, can shape how conflictual or cooperative a government and country will be in the international arena (see Hagan 1994). The research suggests that the more focused leaders are on protecting their own kind, the more threats they are likely to perceive in the environment and the more focused they will be on confronting those responsible. Leaders who are not so intense in this desire are capable of seeing the possibilities for win-win agreements and for building relationships in international politics since the world is viewed as containing opportunities as well as threats.

The two traits, in-group bias and distrust of others, are correlated 0.62 in my sample of 87 heads of state and 0.29 in the broader sample of 122 leaders. In the head of state sample, the rather high correlation indicates that, when such leaders are highly identified with their country, they are also probably highly distrustful and vice versa. In other words, just as in common parlance, heads of state tend to be hawks or doves, hardliners or accommodationists—more threat and problem oriented or more opportunity and relationship oriented.

In-group bias is a view of the world in which one's own group (social, political, ethnic, etc.) holds center stage. There are strong emotional attachments to this in-group, and it is perceived as the best. Moreover, there is an emphasis on the importance of maintaining in-group culture and status. Any decisions that are made favor the in-group. In coding for in-group bias, the unit of analysis is a word or phrase referring to the particular leader's own group. Of interest is ascertaining the following information when the leader makes a reference to his or her own group: are the modifiers used favorable (e.g., *great, peace-loving, progressive, successful, prosperous*); do they suggest strength (e.g., *powerful, capable, made great advances, has boundless resources*); or do they indicate the need to maintain group honor and identity (e.g., "need to defend firmly our borders," "must maintain our own interpretation," "decide our own policies")? If any of these modifiers are present, the phrase indicates in-group bias. The score for in-group bias is the percentage of times in an interview response that a leader refers to in-groups that meet the criteria just outlined. The leader's overall score is the average of these percentages across all the interview responses under examination.

Political leaders high in in-group bias are interested in maintaining the separate identity of their groups at all costs. They become quite concerned when other groups, organizations, governments, or countries try to meddle in what they perceive are the internal affairs of their group. The higher the score, the more isomorphic the leader and group become—the leader is the group; if anything happens to the group it happens to the leader and vice versa. Leaders with high scores for in-group bias tend to see the world in *we* and *them* (friends and enemies)

terms and to be quick to view others as challenging the status of their group. They are prone to perceive only the good aspects of their group and to deny or rationalize away any weaknesses. Thus, such leaders are often relatively late in becoming aware of problems that may undermine their authority.

Leaders high in in-group bias are likely to use external scapegoats—their perceived enemies—as the cause for all of the group's (government's, country's) problems and to mobilize the support of their own population through this external threat. In the extreme, such leaders may keep their group mobilized militarily indefinitely to deal with *the perceived* external enemy. Leaders with high scores are likely to view politics as a zero-sum game where one group's gain is another's loss. Therefore, they must always be vigilant to make sure that it is their group that wins, not loses. Such leaders will want people around them who are also highly identified with the group and loyal—selecting advisers on the basis of their sense of commitment to the group and its goals and interests.

It is important to note here that leaders who are low in in-group bias are still patriots interested in the maintenance of their groups as a separate entity. They are, however, less prone to view the world in black-and-white terms and more willing to categorize people as *we* or *them* based on the nature of the situation or problem at hand so that such categories remain fluid and ever changing depending on what is happening in the world at the moment. These leaders are less likely to use scapegoats as a means of dealing with domestic opposition; instead they may use interactions such as summit conferences and positive diplomatic gestures as strategies for tempering domestic discontent.

Distrust of others involves a general feeling of doubt, uneasiness, misgiving, and wariness about others—an inclination to suspect the motives and actions of others. In coding for distrust of others, the focus is on noun and noun phrases referring to persons other than the leader and to groups other than those with whom the leader identifies. Does the leader distrust, doubt, have misgivings about, feel uneasy about, or feel wary about what these persons or groups are doing? Does the leader show concern about what these persons or groups are doing and perceive such actions to be harmful, wrong, or detrimental to himself or herself, an ally, a friend, or a cause important to the leader? If either of these conditions is present, the noun or noun phrase is coded as indicating distrust. A leader's score on this trait is the percentage of times in an interview response that he or she exhibits distrust toward other groups or persons; the overall score is the average of these percentages across the interview responses being studied.

Leaders who are high in distrust of others are given to being suspicious about the motives and actions of others, particularly those others who are viewed as competitors for their positions or against their cause or ideology. These others can do nothing right; whatever they do is easily perceived as for ulterior motives and designs. In its extreme, distrust of others becomes paranoia in which there is a well-developed rationale for being suspicious of certain individuals, groups, or countries. Distrust of others often makes leaders not rely on others but do things on their own to prevent any sabotage of what they want done. Loyalty becomes a *sine qua non* of working with the leader and participating in policy-making. And such leaders often shuffle their advisers around, making sure that none of them is acquiring a large enough power base to challenge the leader's authority. To some extent distrust of others may grow out of a zero-sum view of the world—when someone wins, someone else loses. The desire not to lose makes the leader question and assess others' motives. Leaders who distrust others tend to be hypersensitive to criticism—often seeing criticism where others would not—and they are vigilant, always on the lookout for a challenge to their authority or self.

Some wariness of others' motives may be an occupational hazard of political leaders. But leaders low in distrust of others tend to put it into perspective. Trust and distrust are more likely to be based on past experience with the people involved and on the nature of the current situation. A person is distrusted based on more realistic cues and not in a blanket fashion.

Constructing a Profile

Once a leader's interview responses have been coded and overall scores have been calculated for each of the seven traits described here, it is time to put the scores into perspective by determining how they compare with those of other leaders. Without doing such a comparison, there is little basis on which to judge whether the particular leader's traits are unusually high or low or about average. The issue is deciding what group of leaders to use as the comparison—or norming—group. Table 8.6 presents scores on all seven traits for the 87 heads of state and the 122 more general political leaders mentioned earlier. The table presents the mean or average score on a particular trait for the two samples of leaders, as well as the scores that are one standard deviation above and below that mean. If the leader under study has a score that exceeds that listed as one standard deviation above the mean for the sample of leaders, he or she is high on the trait; if the leader's score is more than one standard deviation below the mean for the sample of leaders, he or she is low on the trait. If the leader's score falls around the mean for the sample (neither one standard deviation above nor below the mean), he or she is moderate in the trait and is like the average leader in that comparison group. The 87 heads of state represent some forty-six countries from all parts of the globe; the 122 leaders are drawn from forty-eight countries and include, in addition to the 87 heads of state, members of cabinets, revolutionary leaders, legislative leaders, leaders of opposition parties, and terrorist leaders. The sample includes leaders who held positions of authority from 1945 to the present. Scores for particular regional, country, or cultural groups embedded in these 122 leaders are available from the author.

Once the analyst has determined how a leader's scores compare to those of other leaders, it is feasible to use the tables and discussion presented earlier on the traits and leadership styles to develop a profile of the leader. How is the leader likely to respond to constraints (scores on the belief he or she can control events and the need for power)? How open is he or she likely to be to information (scores on self-confidence and conceptual complexity)? What is the nature of the leader's motivation for seeking authority and influence (score on task focus as well as on in-group bias and distrust of others)? By noting whether a leader is more likely to respect or challenge constraints, to be more or less open to information, and to be more internally or externally driven, the analyst can ascertain the particular leadership style (see table 8.1) that leader is likely to exhibit.

Thus, for example, suppose we were developing a profile of Hafez al-Assad, current head of state of Syria. And suppose his scores when compared to the other eighty-seven heads of state show that he (1) is high in the belief he can control events and in the need for power, indicating he is likely to challenge constraints (see table 8.2); (2) has a conceptual complexity score that is higher than his score for self-confidence, suggesting he is open to incoming information (see table 8.3); (3) is high in task focus, denoting that his attention is more centered around the problem rather than relationships; and (4) has an in-group bias though he is relatively low in distrust of others, leading to a focus on being strategic in the way he deals with problems (see table 8.5). According to table 8.1, Assad will evidence an actively independent leadership style. He will be highly interested in maintaining his own and Syria's maneuverability and independence in a world that he perceives continually tries to limit both. Although Assad perceives that the world is conflict prone, he also views all countries as being somewhat constrained by international norms, affording him some flexibility in what he can do. However, he must vigilantly monitor developments in the international arena and prudently prepare to contain an adversary while still pursuing Syria's interests (see Hermann 1988a for more detail on Assad's profile). By using the trait scores, we can begin to build a profile or image of the leader in comparison to other political leaders.

Contextualizing the Profile

Much of the research on personality suggests that some people use contextual cues to determine what they do and, thus, may evidence changes in their trait scores depending on the nature of the situation. Other people's personalities are fairly stable across situations. By examining diverse material on a political leader, it is possible to determine how stable his or her leadership traits are. By analyzing material that cuts across a period of time, across different substantive topics, across different audiences, and is inside or outside of the leadership group (or political unit), we can determine the stability of the leadership traits. Moreover, by examining different aspects of the context such as the topic, audience, and whether the focus of attention is on the domestic or international domains, we can learn if leaders are sensitive to certain cues in their environment but not to others. If there is variability in the scores, then, we can determine if the differences give us insights into how the leader's public images differ—the various ways political leaders adapt to the situations in which they find themselves. We gain cues about how they are likely to change their behavior and what contextual features generate such change.

Nature of Topics Covered

To examine whether and how a leader's traits may differ by substantive topic, it is necessary to ascertain what topics are covered in the material under analysis. At issue is determining what the leader is talking about in each interview response that is being coded. What topics are under discussion? After noting the topics that are covered in the interview responses being studied, it is generally possible to arrive at a set of categories by checking where the topics are similar and which topics are discussed the most. In effect, some topics can be combined into a more generic topic (e.g., technological development and trade/aid topics might be collapsed into a category called *economic issues*). Generic topics that are often discussed by heads of state are military issues, economic issues, relations with another country, relations with an enemy, domestic political stability, and regional politics. Topics that are covered only sporadically in the material are good candidates for combining into more generic categories.

Nature of Audience

Interviews with political leaders are done in a variety of settings and, thus, are often targeted toward different audiences. To examine the effects of audience on a leader's scores, it becomes important to note who is doing the interview and in what setting. For example, in profiling a head of state, an analyst will want to record if the interview involves the domestic or international press. If it is the domestic press, is the interviewer closely affiliated with the particular leader, more affiliated with that leader's opposition, or neutral in orientation? If it is the international press, to whom is the interview likely to be reported—people in an adversary's country, an ally's country, a country whose government the leader would like to influence, or a fairly neutral source? Of interest is whether the leader's trait scores show a pattern of change across these various types of audiences.

Effects of Events and Tenure in Office

Consider whether there have been any events (e.g., negotiations, crises, scandals, international agreements) that have occurred during the tenure of the leader under examination. By noting when these events happened and by choosing interview responses that span these points in time, it is possible to explore whether the leader's scores are affected by specific types of situations. In democratic societies, such an analysis might be conducted for periods before and after elections. For leaders with a long tenure in office, one might consider whether there

are any changes that have occurred across time or whether the leader remains very much the same as when he or she began.

Determining whether Changes Are Significant

If the analyst wants to assess mathematically whether the changes in scores across time, topic, or audience on any of the personal characteristics for a leader are statistically significant, an analysis of variance will provide such data. Most statistical packages for personal computers have a one-way analysis of variance procedure that can easily be applied to exploring this question. If the one-way analyses of variance "F-tests" are significant (have a probability value of .05 or less), then the leader's scores differ on that trait for that context factor (time, topic, audience); in effect, the leader is being adaptive in , that type of situation. By noting where a leader's scores change, the analyst can put the leadership profile into context. One can note if the leader puts on a different face when dealing with foreign diplomats than when interacting inside his or her own country; if the leader has different strategies for dealing with different types of problems; if he or she adapts to being a political leader in a different way with experience and a longer tenure in the position. This contextual analysis adds depth and nuance to the more general profile constructed

Problems Often Faced in Constructing a Profile

What if leaders' scores change dramatically across topics, audiences, and time? Dramatic changes or differences in scores across contextual categories usually suggest that a leader is highly sensitive to the situation. Such leaders tend to judge what their options are based on what is happening at the moment by assessing who is supporting what and the nature of the problem. Action is only taken after such leaders have a chance to survey the scene and to define what important others are likely to do. For these leaders, analysts are going to need to know a lot more about the situations the leaders are facing in order to know what they will do. Examining just where the changes occurred can provide information about what part of the context is important for that leader. If the changes are found for audience, chances are that these leaders are influenced by the people, groups, and organizations with whom they are interacting. If, however, the changes occur by topic, then the leaders are probably attending to solving the problem at hand and tailoring their behavior to deal with what is happening.

What if leaders' scores are very different when they are talking to a domestic audience rather than to an international one? This question is an important one because leaders of third world countries often show such differences. They are much less directive, more charming, and more diplomatic in dealing with the governments of larger, more developed states from whom they may want something than when they focus on their own countries. Toward the domestic scene, they can be highly authoritarian and autocratic, knowing exactly what needs to be done and when. It is important to highlight these differences in any profile since they have implications for what leaders are likely to do where and can lead to misinterpretations of the leadership styles of these leaders.

Do leaders' scores differ in a crisis as opposed to a noncrisis situation? If you have scores for your leader by topic, you may be able to judge whether there is a difference between his or her public images for crisis and noncrisis situations, because some of the topics are more crisislike in tone than others. Therefore, if the topics include "aggression from another country" or "threats to ethnic group," the scores probably reflect crisis behavior—at least more so than when the leader is focusing on the economy or education (unless, of course, there are problems in these domains). Differentiating crises from noncrises becomes important because leaders often experience stress during crises and tend to accentuate the traits in which they are high. They tend to become more extreme in their profile. For example, if they believe they can control

what happens more generally, they have even more faith in this belief during a crisis; if they usually have a high need for power, it will be accentuated in a crisis. This accentuation is most visible in leaders whose scores are fairly stable across time, topic, and audience—those who are relatively insensitive to the environment. Leaders whose scores show marked variability by these context factors appear to become more vigilant in crises and more indecisive, reacting to rather than initiating activity and relying on others' help and support more than usual.

Reliability of the Profiles

There are two types of reliability that are often calculated in building profiles. The first assesses how easy it is for those unfamiliar with the content analysis coding system to learn and apply it to leaders' interview responses with the same skill as its author. In other words, is it possible for others to be trained to use the coding system and to achieve a high degree of agreement with the person who developed the profiling technique? The second reliability examines the stability of the leader's scores, trying to ascertain how sensitive the leader is to the political context. Both kinds of reliability have been determined for the coding system described here.

Across a number of studies (e.g., Hermann 1980a, 1980b, 1984c, 1987b; Hermann and Hermann 1989), the intercoder agreement for the seven traits described in this chapter has ranged from .78 to 1.00 between a set of coders and the author. Where there were disagreements, the discussions that followed between coders permitted refinements of the coding system. Generally, a coder currently is not permitted to content analyze a leader's interview responses to be included in the larger data set until he or she achieves intercoder reliabilities with the author on all traits that are .90 or higher. As the automated coding system is being developed, similar types of reliability coefficients are being calculated to determine how accurately that coding system is in reflecting the original intent of the author. Information about the leader can be gained by assessing trait reliabilities for that particular person. By correlating a leader's odd- and even-numbered interview responses, the analyst can ascertain how stable the traits are across time and issues. This index provides another way of determining how open and closed the leader is likely to be to contextual information (see, e.g., Hermann 1980a, 1984a). One of the questions often raised about content analysis coding systems that use translated material, which we are often forced to do, regards the effect of the translation on the resulting scores. To ascertain whether there were any effects and the nature of such effects, in several instances intercoder agreement has been calculated between a native speaker coding text in the original language and the author focusing on the translated text. The languages were Russian and French. In both cases, agreement averaged .92 across the seven traits (Hermann 1980b, 1987a, 1987b).

Validity of This Profiling Technique

How valid is this particular way of determining leadership style? That is, how accurate is it in capturing the leadership styles that heads of state and others in leading party and bureaucratic positions actually exhibit? Although I have received numerous suggestions about how to determine the validity of this technique, ranging from running experiments with college students to participant observation in city councils, it seemed important to find some means of comparing the results from this coding system with the experiences of those who had interacted with heads of state. In a series of studies, I (Hermann 1984b, 1985, 1986b, 1988b) developed profiles on twenty-one leaders following the procedure described here and, based on these profiles, indicated on a series of rating scales the nature of the leadership behaviors a particular head of state should exhibit given a particular leadership style. These ratings were compared with those made by journalists and former government personnel who had had the opportunity to observe

or interact with the particular leaders. The correlations between the two sets of ratings averaged .84 across the set of leaders, suggesting that the profiles derived from this at-a-distance technique furnished me with similar types of information on which to judge behavior, as had the other raters' experiences with the actual figures.

Conclusion

By doing a trait analysis of seven dimensions of personality, I have proposed that it is possible for a researcher or analyst to develop a profile of the leadership style a particular political leader is likely to exhibit. The seven personal characteristics provide information about whether the leader will respect or challenge constraints, will be open or closed to information from the environment, will focus more on solving problems or building community, and will be more hardline or more accommodationist. The traits also interrelate to suggest which leadership style from a rather wide range is likely to be dominant in any leader. Constructing such a profile has become more feasible with the design of computer software that can analyze leaders' interview responses and with the collection of trait data on 122 political leaders from around the world that comprise a norming group with which to compare any one leader's scores.

Not only is it feasible now to construct a general profile of a particular leader, but it is also possible to place such a profile into perspective by examining a number of contextual factors that indicate how stable the characteristics are with certain kinds of changes in the situation. We can ascertain what the leader is like in general and, then, what kinds of information he or she is likely to be responsive to in the political environment. Thus, the general profile indicates where a specific leader fits in a broader discussion of leadership style; the contextualized profile suggests how that leader has individualized his or her responses to manifest more unique characteristics. With knowledge about both the general and the more individualized profiles, the researcher and analyst gain a more complete portrait of the leader. Not only does the person become representative of a particular type of leader, but we know when and to what degree he or she has modulated his or her behavior to take the context into account.

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Chapter 13

William Jefferson Clinton's Leadership Style

This leadership profile of Bill Clinton, forty-second president of the United States, is based on an analysis of his responses to the domestic and international press in fifty-four interviews between 1992 and 1998. The description that follows is derived from an at-a-distance assessment of some 36,750 words. The words were examined for evidence of seven different characteristics that have implications for how political leaders will behave, the kinds of actions they are likely to urge on their parties and governments, and the way they structure and interact with their advisory groups. An individual leader's traits are put into perspective by comparing them with similar scores for other political leaders from their region and around the globe. The characteristics are contextualized further by exploring how stable they are across issues, audiences, and time. The attributes that define the profile are those that historians, journalists, political scientists, and other students of leadership have found to be influential in shaping what leaders will do politically. The traits that are examined are (1) the belief that one can influence or control what happens, (2) the need for power and influence, (3) conceptual complexity (the ability to differentiate among things and people in one's environment), (4) self-confidence or self-esteem, (5) in-group bias, (6) general distrust of others, and (7) the tendency to focus on problem solving and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others' ideas and sensitivities. The at-a-distance technique is described in more detail in chapter 8.

Several types of verbal material were available on Clinton: speeches, public statements, memorandums, messages, and interviews with the press. Since the first four types of material can be written or crafted for the leader by others, some caution must be exercised in examining such statements to ascertain what the leader is like. Care and thought have often gone into what is said and how it is said. Interviews with the media, however, are generally more spontaneous. During the give-and-take of a question-and-answer period, the leader must respond quickly without props or aid; what he or she is like can influence the nature of the response and how it is worded. Although there may be some preparation of leaders prior to an interview with the press, during the interview they are on their own to respond. For these reasons, the following profile is based only on Clinton's responses to media questions in an interview setting.

Leadership Profile in General

Table 13.1 reports the average trait scores for Clinton across 105 interview responses. The scores represent the percentage of time Clinton used words that are indicative of a particular characteristic where the criteria for coding the trait were present. The percentages can range from zero to one hundred. Table 13.1 also presents what would be considered low and high scores on a specific characteristic based on the scores of 18 North American leaders, as well as those of 122 political leaders from forty-six countries around the globe. Low and high scores are one standard deviation below and above the average score for a particular trait for the group of leaders with whom Clinton is being compared and differentiate him from these others. Clinton is considered moderate in the characteristic if his score is not one standard deviation above or below the mean of the particular group of leaders; in other words, he resembles the comparison set of leaders on that trait. As the reader will note, when Clinton's scores are close to being low or high, I have noted that he leans toward being one or the other.

Bill Clinton is different from the two samples of leaders on four of the seven traits (57 percent). He differs from the other leaders on conceptual complexity, self-confidence, in-group bias, and distrust of others. The similarities and differences between Clinton and these other

leaders have implications for his leadership style. The discussion that follows details these implications. It is based on extensive research in the social sciences on how these characteristics affect leadership, elaborated in chapter 8.

Does the Leader Respect or Challenge Constraints in the Political Environment?

In considering leaders' responsiveness to political constraints, we are interested in how important it is for them to exert control and influence over the environment in which they find themselves, as opposed to being adaptable to the situation and remaining open to responding to the demands of domestic and international constituencies and circumstances. Scores on the belief one can control events and on the need for power provide us with information with which to decide whether a leader will challenge or respect constraints. Leaders who are high on both traits work to take charge of any situation in which they find themselves and to test the limits of what is possible; those who are low in both traits perceive the importance of working within the constraints in their environments to build consensus and to accommodate constituents' interests.

Clinton's scores on these traits indicate that he is moderate in comparison to other leaders. He is like these leaders; he does not stand out on either characteristic from leaders in his region or around the globe. Such moderate scores suggest the leader will generally respect constraints but under certain circumstances can challenge what appear to be inappropriate or unfounded limitations on his role. Most of the time leaders with moderate scores like Clinton's will work within the parameters they perceive to structure their political environment. Because of the limitations within which they perceive they have to work, building consensus and achieving compromise are important skills for a politician to have and to exercise.

Such leaders are more likely to be reactive than to take the initiative; they want to wait to see how the situation will probably play out before acting. They prefer to let others take the lead and responsibility for anything too daring and out of the ordinary; they want to lead in contexts where there is at least a 50 percent or better chance of success or where compromise is possible. Leaders like Clinton will want to test out their ideas before making decisions—to "run ideas up the flagpole and see who salutes them." Polling data, particular constituents' opinions, and discussions with affected groups are important in providing the basis for knowing what will work. Such cautious behavior makes it possible to blame others if something goes wrong but also reduces the likelihood of action unless it will already receive support.

As will become evident in the discussion when we contextualize Clinton's profile, there are some times when leaders with his scores will challenge the constraints put in their path. Threats to policies that undergird their leadership positions, what appear to them to be unfair charges, and national crises are some situations in which leaders with moderate scores on the belief that they can control what happens and on the need for power will be more likely to take charge and become highly manipulative in moving toward their goals. The situations require action, and the person will be viewed as lacking leadership if he or she does not do something.

Is the Leader Open or Closed to Contextual Information?

Political leaders have been found to differ in their degree of openness to contextual information based on their levels of *self-confidence* and *conceptual complexity*. These two traits interrelate to form a leader's self-other orientation—how open they will be to input from others in the decision-making process and from the political environment in general. Leaders like Clinton whose scores on these two traits are relatively equal and higher than other leaders are generally open to information. Indeed, they are likely to be quite strategic in their behavior, focusing their attention on what is possible and feasible at any point in time. Their high self-confidence facilitates having patience in the situation and taking their time to see what will

succeed, while their high conceptual complexity pushes them to search for information from a variety of constituents and perspectives. These leaders combine the best qualities of both these traits—a sense of what they want to do but the capability to check the environment to see what will work.

These leaders seek both confirmatory and disconfirmatory information from the context to know what is feasible. They want to become the center of any information network that will provide them with a sense of what is happening and who is supporting or opposing what options and activities. In their minds, information is power. If they can maintain themselves as the hubs of such networks, they know more than any other member. Such a role allows them to be in the middle of all decisions.

One dilemma such leaders have is that their behavior can seem erratic and opportunistic to the outside observer. If one does not know the goals or understand how such leaders are perceiving the situation, their decisions and actions may seem indecisive and chameleonlike as they try to decipher what is doable at any point in time. To gather information, these leaders may lead particular constituents and groups to believe that their position is supported when, indeed, all that the leaders were doing was considering options and getting reactions.

Political leaders like Clinton who are high in conceptual complexity attend to a wider array of stimuli from their environment than do those who are low. They have a sense that issues are more gray than black or white and seek a variety of pieces of information through which to organize the situation in which they find themselves. These leaders remain highly attuned to contextual information since they do not necessarily trust their initial response to an event. In order to understand a situation and to plan what to do, such individuals perceive that there is always room for one more piece of data or point of view. Thus, such leaders often take their time in making decisions and touch base with a large number of actors in the decision-making process. Flexibility is seen as the key to being effective in politics.

Is the Leader Motivated by Problem or Relationship? In politics, the literature suggests that leaders have certain reasons for assuming their positions of authority that have to do with them and with the relevance of the groups with whom they identify. Leaders are driven, in general, either by an internal focus—a problem, cause, specific set of interests—or by the desire for a certain kind of feedback from those in their environment—relationship, be it acceptance, power, support, or acclaim. They also appear to be activated by needs to protect their own kind. Whereas leaders who are more closely identified with particular groups work to ensure such entities' survival, those who are less strongly tied to a specific group view the world as posing potential opportunities for working with others for mutual or their own benefit. *Task versus interpersonal focus* indicates the former type of motivation, and a combination of *in-group bias* and *distrust of others* indicates the latter type.

Leaders like Clinton who have moderate scores on task versus interpersonal focus have the facility to direct their attention to the problem when that is appropriate to the situation at hand or to build relationships when that seems more relevant. Such leaders sense when the context calls for each of these functions and focus on it at that point in time. Depending on the circumstances, they can push toward their goals or center their attention on keeping the loyalty and morale of important constituencies high. In effect, they can fulfill both functions considered important to governance—accomplishing something and maintaining coalitions. "With the ability to move between a concern for solving a problem and a sensitivity to what it will take to keep people allied to a cause, these leaders are likely to monitor the environment for cues that indicate the demand for a particular focus of attention. For Clinton, such a capability augments his more general openness to information, enhancing the strategic nature of his proposals and activities. Situations are judged, and actions are taken, based on what he has to do to keep his position and move toward his goals, be it to become a taskmaster or to rally the troops around the flag.

Clinton's relatively low scores on in-group bias and distrust of others indicate that he tends to see politics as more cooperative than conflictual. Indeed, there are certain times when cooperation with others is both feasible and appropriate. The political environment contains opportunities as well as threats and the possibility for win-win agreements. In fact, Clinton views the political process as a large game board, where all players must sacrifice some things so that they can advance toward the general goal. The desirable end is a solution that is mutually beneficial to all—or a compromise in which all gain some of what they want while only having to give up a little. Compared to leaders with an adversarial or zero-sum view of politics, where there should always be a clear winner and loser, such tactics make Clinton seem as if he has no principles or, at the least, is wishy-washy and weak.

For Clinton, politics is the art of the possible. There will generally be another chance, another time to try to get more. In effect, there is forever next year. Some observers have described Clinton as similar to a child's "Bobo clown"—when hit down in one place, it pops back up; no matter how many times the clown is pushed down, it comes right back up again. The toy, in a similar manner to Clinton, seems to say, "You didn't like that; well let's try another way to do it." There are always opportunities to be taken advantage of and relationships to be built.

One downside of this more optimistic view of life and politics is that threats may have to be major before they are registered as threatening. Clinton may miss what to others would be obvious signs of a brewing confrontation because he is working on what is positive in the situation rather than seeing the negative. Thus, at times he is figuratively interested in negotiating a settlement, not perceiving that the other party is not ready to go to the bargaining table. Some have called this behavior of Clinton's an "artichoke" reaction to stress, peeling off one layer at a time and in bits and pieces. But his scores on in-group bias and distrust of others suggest that it may take a number of times for the threat quality of the situation to be perceived.

Leadership Style

Clinton's pattern of scores on the seven traits helps us determine the kind of leadership style he will exhibit. By ascertaining that he is likely to (1) generally respect constraints in his political environment, (2) be open to, and to search out, information in the situation, (3) be motivated by both solving the problem and keeping morale high, and (4) view politics as the art of the possible and mutually beneficial, we know from extensive research that Clinton will exhibit a collegial leadership style. His focus of attention is on reconciling differences and building consensus, on retaining power and authority through building relationships and taking advantage of opportunities to work with others toward specific ends. Clinton's leadership style predisposes him toward the team-building approach to politics. Like the captain of a football or basketball team, the leader is dependent on others to work with him to make things happen. Such leaders see themselves at the center of the information-gathering process. With regard to the advisory process, working as a team means that advisers are empowered to participate in all aspects of policy-making but also to share in the accountability for what occurs. Members of the team are expected to be sensitive to and supportive of the beliefs and values of the leader.

Given Clinton's ability to move between building relationships and solving problems, he can, at times, evidence a more opportunistic leadership style as he takes advantage of a situation to move toward his goals. Although his predispositions lean toward the collegial style of leadership, when circumstances call for it, Clinton can become more focused on the task and what needs to be done, using the event to accomplish something on his agenda.

Among the 122 leaders from around the world who formed the comparison group for this profile, Clinton's pattern of scores is closest to those of Mikhail Gorbachev (Soviet Union) and Chou En-Lai (China). Both these leaders retained their positions because they understood the constraints under which they had to operate but were sensitive to what was feasible and doable in the situation at hand. For each, information was power, and they sought to be at the center of

any information network. Both took advantage of what they perceived to be opportunities in their political environments to build relationships and viewed politics as requiring consensus and compromise. Mutually beneficial solutions were possible in the right circumstances and with the right negotiating partners. They believed that being politically effective required flexibility and openness.

Leadership Profile in Context

An important question with any leadership profile centers around the stability of the traits. Do Clinton's scores remain basically the same across his tenure in office, when he is being interviewed by the domestic and foreign press, and when he is discussing different substantive topics? We can be assured that we are assessing what the leader is like if there is little change in the scores as the context changes; at the least, we know that the leader does not seem to be responding to the situation. It is easier to suggest what a leader is likely to do politically when the trait scores are more stable; with changes in scores, the researcher or analyst must consider contextual factors in deciding both how to influence the leader and what he or she is likely to do.

A statistical procedure (analysis of variance) can be used to determine whether Clinton's scores are stable across time, audience, and topic. Table 13.2 presents the results of such an analysis and the traits where there were statistically significant differences among the scores across the various types of context. Of the twenty-one possible changes (seven traits times three contextual factors), six (29 percent) were statistically significant. In other words, the leadership profile described previously for leaders like Clinton is applicable for him in most circumstances. The statistically significant differences, however, do amplify the portrait of Clinton as leader and, thus, will be discussed subsequently in some detail.

Effects of Time Period

A comparison of Clinton's scores during interviews held during his first administration with those occurring in the second administration suggests that he has changed his style somewhat since being reelected. In the second administration, Clinton has shown more willingness to challenge the constraints in his environment—to work both directly and indirectly to move toward his goals. His scores for the belief that he can control what happens and for the need for power become higher during the second administration. He evidences more interest in guiding and manipulating what is occurring than he did during the first administration. Consensus and compromise have to, at times, be pushed and coerced into place. If other parties are not forthcoming, then the leader has the right to force the issue.

In the second administration Clinton also shows more tendency to focus on solving problems rather than attending to others' feelings and desires. He becomes more of a taskmaster, taking the initiative to push his agenda. Moreover, his environment becomes more suspicious and threatening by the second administration. It is no longer enough to take advantage of opportunities, but he must be vigilant to deal with potential enemies and threats to his position. The world is a little less rosy in the second administration than it was during the first.

Clinton's leadership style in the second administration is more actively independent—he begins to act out the part of the "new Democrat." Although still highly sensitive and responsive to stimuli from the political arena, Clinton is now ready to challenge what he perceives as growing constraints on his role and activities; to push his agenda, albeit in subtle and strategic ways; and to be prepared to contain an adversary if he is threatened himself or if his programs are attacked. He is interested in maintaining his flexibility and maneuverability. In the second administration, there is the perception that these two important characteristics of the political

game are being taken away from him. How to gain them back and be able to show some movement on his agenda become focal points for him and his administration.

Effects of Audience

The data in table 13.2 suggest that Clinton is much more willing to challenge constraints in the domestic than the international arena. His scores on the belief that he can control events and on the need for power lean high when he is talking to the domestic press; these two scores are moderate for discussions with the international media. Given Clinton's lack of experience in foreign policy before taking office, these differences may reflect his own greater degree of comfort with domestic than foreign policy issues. As observers have commented, even when Clinton has become involved in foreign policy, it has been with a domestic orientation. But the domestic center of his attention has meant that Clinton has been learning foreign policy on the job and has been only as good at it as the sources and information at his disposal. He has known where to search for data and people to help him on the domestic front; he has been less skillful in the international domain. His scores suggest this willingness to be more reactive and to let others take the leadership in international affairs. As a result, it is possible to shift the blame when something goes wrong or to accuse others of making it difficult for him to act.

Chapter 17

Saddam Hussein's Leadership Style

This leadership profile of Saddam Hussein is based on an analysis of his responses to the domestic and international press in fifteen interviews between 1979 and the present. The description that follows is derived from an at-a-distance assessment of some twenty-one thousand words. The words are examined for evidence of seven different characteristics that have implications for how heads of state will behave, the kinds of actions they are likely to urge on their governments, and the way they structure and interact with their advisory systems. An individual leader's traits are put into perspective by comparing them with similar scores for other heads of state more generally and from the particular region. The characteristics are also contextualized by exploring how stable they are across issues, audiences, and time. The attributes that define the profile are those that historians, journalists, political scientists, and other students of leadership have found to be influential in shaping what leaders will do politically. The traits that are examined are (1) nationalism, (2) the belief that one can influence or control what happens, (3) the need for power and influence, (4) conceptual complexity (the ability to differentiate things and people in one's environment), (5) one's general distrust or suspiciousness of others, (6) one's self-confidence or self-esteem, and (7) the tendency to focus on problem solving and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others' ideas and sensitivities. The at-a-distance technique is described in more detail in chapter 8.

Several types of verbal material were available on Saddam Hussein: speeches, proclamations, messages, and press interviews. Since the first three types of material can be written or crafted for the leader by others, some caution must be exercised in examining such statements to ascertain what the leader is like. Care and thought have often gone into what is said and how it is said. Interviews with the media are generally a little more spontaneous. During the give-and-take of a question-and-answer period, the leader must respond quickly without props or aid; what he or she is like can influence the nature of the response and how it is worded. Although there may be some preparation of leaders prior to an interview with the press, during the interview leaders are on their own to respond. For these reasons, the following profile is based only on Hussein's responses to media questions in an interview setting.

Leadership Profile in General

Table 17.1 reports the average trait scores for Hussein across sixty interview responses. The scores represent the percentage of time that Hussein used words that could have exhibited a particular trait where the criteria for coding the trait were present. The percentages can run from zero to one hundred. Table 17.1 also presents what would be considered a low and high score on a specific characteristic based on the scores of twelve Middle Eastern leaders from seven countries, as well as on the scores of eighty-seven heads of state from forty-six countries. The twelve Middle Eastern leaders are a more culturally focused subset of the eighty-seven. Low and high scores are one standard deviation below and above the average score for a particular characteristic for the group of leaders with whom Hussein is being compared and differentiate him from these others. Hussein is considered moderate in the trait if his score is *not* one standard deviation above or below the mean of the group; in other words, he resembles the comparison group of leaders on that trait. As the reader will note, when Hussein's scores are close to being low or high, I have noted that he leans toward being one or the other.

Saddam Hussein is different from the two samples of leaders on over half of the traits—nationalism, need for power, distrust of others, and self-confidence. He is like other leaders with regard to his belief that he can control events, conceptual complexity, and his focus on accomplishing something versus focusing on the people involved (the higher the score here, the

more likely the focus on getting things done). These similarities with and differences from other leaders have implications for Hussein's leadership style. The discussion that follows is based on extensive research in the social sciences on how these characteristics affect leadership, elaborated in chapter 8.

Nationalism and Distrust of Others

The higher the score on nationalism, the more isomorphic the leader and the country; indeed, in the leader's eyes, he or she is the country. If something happens to the nation, it happens to the leader too, and vice versa. Such leaders are likely to internalize threats to the state as threats to their power and prestige. Moreover, leaders high in nationalism will perceive their political world as divided into friends and enemies ("us" versus "them") and will be quick to blame their enemies for the country's problems. They are prone to see only the good aspects of their own nation and to deny or rationalize away any weaknesses. As a result, these leaders are likely to mobilize the support of their people through scapegoating or attributing the ills in society to an external threat. In the extreme, they may keep their country mobilized militarily indefinitely to deal with *the* external threat. Politics is a battle between good and evil, just and unjust, the noble and the degenerate; it is a zero-sum game where one side's loss is another side's gain. Therefore, a leader must be constantly vigilant to ensure that his or her nation wins, not loses—or be quick to interpret ambiguous events as wins. Highly nationalistic leaders generally choose to have around them advisers who are loyal and committed to the goals and interests of the leader; advisers who show any individual initiative risk becoming a scapegoat themselves for any failed policies.

Leaders who combine a strong sense of nationalism with a high distrust of others are likely to view politics as the art of dealing with threats. Everything that has just been said about leaders who are high in nationalism is accentuated by an intense distrust of others. Such leaders will always be suspicious of the intentions and actions of others, seeing ulterior motives and designs where there may be none. Moreover, the others—the enemies—are viewed as "pulling the strings" and being in charge of what happens; thus, these leaders can only react, so they must be highly vigilant and try to anticipate what is going to happen if they are to have any influence over events. And they will become hypersensitive to criticism, often perceiving that they have been criticized where others would not; such leaders are always on the watch for a challenge to their authority or self.

Given Hussein's high scores on nationalism and distrust of others, he is expected to reflect this type of leadership. As a consequence, he is likely to take most actions on his own—advisers are implementers of actions, not participants in the decision-making process—to act deliberately but often to interpret the environment as threatening and demanding when such was not the intention of those involved, to take bold actions in anticipation of what is going to happen, to be highly sensitive to criticism, and to be very controlling of those around him. He wants to be the winner in the game of chess that is politics; to do so requires vigilance, strategic behavior, and a willingness to take risks.

The Need for Power and Task Focus

Information on the characteristics of the need for power and task focus provides clues about the motives of leaders. A high score on task focus is suggestive of a high interest in achievement; a low score on task focus indicates a concern with the feelings and sensitivities of others and, thus, a need for affiliation/approval/support. Leaders who are moderate in their scores on the task focus trait have been found in the comparative politics literature to be charismatic. They can concentrate on solving problems when called for by the situation, but they can also switch to an interest in others' ideas and feelings when the context in which they find

themselves changes. The charismatic leader has a certain degree of flexibility, matching motive to context in attempting to meet what he or she perceives are the people's needs. The need for power assesses leaders' desire to have control and influence over other persons and groups.

Leaders with Hussein's motive scores (moderate in task focus and leaning toward high in the need for power) often display a certain charismatic charm but are highly Machiavellian in their use of this charm. Whether or not they are sensitive to others or focus on solving a problem depends on the issue at hand and the goal of the leader. Such leaders work to manipulate the environment to stay in power and to appear a winner. They are good at sizing up situations and sensing what tactics will work to achieve their ends. In effect, other people and groups are viewed as instruments for the leader's ends; guile and deceit are perceived as part of the game of politics. These leaders are more skillful when they can directly interact with those involved than when they must deal with important constituencies at a distance. Without face-to-face interaction, they can misjudge the assumptions the other party is making and how far they are willing to go.

Leaders with Hussein's type of motive pattern can be very good to those who are loyal to them and facilitate them retaining power. But their attachments serve a purpose; these leaders are not emotionally invested in people nor necessarily guided by conventional morality or a conscience. To remain within the leader's inner circle, advisers must be willing to do what the leader wants without regard to the action's consequences. Moreover, they need to stay alert to when the leader has changed tactics and to move with him; any perceived challenges to the leader's authority provide reasons for dismissal, exile, or even death.

It can be very difficult to have an effect on leaders with this motive pattern because they appear to be one step ahead, always maneuvering in any situation to gain what they want—often at the other party's expense. At issue is how to frame proposals and information so that the offers appear in the self-interest of such leaders; they are likely to pursue and be attracted to overtures that are self-serving. But in framing proposals in this way, it is important to put oneself into the leader's shoes and consider how he is likely to view the current circumstances, given his need to retain control and influence over what is happening. In the vernacular of the bazaar merchant, an opponent will have to give something in order to get something in return; bartering and bargaining allow these leaders to sense what is possible and what the consequences will be of pushing further toward their goals. Leaders with this motive pattern will test the limits before adhering to a course of action.

Self-Confidence and Conceptual Complexity

Scores on the characteristics of self-confidence and conceptual complexity indicate how open leaders will be to input from others and the environment in the decision-making process, as well as the kinds of incentive systems leaders are likely to use with advisers, subordinates, and other leaders. In table 17.1, note that Hussein scores high in self-confidence and moderate in conceptual complexity in comparison to other heads of state.

When the trait score for self-confidence exceeds that for conceptual complexity, the leader tends to be more principled and less pragmatic in decision making and dealings with others. Such leaders know what they want and what should happen and spend their time persuading others of the appropriateness of their course of action. They are not above using coercion or devious tactics to ensure that their views are adopted. Indeed, threats are perceived as a legitimate incentive for prodding others into action. These leaders seek out information that will confirm their case and enhance their ability to convince others of what should be done. The focus is on developing a persuasive rationale for an already selected course of action, not considering what would be best, most cost effective, or most feasible given the situation and context. It will take a series of failures to convince this type of leader that a plan is faulty or will

not work. But once convinced, such leaders can evidence a dramatic shift in behavior and can produce a persuasive argument for why the change was necessary, given the country's goal. *They* interpret the world and politics; learning about others' views only becomes important in order to sell one's position or to know who needs to be persuaded.

Leaders with this pattern of scores often organize the decision-making process in a hierarchical fashion so that they can maintain control over what happens. This type of organization means that they are the hub of the information wheel, able to withhold or share intelligence so that they will be the only person who knows everything. That they are moderate in conceptual complexity means that they are constantly monitoring the environment for data that facilitates them maintaining influence over the process and who is included in implementing actions. These leaders will not win any "most popular leader" contests, but they are often admired or feared for what they can do, and they stand out and cannot be discounted.

General Orientation to Politics

Hussein's pattern of scores suggests that he has an expansionistic orientation to politics. Leaders who are more expansionistic in their behavior have been found to be high in nationalism, the need for power, distrust of others, and self-confidence. In a similar fashion to such leaders, Hussein perceives the political world as highly anarchic and full of threats; the only way for him and Iraq to have any power and influence in this world is for him to maintain control over what he currently has and to work to increase his power and authority in his region through enterprises such as building and maintaining various types of weaponry, invading neighbors' territory, affecting world oil prices, challenging the world's superpower, or attempting to assume the mantle of leader of the Arab world. Hussein's profile is quite similar to those of Fidel Castro (Cuba), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), and Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt). Each of these leaders was interested in playing a larger role on the world's stage than their country's size or capabilities had dealt them. Each centralized power in his government, perceived himself as the government, was highly distrustful of others' intentions, skillfully used scapegoating to enhance the nationalistic fervor of their constituencies, was highly Machiavellian in dealing with the superpowers of the day, and appeared to the world to know where he was going and to be in charge of getting there. Pressure from the outside world only increased the challenge and raised the competitive stakes for these leaders made the game of politics more fun and potentially more deadly. Engaging in the give-and-take of face-to-face bargaining or expressing willingness to grant them a momentary place on the major power stage appears to have been more successful in reigning in their behavior than threats. However, whenever they gave in, or were forced to accede, these leaders always pronounced themselves the winners to their people.

Leadership Profile in Context

An important question with any leadership profile centers around the stability of the traits. Do Hussein's scores remain basically the same across his tenure in office, when he is being interviewed by the domestic and foreign press, and when he is discussing different substantive topics? We can be assured that we are assessing what the leader is like if there is little change in the scores as the context changes; at the least, we know that he does not seem to be responding to the situation. It is easier to suggest what a leader is likely to do politically when the trait scores are more stable; with changes in scores, the researcher or analyst must consider contextual factors in deciding both how to influence the leader and what he or she is likely to do.

A statistical procedure (analysis of variance) indicated that generally Hussein's scores were stable across time, audience, and topic. Only five out of twenty-one (24 percent) possible

changes (seven traits times three contextual factors) were statistically significant. Overall, the leadership profile described previously for leaders like Hussein is applicable for him in most circumstances. The statistically significant differences, however, do amplify the portrait of Hussein as leader and, thus, will be discussed in some detail. Table 17.2 presents the traits where there were significant differences across the various types of context.

The differences in Hussein's scores on conceptual complexity across time and audience suggest that he may appear more dogmatic and inflexible in the international arena and with regard to Iraq's position in the world in the aftermath of the Gulf War and UN inspections than is actually the case. He is capable of much more flexibility than these scores imply, given his scores for domestic press interviews across time from 1979 to 1990. Indeed, these latter scores would be considered high when compared with the conceptual complexity of other Middle Eastern leaders and eighty-seven heads of state (see table 17.1). The data intimate that, when Hussein wants or believes he needs more information in order to decide what to do or to maintain his power and influence, he can be quite complex and pragmatic. When, however, he has made up his mind or believes he is backed into a corner, his rhetoric will become very principled and dogmatic; he is doing what is right. He may, though, be merely posturing, proposing the "tough" bargaining position as his opening move, and testing the opposition. If the opposition does not counter, Hussein has proven his point; if they do counter, the bargaining has begun. In the course of the bargaining, the subtleties in Hussein's thinking and a certain pragmatism will become evident. To be most effective, given Hussein's Machiavellian impulses, any negotiations with him should be face-to-face or through highly trusted intermediaries. He is less likely to misinterpret or misconstrue toward his own ends what is possible in such settings than when the negotiations occur at a distance.

The data in table 17.2 suggest that Hussein is sensitive to issues and problems; three of the seven (43 percent) traits evidenced statistically significant differences by the topic under discussion. Given his proclivity to see the world as full of threats that must be dealt with, it is easier to understand his focus on problems. To maintain power and influence, he has to meet such threats head on and, thus, must be constantly vigilant. But this responsiveness implies that one way to know what Hussein is thinking about a problem is to code his discussions of that issue in speeches and interviews.

One of the traits that differed significantly by topic was nationalism. Although all the means for nationalism by topic were high when compared to Middle Eastern leaders and eighty-seven heads of state, Hussein clearly tempered and increased his emphasis on nationalism depending on the target. Although still high, his nationalism in discussions of relations with Arabic and non-Arabic countries is more focused on the positive qualities of Iraq and the payoffs of relationships with Iraq for the other government and state; it is more tempered and is "courting" in tone—whereas when he perceives trouble, his nationalism increases and his focus is on contrasting how good Iraq is with how bad the particular opposition is. Indeed, he tends to "rail" against those who are causing him trouble. In such cases, there are definite enemies, and they are in the wrong. His nationalism scores are above his own mean score for areas that are threatening to him and below his mean score when he perceives there is an opportunity to move ahead on his goals. This difference in scores may signal a potential indicator of what he perceives as threats and what he perceives as opportunities. Note that of the six topics, two-thirds are threats, which is likely to be the balance in any examination of his rhetoric, given his generally high nationalism.

Another of Hussein's traits that showed statistically significant differences across topics was the need for power. The literature on this motive suggests that individuals display this need when they are in situations where they, indeed, do seek power and believe they do not currently have it. Hussein's scores across topics tend to reflect this more general finding. He evidences less need for power in his discussions of domestic politics and the Gulf War. Both these need for power scores are low in comparison to Middle Eastern leaders and the eighty-seven heads

of state. Hussein had and was wielding power in both these contexts. Where he sought more power and influence was in his responses to interviewers' queries about relations with other Arab as well as non-Arab states and in his responses regarding the Iran-Iraq War. All three of the need for power scores are high when related to the comparison groups of leaders. Here is where Hussein's Machiavellianism will be at its most pronounced. He is likely to attempt all sorts of tactics to gain more influence. He will be charming if such behavior seems likely to succeed; he will be a bully if such a strategy has a chance of working. In each case, Hussein will test the limits to see how far he can go before he starts to lose rather than maintain or win more power. The differences in the need for power scores suggest how ruthless Hussein is prepared to be and how much risk he is likely to take to gain what he wants. To some extent, the topics where the scores are highest also indicate the arenas over which Hussein seeks more control.

The last characteristic where there were significant differences across topics was distrust of others. Hussein's scores on distrust of others suggest whom he blames for his situation and the ills of Iraq. His scores for responses regarding the Kurds, the Iran-Iraq War, and the Gulf War are all high in comparison to the Middle Eastern leaders and the group of eighty-seven heads of state. Others are to blame for what is happening, for stirring up trouble, for making it hard for him to succeed. Because Hussein himself is responsible for domestic policy-making, he can remove those who he perceives do him ill. He can control what happens. Thus, note that the distrust of others score surrounding discussions of domestic politics is low. According to Hussein, outsiders are responsible for what goes wrong in Iraq; he is responsible for what goes right. Such a view of politics is hard to disrupt unless one does not mind Hussein's taking credit for what an outsider might view as something he or she did to help Iraq.