

**Chomsky, N. (1982). *Towards a new Cold War: U.S. foreign policy from Vietnam to Reagan*. New York: The New Press. (pp. 93 – 123).**

*So it would seem that our repeated interventions, covert and overt, in Latin America and elsewhere, our brutal assault on the Vietnamese people, not to mention our benign inattentiveness to the abolition of democracy in Greece by a few crummy colonels wholly dependent on American arms and loans, are all mere accidents or mistakes perhaps.*

— Philip Rahv, *New York Review of Books*,  
October 12, 1967

## **Chapter Two**

### **Foreign Policy and the Intelligentsia (1978)**

If we hope to understand anything about the foreign policy of any state, it is a good idea to begin by investigating the domestic social structure. Who sets foreign policy? What interests do these people represent? What is the domestic source of their power? It is a reasonable surmise that the policy that evolves will reflect the special interests of those who design it. An honest study of history will reveal that this natural expectation is quite generally fulfilled. The evidence is overwhelming, in my opinion, that the United States is no exception to the general rule—a thesis that is often characterized as a "radical critique," in a curious intellectual move to which I will return.

Some attention to the historical record, as well as common sense, leads to a second reasonable expectation: In every society there will emerge a caste of propagandists who labor to disguise the obvious, to conceal the actual workings of power, and to spin a web of mythical goals and purposes, utterly benign, that allegedly guide national policy. A typical thesis of the propaganda system is that *the nation* is an agent in international affairs, not special groups within it, and that *the nation* is guided by certain ideals and principles, all of them noble. Sometimes the ideals miscarry, because of error or bad leadership or the complexities and ironies of history. But any horror, any atrocity will be explained away as an unfortunate—or sometimes tragic—deviation from the national purpose. A subsidiary thesis is that the nation is not an active agent, but rather responds to threats posed to its security, or to order and stability, by awesome and evil outside forces.

Again, the United States is no exception to the general rule. If it is exceptional at all, its uniqueness lies in the fact that intellectuals tend to be so eager to promulgate the state religion and to explain away whatever happens as "tragic error" or inexplicable deviation from our most deeply held ideals. In this respect the United States is perhaps unusual, at least among the industrial democracies. In the midst of the worst horrors of the American war in Vietnam, there was always a Sidney Hook to dismiss "the unfortunate accidental loss of life" or the "unintended consequences of military action" <sup>1</sup> as B-52s carried out systematic carpet bombing in the densely populated Mekong Delta in South Vietnam, or other similar exercises of what Arthur Schlesinger once described as "our general program of international good will" (referring to United States Vietnam policy in 1954).<sup>2</sup> There are many similar examples.

Here is one case, not untypical. William V. Shannon, liberal commentator for the *New York Times*, explains how "in trying to do good, we have been living beyond our moral resources and have fallen into hypocrisy and self-righteousness." <sup>3</sup> A few passages convey the flavor:

For a quarter century, the United States has been trying to do good, encourage political liberty, and promote social justice in the Third World. But in Latin America where we have traditionally been a friend and protector and in Asia where we have made the most painful sacrifices of our young men and our wealth, our relationships have mostly proved to be a recurring source of sorrow, waste and tragedy. . . . Thus through economic assistance and the training of anti-guerrilla army teams we have been intervening with the best of motives

[in Latin America]. But benevolence, intelligence and hard work have proved not to be enough. Chile demonstrates the problem [where with the best of motives] by intervening in this complicated situation, the C.I.A. implicated the United States in the unexpected sequel of a grim military dictatorship that employs torture and has destroyed the very freedom and liberal institutions we were trying to protect.

And so on. He concludes that we must observe Reinhold Niebuhr's warning that "no nation or individual, even the most righteous, is good enough to fulfill God's purposes in history"—not even the United States, that paragon of righteousness and selfless benevolence, which has been a friend and protector for so long in Nicaragua and Guatemala and had made such painful sacrifices for the peasants of Indochina in the preceding twenty-five years. We must therefore be more constrained in our efforts to "advance our moral ideals," or we will be trapped in "ironic paradoxes" as our efforts to fulfill God's purposes lead to unexpected sequels.

Had these words been written twenty years earlier, they would have been disgraceful enough. That they should appear in September 1974 surpasses belief, or would do so were it not that such depraved submissiveness to the state propaganda system is so typical of substantial segments of the liberal intelligentsia as virtually to go unnoticed.

It is commonly believed that an adversary relationship developed between the government and the intelligentsia during the Vietnam War. We read, for example, that "most American intellectuals have since Vietnam come to believe that the exercise of American power is immoral" and that a new "convergence is emerging now around [a new] objective: the dismantling of American power throughout the world."<sup>4</sup> This is sheer myth, akin to the belief that the media have become a "notable new source of national power," opposed to the state.<sup>5</sup> In fact, through the war and since, the national media remained properly subservient to the basic principles of the state propaganda system, with a few exceptions,<sup>6</sup> as one would expect from major corporations. They raised a critical voice when rational imperialists determined that the Vietnam enterprise should be limited or liquidated, or when powerful interests were threatened, as in the Watergate episode.<sup>7</sup>

As for the intellectuals, while it is true that an articulate and principled opposition to the war developed, primarily among students, it never passed quite limited bounds. Illusions to the contrary are common, and are fostered often by those who are so frightened by any sign of weakening of ideological controls that they respond with hysteria and vast exaggeration. Critics of new initiatives in strategic weapons development are commonly denounced for their "call for unilateral disarmament." Correspondingly, the call for a "pragmatic" retreat from the exuberant interventionism of earlier years is transmuted into a demand for "the dismantling of American power throughout the world."<sup>8</sup>

A typical version of the dominant "pragmatic" position is presented by columnist Joseph Kraft, commenting on Kissinger's diplomacy and the reaction to it:

The balance-of-power approach was acceptable as long as it worked. More specifically, while the Vietnam war lasted, particularly while chances of an indecisive or happy end seemed open, the Kissinger diplomacy commanded general approval. But the debacle in Vietnam showed that the United States has broken with its traditional policy of selflessly supporting the good guys. It demonstrated that American policymakers had used all the dirty tricks in the game on behalf of the baddies.<sup>9</sup>

Note the curious reasoning: Our clients become "baddies" when they lose, and our tricks become "dirty" when they fail. Kraft's comment is characteristic in its reference to our alleged "traditional policy" and is accurate in noting that Kissinger's attempt to maintain an American client regime in South Vietnam in explicit violation of the 1975 Paris Agreements did command substantial support until events revealed that it could not succeed.<sup>10</sup>

In a revealing study of public attitudes towards the Vietnam war, Bruce Andrews discusses the well-documented fact that "lower-status groups" tended to be less willing than others to support government policy.<sup>11</sup> One reason, he suggests, is that "with less formal education, political attentiveness, and media involvement, they were saved from the full brunt of Cold War appeals

during the 1950s and were, as a result, inadequately socialized into the anticommunist world view." His observation is apt. There are only two avenues of escape from the awesome American propaganda machine. One way is to escape "formal education" and "media involvement," with their commitment to the state propaganda system. The second is to struggle to extract the facts that are scattered in the flood of propaganda, while searching for "exotic" sources not considered fit for the general public— needless to say, a method available to very few.

In discussing the intellectuals, we may invoke a distinction sometimes drawn between the "technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals" and the "value-oriented intellectuals," in the terminology of the study of the Trilateral Commission cited above.<sup>12</sup> The technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals at home are the good guys, who make the system work and raise no annoying questions. If they oppose government policy, they do so on "pragmatic" grounds, like the bulk of the "American intellectual elite." Their occasional technical objections are "hard political analysis" in contrast to the "moralism" or "dreamy utopianism" of people who raise objections of principle to the course of policy.<sup>13</sup> As for the value-oriented intellectuals, who "devote themselves to the derogation of leadership, the challenging of authority, and the unmasking and delegitimation of established institutions," they constitute "a challenge to democratic government which is, potentially at least, as serious as those posed in the past by the aristocratic cliques, fascist movements, and communist parties," in the judgment of the trilateral scholars. Much of the current writing on "the time of troubles" in the 1960s is a variation on the same theme, and a fantastic "history" of the period is in the process of creation, to be exposed, perhaps, by the "revisionist historians" of a future generation.

A variant of the trilateral argument, not uncommon, is that the "American commitment to democracy is being undermined by analyses—generally from the liberal and left part of the political spectrum—which assert that concern for democracy has played no role in American foreign policy." <sup>14</sup> In fact, a strong case can be made—and often is made, by no means from the left—that "it is only when her own concept of democracy, closely identified with private, capitalistic enterprise, is threatened by communism [or, we may add, by mild reform, as in Guatemala, for example] that [the United States] has felt impelled to demand collective action to defend it," or to intervene outright: "There has been no serious question of her intervening in the case of the many right-wing coups, from which, of course, this [anti-Communist] policy generally has benefited." <sup>15</sup> Is it such analyses, or the facts which they accurately describe, that "undermine the American commitment to democracy," or, better, reveal how shallow is the commitment? For the statist intelligentsia, it does not matter—that such analyses may be correct; they are dangerous, because they "challenge the existing structures of authority" and the effectiveness of "those institutions which have played the major role in the indoctrination of the young," in the terminology of the trilateral theorists, for whom such categories as "truth" and "honesty" are simply beside the point.<sup>16</sup>

We can distinguish two categories among the "secular priesthood" <sup>17</sup> who serve the state. There are, in the first place, the outright propagandists; and alongside them are the technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals who simply dismiss any question of ends and interests served by policy and do the work laid out for them, priding themselves on their "pragmatism" and freedom from contamination by "ideology," a term generally reserved for deviation from the doctrines of the state religion. Of the two categories, the latter are probably far more effective in inculcating attitudes of obedience and in "socializing" the public.

A personal experience may be relevant at this point. Like many others who have been involved in writing and actions opposed to state policy, I am frequently asked for comments on current affairs or social and political issues by press, radio, and television in Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Latin America, and Australia—but almost never in the United States. Here, commentary is reserved for professional experts, who rarely depart from a rather narrow ideological range; as Henry Kissinger has accurately commented, in our "age of the expert" the "expert has his constituency—those who have a vested interest in commonly held opinions; elaborating and defining its consensus at a high level has, after all, made him an expert." <sup>18</sup> The academic profession has numerous devices to ensure that professional expertise remains "responsible," though it is true that this system of control was partially threatened in the 1960s. Since the media in

the United States, in part perhaps from naivete, conform virtually without question to the cult of expertise, there is little danger that dissident analyses will be voiced, and if they are, they are clearly labeled "dissident opinion" rather than dispassionate, hard, political analysis. This is another example of "American exceptionalism" within the world of industrial democracies.

To return to the main theme: The United States, in fact, is no more engaged in programs of international good will than any other state has been. Furthermore, it is just mystification to speak of the nation, with its national purpose, as an agent in world affairs. In the United States, as elsewhere, foreign policy is designed and implemented by narrow groups who derive their power from domestic sources—in our form of state capitalism, from their control over the domestic economy, including the militarized state sector. Study after study reveals the obvious: Top advisory and decision-making positions relating to international affairs are heavily concentrated in the hands of representatives of major corporations, banks, investment firms, the few law firms that cater to corporate interests,<sup>19</sup> and the technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals who do the bidding of those who own and manage the basic institutions of the domestic society, the private empires that govern most aspects of our lives with little pretense of public accountability and not even a gesture to democratic control.

Within the nation-state, the effective "national purpose" will be articulated, by and large, by those who control the central economic institutions, while the rhetoric to disguise it is the province of the intelligentsia. An Arthur Schlesinger can write, presumably without irony, that under the Carter Administration, "human rights is replacing self-determination as the guiding value in American foreign policy" (see p. 89, above). In such pronouncements we see very clearly the contribution of the technocratic and policy-oriented intellectual to what we properly call "thought control" in the totalitarian states, where obedience is secured by force rather than by density of impact. Ours is surely a more effective system, one that would be used by dictators if they were smarter. It combines highly effective indoctrination with the impression that the society really is "open," so that pronouncements conforming to the state religion are not to be dismissed out of hand as propaganda.

It should be noted that the United States *is* in certain important respects an "open society," not only in that dissident opinion is not crushed by state violence (generally; see, however, note 7), but also in the freedom of inquiry and expression, which is in many respects unusual even in comparison with other industrial democracies such as Great Britain. The United States has no Official Secrets Act, nor the heavily constraining libel laws to be found elsewhere. And in the past few years it has had an important Freedom of Information Act. But this relatively high degree of internal freedom merely highlights the treachery of the intellectuals, who cannot plead that their subordination to the state religion is compelled by force or by constraints on access to information.

Much of the writing on the "national interest" serves to obscure the basic social facts. Consider, for example, the work of Hans Morgenthau, who has written extensively and often perceptively on this topic. In a recent presentation of his views, he states that the national interest underlying a rational foreign policy "is not defined by the whim of a man or the partisanship of party but imposes itself as an objective datum upon all men applying their rational faculties to the conduct of foreign policy." He then cites in illustration such commitments as support for South Korea, containment of China, and upholding of the Monroe Doctrine. He further observes that "the concentrations of private power which have actually governed America since the Civil War have withstood all attempts to control, let alone dissolve them [and] have preserved their hold upon the levers of political decision," (*New Republic*, January 22, 1977). True, no doubt. Under such circumstances, do we expect the "national interest" as actually articulated and pursued to be simply the outcome of the application of rational faculties to objective data, or to be an expression of specific class interests? Obviously the latter, and a serious investigation of the cases Morgenthau cites will demonstrate that the expectation is amply fulfilled. The real interests of Americans were in no way advanced by "containing China" (where was it expanding?) or crushing popular forces in South Korea in the late 1940s and supporting a series of dictatorial regimes since, or ensuring that Latin America remains subordinated to the needs of U.S.-based transnational corporations—the real meaning of our upholding of the Monroe Doctrine in the modern period, or of the (Theodore)

Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine which made it the duty of the United States, as a "civilized nation," to exercise its "international police power" in the case of "chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society" (cf. Connell-Smith, note 15 above). But it can be argued that the interests of the "concentrations of private power" in the United States that largely dominated the world capitalist system have been advanced by this pursuit of the "national interest." The same holds generally. The idea that foreign policy is derived in the manner of physics, as an objective datum immune to class interest, is hardly credible.

Or, consider a recent analysis by Walter Dean Burnham in the journal of the Trilateral Commission.<sup>20</sup> He notes that the "basic functions" of the state are "the promotion externally and internally of the basic interests of the dominant mode of production and the need to maintain social harmony." The formulation is misleading. These basic functions are not a matter of metaphysical necessity but arise from specific social causes. Furthermore, the "dominant mode of production" does not have interests; rather, individuals or groups who participate in it have interests, often conflicting ones, a distinction that is no mere quibble. And since those who manage this system are also in effective control of the state apparatus, the "basic interests" pursued will tend to be theirs. There are no grounds in history or logic to suppose that these interests will coincide to any significant extent with the interests of those who participate in the dominant mode of production by renting themselves to its owners and managers.

A standard and effective device for obscuring social reality is the argument that the facts are more complex than as represented in the "simplistic theories" of the "value-oriented" critics. Note first that the charge is of course correct: The facts are always more complex than any description we may give. Faced with this contingency of empirical inquiry, we may adopt several courses: (1) We may abandon the effort; (2) we may try to record many facts in enormous detail, a course that reduces in effect to the first, for all the understanding it provides; (3) we may proceed in the manner of rational inquiry in the sciences and elsewhere to try to extract some principles that have explanatory force over a fair range, thus hoping to account for at least the major effects. Pursuing the third—i.e., the rational—approach, we will always be subject to the criticism that the facts are more complex, and if rational, we dismiss the charge as correct but irrelevant. It is instructive that we have no difficulty in adopting a rational stance when considering the behavior of official enemies. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan, for example, surely involves complexities beyond those introduced even in fairly careful analyses of contemporary Soviet international behavior, and surely beyond the standard media accounts. For example, it appears that the major guerrilla groups have been engaged in disruptive operations in Afghanistan since 1975, backed by Pakistan in an effort to destabilize the Afghan regime and bring it to accept Pakistani border claims ("international terrorism," from one point of view; cf. Lawrence Lifschultz, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 30, 1981). Nevertheless, such facts as these do not prevent us from focusing on the main point—the Russian invasion—though some commissar might complain that we are ignoring the complexities of history and the difficulties faced by a great power attempting to maintain order with the noblest of intentions.

Another device is the pretense—virtually a reflex reaction—that those who pursue the rational approach are invoking a "conspiracy theory," as they proceed to document the fact that elite groups with an interest in foreign policy (e.g., transnational corporations) attempt to use their power to influence it or direct it, to assume major roles in the state executive, to produce geopolitical analyses and specific programs to guarantee a favorable climate for business operations, etc. With equal logic, one could argue that an analyst of General Motors who concludes that its managers try to maximize profits (instead of selflessly laboring to satisfy the needs of the public) is adopting a conspiracy theory—perhaps business propagandists actually take this stance. Once some analysis is labeled "a conspiracy theory" it can be relegated to the domain of flat-earth enthusiasts and other cranks, and the actual system of power, decision-making, and global planning is safely protected from scrutiny.

A related claim is that critical analysis of the ideological system is a form of paranoia.<sup>21</sup> As noted, it would not be surprising to find in any society a pervasive and systematic bias in the

treatment of foreign affairs: Crimes of the state (which can be stopped) are ignored or downplayed, while the spotlight is focused on crimes of official enemies (about which little can be done). In the former category, standards of evidence must match those of physics; in the latter, any fanciful construction will do. In the extreme case, the Soviet press effaces state crimes completely while trumpeting such "facts" as U.S. germ warfare in Korea. Suppose that one documents the expected pattern in the case of the United States. This obviously reveals an extreme form of paranoia. With regard to the first category, it is unfair, ridiculous, to expect the media to be able to discover an eyewitness account of U.S. bombing in northern Laos in *Le Monde* (even when it is brought to their attention), or a Sihanouk press conference calling on the international press to condemn the bombing of Khmer peasants in March 1969 (besides, he didn't specifically say "B-52s" so suppression was legitimate) or a subsequent White Paper of the Sihanouk government on U.S. and U.S.-backed attacks on neutral Cambodia, or Timorese refugees in Lisbon; or to explore the relation between U.S. policies and state terror, starvation and slavery in Latin America, etc. With regard to the second category, the standard line is still more intriguing. Someone who suggests normal standards of adherence to evidence thereby falls into the category of "apologist for atrocities," "defender of the honor of Hanoi," etc. The suggestion that facts matter is easily transmuted into another service for the propagandist. It is not gratifying to the ego merely to march in a parade; therefore those who join in ritual condemnation of an official enemy must show that they are engaged in a courageous struggle against powerful forces that defend it. Since these rarely exist, even on a meager scale, they must be concocted; if nothing else is at hand, those who propose a minimal concern for fact will do. The system that has been constructed enables one to lie freely with regard to the crimes, real or alleged, of an official enemy, while suppressing the systematic involvement of one's own state in atrocities, repression, or aggression on the grounds that the facts are more complex than the emotional and naive critics believe (an exception is tolerated if some evil or misguided individual can be identified as responsible for policy, so that institutional critique is deflected). Given, that those who do not accept standard doctrine—e.g., that of the "American intellectual elite" discussed above—have virtually no access to a general audience and that little is required in the way of argument or credible evidence from those of a higher degree of doctrinal purity, the farce plays quite well. It is a system of no small degree of elegance, and effectiveness.

Attempting to pursue a rational course, let us consider American foreign policy since World War II. We are faced at once with some striking features of the world that emerged from the wreckage of the war. Primary among them is the enormous preponderance of American power with respect to the other industrial societies, and *a fortiori*, the rest of the world. During the war, most of the industrial world was destroyed or severely damaged, while industrial production rose dramatically in the United States. Furthermore, long before, the United States had become the leading industrial society, with unparalleled internal resources, natural advantages and scale, and a reasonably high degree of social cohesion. It was natural to expect, under these circumstances, that the United States would use its enormous power in an effort to organize a global system, and it is uncontroversial that this is exactly what happened, though the question "What were the guiding principles?" is indeed controversial. Let us consider these principles.

Where should we look to discover some formulation of them? In a totalitarian society this would pose problems, but the United States really is open in this respect, and there is considerable documentary evidence concerning the vision of the postwar world developed by the very people who were to play the major part in constructing it.

One obvious documentary source is the series of memoranda of the War and Peace Studies Project of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) during the war. Participants included top government planners and a fair sample of the "foreign policy elite," with close links to government, major corporations, and private foundations.<sup>22</sup> These memoranda deal with the "requirement[s] of the United States in a world in which it proposes to hold unquestioned power," foremost among them being "the rapid fulfillment of a program of complete re-armament" (1940). In the early years of the war it was assumed that part of the world might be controlled by Germany. Therefore, the major task was to develop "an integrated policy to achieve military and economic supremacy for

the United States within the non-German world," including plans "to secure the limitation of any exercise of sovereignty by foreign nations that constitutes a threat to the world area essential for the security and economic prosperity of the United States and the Western Hemisphere." (The concern for the "prosperity of the Western Hemisphere" is adequately revealed by United States policies, say, in Central America and the Caribbean, before and since; this opposition to imperial prerogatives that constrain U.S. capital and access to resources is often adduced by scholarship as evidence that U.S. foreign policy is guided by "anti-imperialist" commitments). These areas, which are to serve the prosperity of the United States, include the Western Hemisphere, the British Empire, and the Far East, described as a natural integrated economic unity in the geopolitical analysis of the planners.

The major threat to United States hegemony in the non-German world was posed by the aspirations of Britain. The contingencies of the war served to restrict these, and the American government exploited Britain's travail to help the process along. Lend-lease aid was kept within strict bounds: enough to keep Britain in the war but not enough to permit it to maintain its privileged imperial position.<sup>25</sup> There was a mini-war between the United States and Great Britain within the context of the common struggle against Germany, where, of course, Britain was on the front line—more accurately, the overwhelming burden of fighting Nazi Germany fell to the Russians,<sup>24</sup> but let us keep now to the Anglo-American alliance. In this conflict within the alliance, American interests succeeded in taking over traditional British markets in Latin America and in partially displacing Britain in the Middle East, particularly in Saudi Arabia, which was understood to be "a stupendous source of strategic power, arid one of the greatest material prizes in world history," in the words of the State Department.<sup>25</sup> I will return to this matter, but let us continue to explore the CFR planning documents.

The U.S.-led non-German bloc was entitled the "Grand Area" in the CFR discussions. Actually, a U.S.-dominated Grand Area was only a second-best alternative. It was explained in June 1941 that "the Grand Area is not regarded by the Group as more desirable than a world economy, nor as an entirely satisfactory substitute." The Grand Area was seen as a nucleus or model that could be extended, optimally, to a global economy. It was soon recognized that with the coming defeat of Nazi Germany, at least Western Europe could be integrated into the Grand Area. Participants in the CFR discussions recognized that "the British Empire as it existed in the past will never reappear and . . . the United States may have to take its place." One stated frankly that the United States "must cultivate a mental view toward world settlement after this war which will enable us to impose our own terms, amounting perhaps to a pax-Americana." Another argued that the concept of the United States security interests must be enlarged to incorporate areas "strategically necessary for world control." It is a pervasive theme that international trade and investment are closely related to the economic health of the United States, as is access to the resources of the Grand Area, which must be so organized as to guarantee the health and structure of the American economy, its internal structure unmodified.

The notion of "access to resources" is marvelously expressed in a State Department memorandum of April 1944 called "Petroleum Policy of the United States," dealing with the primary resource.<sup>26</sup> There must be equal access for American companies everywhere, but no equal access for others, the document explained. The United States dominated Western Hemisphere production,<sup>27</sup> and this position must be maintained while United States holdings are diversified elsewhere. The policy "would involve the preservation of the absolute position presently obtaining, and therefore vigilant protection of existing concessions in United States hands coupled with insistence upon the Open Door principle of equal opportunity for United States companies in new areas." That is a fair characterization of the principle of the "Open Door."<sup>28</sup>

All of this is in accord with the concepts of Grand Area planning, and it also corresponded to the evolving historical process. The United States retained its dominance of Western Hemisphere petroleum resources while the American share of Middle East oil rapidly increased.<sup>29</sup> The British maintained their control of Iranian oil until 1954, when the United States government imposed an international consortium after the CIA-backed coup that restored the Shah, with American companies granted a 40 percent share.<sup>30</sup> Similarly, in the Far East "occupied Japan was not

permitted to reconstruct the oil-refining facilities that had been destroyed by Allied bombings, a policy widely attributed in the oil industry of Japan to the fact that the oil bureau of General MacArthur's headquarters was heavily staffed with American personnel on temporary leave from Jersey Standard and Mobil." Later, American-based companies were able to take over a dominant position in controlling Japan's energy resources. "Under the Allied occupation the Japanese government was powerless to block such business links."<sup>31</sup>

Much the same was true elsewhere. For example, the United States succeeded in expelling French interests from Saudi Arabia in 1947 by some legal legerdemain, alleging that French companies were "enemies" as a result of Hitler's occupation of France, so that the 1928 Red Line agreement on sharing oil in the former Ottoman Empire was abrogated (*MNOC*, pp. 50f.). British interests in Saudi Arabia were excluded by a different device—namely, when American companies expressed their fear that "the British may be able to lead either Ibn Saud or his successors to diddle them out of the concession and the British into it" (Navy Under Secretary William Bullitt), and "told the Roosevelt Administration that direct U.S. Lend Lease assistance for King Saud was the only way to keep their Arabian concession from falling into British hands," the President obligingly issued the following directive to the Lend Lease administrator: "In order to enable you to arrange Lend Lease aid to the Government of Saudi Arabia, I hereby find that the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States"—its defense from whom, he did not stipulate, though a cynic might remark that the tacit identification of the United States with the Aramco concession is consistent with the actual usage of the phrase "national interest." Lend Lease had been authorized by Congress for "democratic allies" fighting the Nazis. In other ways as well, the Roosevelt Administration acted to support the American companies against their British rivals, through aid (Saudi Arabia received almost \$100 million under Lend Lease, including scarce construction materials) or direct government intervention (*MNOC*, pp. 36f.).

As an aside, recall what happened when Iranians experimented with the curious idea of taking control of their own oil in the early 1950s. After an oil company boycott, a successful CIA-backed coup put an end to that installing the regime of the Shah, which became a powerful United States client state purchasing vast quantities of American arms, conducting counterinsurgency in the Arabian peninsula, and, of course, subjecting the Iranian people to the Shah's pleasant whims.

The coup had other useful consequences. Exxon (i.e., its predecessor corporation) feared that the USSR might gain some share of Iranian oil unless "the problem was solved," in which case it might dump Iranian oil on the world market, depressing prices (*MNOC*, p. 67). But that threat to the free enterprise system was eliminated with the coup.

We should bear in mind that the CIA-backed coup that ended the experiment in Iranian democracy and led to a further displacement of British power was welcomed as a great triumph here. When the agreement was signed between Iran and the new oil consortium organized by the United States government, the *New York Times* commented editorially (August 6, 1954) that this was "good news indeed": "Costly as the dispute over Iranian oil has been to all concerned, the affair may yet be proved worth-while if lessons are learned from it." The crucial lessons are then spelled out as follows:

Underdeveloped countries with rich resources now have an object lesson in the heavy cost that must be paid by one of their number which goes berserk with fanatical nationalism. It is perhaps too much to hope that Iran's experience will prevent the rise of Mossadeghs in other countries, but that experience may at least strengthen the hands of more reasonable and more far-seeing leaders.

Like the Shah. With typical ruling-class cynicism, the *Times* then goes on to say that "the West, too, must study the lessons of Iran" and must draw the conclusion that "partnership, even more in the future than the past, must be the relationship between the industrialized Western nations and some other countries, less industrialized, but rich in raw materials, outside Europe and North



America," a statement that must have been most inspiring for the underdeveloped countries that had enjoyed the great privilege of partnership with the West in the past.

The "costs" incurred in this affair, according to the *Times*, do not include the suffering of the people of Iran but rather the propaganda opportunities offered to the Communists, who will denounce the whole affair in their wicked fashion, and the fact that "in some circles in Great Britain the charge will be pushed that American 'imperialism'—in the shape of the American oil firms in the consortium—has once again elbowed Britain from a historic stronghold." The implication is that this charge, or even the concept of American "imperialism," is too obviously absurd to deserve comment, a conclusion based as always on the doctrines of the state religion rather than an analysis of the facts. The exuberance over the "demonstration effect" of the CIA achievement is also typical, though the vulgarity of the *Times* account perhaps goes beyond the ordinary. The theme became familiar with reference to Vietnam in subsequent years.

But let us return to the CFR global planning, which laid out a program for organizing the Grand Area, or if possible, the world, as an integrated economic system that would offer the American economy "the 'elbow room' . . . needed in order to survive without major readjustments"—that is, without any change in the distribution of power, wealth, ownership, and control.

The memoranda, which are explicit enough about Grand Area planning, are careful to distinguish between principle and propaganda. They observed in mid-1941 that "formulation of a statement of war aims for propaganda purposes is very different from formulation of one defining the true national interest." Here is a further recommendation:

If war aims are stated, which seem to be concerned solely with Anglo-American imperialism, they will offer little to people in the rest of the world, and will be vulnerable to Nazi counter-promises. Such aims would also strengthen the most reactionary elements in the United States and the British Empire. The interests of other peoples should be stressed, not only those of Europe, but also of Asia, Africa and Latin America. This would have a better propaganda effect.

The participants must have been relieved when the Atlantic Charter suitably vague and idealistic in tone, was announced a few months later.

The CFR studies were extended in subsequent years to include analyses of prospects and plans for most parts of the world. The sections on Southeast Asia are interesting in the light of developments there. The analyses that issued from CFR study groups closely resemble the National Security Council memoranda and other material now available in the Pentagon Papers, a remarkable documentary record of the design and execution of imperial planning.<sup>32</sup> The similarity is hardly accidental. The same interests and often the same people are involved. The basic theme is that Southeast Asia must be integrated within the U.S.-dominated global system to ensure that the needs of the American economy are satisfied, and also the specific needs of Japan, which might be tempted again to set its independent course or to flood Western markets unless granted access to Southeast Asian markets and resources, within the overarching framework of the Pax Americana—the Grand Area. These principles were firmly set by the 1950s and guided the course of the American intervention, then outright aggression, when the Vietnamese, like the Iranians, went "berserk with fanatical nationalism," failing to comprehend the sophisticated Grand Area concepts and the benefits of "partnership" with the industrialized West.

The material that I have been reviewing constitutes a primary documentary source for the study of formation of American foreign policy, compiled by those who carried out this policy. We might ask how this material is dealt with in academic scholarship. The answer is simple: It is ignored. The book by Shoup and Minter (see note 22) seems to be the first to examine these records. American scholars justly complain that the Russians refuse to release documentary materials, thus raising all sorts of barriers to the understanding of the evolution of their policies. Another just complaint is that American scholars avoid documentary materials that might yield much insight into the formation of American policy, a fact easily explained in this instance, I believe: The documentary record is no more consistent with the doctrines of the state religion, in this case, than is the historical record itself. Parenthetically, it might be noted that the Pentagon Papers, which provide a

record of high-level policy planning that is unusual in its richness, have suffered the same fate. This record too is ignored—indeed, often misrepresented. There is indeed a spate of scholarly work on United States Vietnam policy, some of which makes extensive use of material in the Pentagon Papers. Typically, however, attention is focused on the 1960s. Then we have a detailed microanalysis of bureaucratic infighting, political pressures, and the like, completely disregarding the general framework, set long before and never challenged by those who were simply applying imperial doctrine as carefully elaborated ten to twenty years earlier. This is a marvelous device for obscuring the social reality by diverting attention from the documentary record concerning the guiding principles of state policy, as clearly revealed in the basic documentation that is characteristically ignored.

Space prevents a detailed review here, but one example may suffice to illustrate. Consider a review of several books on Vietnam by William S. Turley, one of the more critical and independent American academic scholars with a professional involvement in Indochina.<sup>33</sup> He discusses two "prevailing images of American policy-making on Vietnam": the "quagmire hypothesis," which "held that involvement was the result of incremental decisions made without adequate understanding of probable consequences," and "the interpretation that American policy was stalemated by the need of successive administrations, for domestic political reasons, to do what was minimally necessary to avoid losing a war." The book he reviews, by Robert Galluci,<sup>34</sup> finds both of these images too simple and seeks a more complex interpretation through application of a bureaucratic process model. Turley points out that the Pentagon Papers provide important evidence bearing on the questions.

In fact, the Pentagon Papers provide extensive evidence for a different hypothesis, one that goes unmentioned, as it is passed over in silence in the scholarly literature—namely, that American policy in Vietnam was a conscious application of principles of imperial planning that formed part of a consensus established long before the specific period, the 1960s, to which attention is generally restricted. This hypothesis is extensively documented in the Pentagon Papers and elsewhere, but the documentary record is never so much as mentioned in the book under review, the review itself, or academic scholarship generally. The hypothesis in question is simply not fit for discussion in polite company, no matter what the documentation may be. It is not even a competitor, to be rejected.<sup>35</sup>

I do not suggest that in refusing to consider the hypothesis in question or the substantial documentation supporting it, scholars are being dishonest. It is simply that nothing in their training or in the literature generally available to them makes this hypothesis comprehensible. It is a reflection of the success of the educational system in "socialization," the success of what the trilateral analysts call the "institutions which have played the major role in the indoctrination of the young," that certain ideas, however natural and well-supported, do not even come to mind or, if noticed, can be dismissed with derision. People who break away from the consensus have dubious prospects in the media or the academy, in general. The resulting subversion of scholarship is systematic, not individual. Similar phenomena are familiar from the history of organized religion. Anyone who has spent some time in a university knows how it is done. Some young scholars are "hard to get along with" or are "too strident" or "show poor taste in their choice of topics" or "don't use the proper methodology," or in other ways do not meet the professional standards that not infrequently serve to insulate scholarship from uncomfortable challenge (see Chapter 1, note 23 for one of many examples). The ideological disciplines are particularly subject to these tendencies.

Primary documentary sources like the CFR studies and the Pentagon Papers must be investigated with a critical eye and supplemented by much additional evidence if one wants to reach any serious understanding of the evolution of American policy. It might turn out to be the case that the analyses cited above, which are among the few even to concern themselves with the basic documentary record, are inadequate or even seriously in error in the interpretations they provide. What is remarkable and noteworthy, however, is how consistently American scholarship takes a different tack, simply ignoring the documentary record that does not accord with received opinion.

Consider one final example of how the central questions are evaded in academic scholarship. Let us return again to our hypothetical rational observer attempting to discern some of the major factors in foreign policy formation and consider some further facts that should immediately strike him as significant.

Since World War II there has been a continuing process of centralization of decision-making in the state executive, certainly with regard to foreign policy. Secondly, there has been a tendency through much of this period toward domestic economic concentration. Furthermore, these two processes are closely related, because of the enormous corporate influence over the state executive. And finally, there has been a vast increase in overseas investment, marketing, and resource extraction in the post-war period, greatly increasing the stake of the masters of the corporate economy in foreign affairs. To cite one indication, "It has been estimated that earnings from these foreign operations by 1970 contributed between 20 and 25 percent of total U.S. corporate profits after taxes, a very considerable magnitude indeed."<sup>36</sup> The basic facts are uncontroversial. They suggest, perhaps, a certain hypothesis for investigation: Corporations have some influence, perhaps considerable influence, in setting foreign policy. How does academic scholarship deal with this issue?

There is a (rare) discussion of the question by political scientist Dennis M. Ray in the volume on the multinational corporation just cited.<sup>37</sup> He observes that "we know virtually nothing about the role of corporations in American foreign relations." Scholarship has "clarified the influence of Congress, the press, scientists, and non-profit organizations, such as RAND, on the foreign policy process. The influence of corporations on the foreign policy process, however, remains clouded in mystery."

Is this "mystery" somehow inherent in the difficulty of discerning the corporate role, as distinct from the massive impact of scientists and the press on foreign policy? Not at all. As Ray points out, the issue remains clouded in mystery because it is systematically evaded:

My search through the respectable literature on international relations and U.S. foreign policy shows that less than 5 percent of some two hundred books granted even passing attention to the role of corporations in American foreign relations. From this literature, one might gather that American foreign policy is formulated in a social vacuum, where national interests are protected from external threats by the elaborate machinery of governmental policymaking. There is virtually no acknowledgement in standard works within the field of international relations and foreign policy of the existence and influence of corporations.

Note that Ray limits himself to the "respectable literature." He excludes what he calls the literature of "advocacy," which includes two streams: statements by corporate executives and business school professors, and "radical and often neo-Marxist analyses." In this literature, particularly the latter category, there is much discussion of the role of corporations in foreign policy formation. Furthermore, as Ray turns to the topic itself, he discovers that the conclusions reached seem to be correct. "Few if any interest groups, outside of business, have generalized influence on the broad range of foreign policy," he observes, citing one of the few works in the "respectable literature" that raises the question. Ray believes that scholars will discover these facts if they "begin to examine the question."

In short, if scholars begin to study the question, they will discover the truth of truisms that have been discussed and documented for years outside of the "respectable literature," exactly as one would expect in the light of such basic and fundamental facts about American society as those noted earlier.

It is interesting that Ray never inquires into the causes of this strange lapse in "respectable" scholarship. In fact, the answer does not seem obscure. If we are interested in careful investigation of the inner workings of the Politburo, we do not turn to studies produced at Moscow and Leningrad Universities, and we know exactly why. There is no reason not to apply the same standards of rationality when we find something similar in the United States, though here the mechanisms are entirely different: willing subversion of scholarship rather than obedience to external force.

Moreover, consider Ray's attitude towards those who do study the major and dominant themes, providing the obvious answers that he himself repeats: They are not respectable scholars, in his view, but are engaged in "advocacy"—while the scholarly mainstream, which carefully skirts the major formative influence on foreign policy, does not lose its "respectability" for this curious oversight, and does not seem to him to be engaged in "advocacy."

An anthropologist observing the phenomenon I have been describing would have no hesitation in concluding that we are dealing here with a form of taboo, a deep-seated superstitious avoidance of some terrifying question: in this case, the question of how private economic power functions in American society. Among the secular priesthood of academic scholars, the issue can be mentioned only, if at all, in hushed tones. Those who do raise the question seriously are no longer "respectable." As diplomatic historian Gaddis Smith asserts in a review of recent work by William Appleman Williams and Gabriel Kolko, they are "essentially pamphleteers" rather than authentic historians.<sup>38</sup>

In a free society we do not imprison those who violate profound cultural taboos or burn them at the stake. But they must be identified as dangerous radicals, not fit to be counted among the priesthood. The reaction is appropriate. To raise the dread question is to open the possibility that the institutions responsible "for the indoctrination of the young" and the other propaganda institutions may be infected by the most dangerous of plagues: insight and understanding. Awareness of the facts might threaten the social order, protected by a carefully spun web of pluralist mysticism, faith in the benevolence of our pure-hearted leadership, and general superstitious belief.

An ideological structure, to be useful for some ruling class, must conceal the exercise of power by this class either by denying the facts or more simply ignoring them—or by representing the special interests of this class as universal interests, so that it is seen as only natural that representatives of this class should determine social policy, in the general interest. As Ray notes, it is not unexpected that foreign policy decision-makers should perceive the world from the same perspective as businessmen: "In this context, we are not dealing simply with phenomena of influence, for national goals may in fact be synonymous with business goals." Extricating the expression "national goals" from its typical mystical usage, the remark approaches tautology.

Outside the ranks of the priesthood the facts are clearly presented in the socially marginal literature of "advocacy" by "pamphleteers" who make extensive and often very insightful use of the relevant documentary sources. Here, it is recognized that the notion of "national goals" is merely a device of mystification, and that the often conflicting goals of various social groups can be conceived in terms other than those set by the masters of the private economy. But the universities, the scholarly professions, the mass media, and society at large are carefully insulated from these dangerous heresies in a highly indoctrinated society, which is commonly described—the ultimate irony—as "pragmatic" and "nonideological." All of this is the more interesting when we realize that the society really is free from ugly forms of totalitarian control and coercion that are prevalent elsewhere.

Carl Landauer, who participated in the short-lived revolutionary government in Bavaria after World War I, remarked that the censorship of the bourgeois press by the revolutionary government marked the "beginning of freedom of public opinion."<sup>39</sup> His point was that the organs of propaganda and opinion, firmly in the hands of ruling groups, destroyed freedom of opinion by their dominance of the means of expression.<sup>40</sup> Clearly one cannot accept the view that state censorship is the answer to the distortion and deceit of intellectual servants of ruling groups. Just as surely, we cannot pretend that there is freedom of opinion in any serious sense when social and cultural taboos shield the formation of policy from public awareness and scrutiny.

It is, in fact, quite true that the business press sometimes tends to be more honest about social reality than academic scholarship. Consider, for example, this reaction to the American failure in Vietnam (and elsewhere) in *Business Week* (April 7, 1975). The editors fear that "the international economic structure, under which U.S. companies have flourished since the end of World War II, is in jeopardy." They go on to explain how,

fueled initially by the dollars of the Marshall Plan, American business prospered and expanded on overseas orders despite the cold war, the end of colonialism, and the creation of militant and often anticapitalistic new countries. No matter how negative a development, there was always the umbrella of American power to contain it. ... The rise of the multinational corporation was the economic expression of this political framework.

But "this stable world order for business operations is falling apart" with the defeat of American power in Indochina. Nothing here about our unremitting campaign "to do good" and "advance our moral ideals." They explain further how congressional obstinacy is undermining our efforts to persuade our European allies to support our concept of "a floor price on oil," and the "debilitating impact on international economics" with the "the collapse of U.S. foreign policy around the globe," particularly "if Japan cannot continue to export a third of its products to Southeast Asia." Unless a new "bipartisan foreign policy" (i.e., one-party state) is reestablished, it may be "impossible to maintain a successful international economic framework."

A year later, however, things were looking up, and "it appears that the future of the West again lies in the hands of the U.S. and to a lesser extent, West Germany," American oil policies perhaps being one reason.<sup>41</sup> As the *Business Week* editors note, "Trends now at work in the world have greatly strengthened the competitive position of the U.S. economy" with the result that "Washington will have more freedom to maneuver in formulating foreign economic policies than it has had since the early 1960s."<sup>42</sup> In short, the Grand Area is being successfully reconstituted, though the optimism proved a bit premature, in this case.

Occasionally, the light breaks through in statements of public officials as well. Consider for example a Statement by Frank M. Coffin, Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development (AID), outlining "Objectives of the AID Program":

Our basic, broadest goal is a long-range political one. It is not development for the sake of sheer development. . . . An important objective is to open up the maximum opportunity for domestic private initiative and enterprise and to insure that foreign private investment, particularly from the United States, is welcomed and well treated. . . . The fostering of a vigorous and expanding private sector in the less developed countries is one of our most important responsibilities. Both domestic private initiative and management and outside investment are important. . . . Politically, a strong and progressive private business community provides a powerful force for stable, responsible Government and a built-in check against Communist dogma.<sup>43</sup>

Another "built-in check" is counterinsurgency, as Coffin goes on to explain, "And we in AID of course have a public safety program which, perhaps to oversimplify, seeks to equip countries to utilize the civilian police in preventive action so that they do not have to place excessive reliance on the military." Oversimplification indeed. Many thousands of people in Latin America and Asia have benefited from this particular element in their "partnership with the West" over the years.<sup>44</sup> Needless to say, all of this is spiced with rhetoric on how our aid program seeks "partnership"—in contrast to those of the Russians and the Chinese, which seek "domination"—and so on. Spectacularly lacking is a comparative analysis of the aid programs to support this claim.

While noting occasional flashes of honesty in the business press, I would not want to imply that businessmen are free from the cant of much academic scholarship. Here is a single example, which could easily be duplicated in years before and since, to the present:

You will point an accusing finger and you will hurl the challenging question: "What about Hayti [sic] and San Domingo, what about Nicaragua, Honduras, and so forth?" It is true we did send military forces to these countries. There did, most regrettably, occur some bloodshed. In the execution of our program we did commit some errors in judgment and in manners. We did, in certain measures, proceed bunglingly and clumsily, as Governments and their agents not infrequently do, especially when, as in the cases under discussion, the task to be undertaken is an unusual and unexpected one, and there are neither traditions which afford guidance nor a trained personnel to attend to the execution. (Incidentally, the

very absence of such personnel tends to prove how little the thoughts of our Government and people were on Imperialism.)

But the test is in the answer to the question which in my turn I ask of you: "What was our purpose? Did we go to oppress and exploit, did we go to add these territories to our domain? Or did we go to end an inveterate rule of tyranny, malefactions and turmoil, to set up decent and orderly government and the rule of law, to foster progress, to establish stable conditions and with them the basis for prosperity to the population concerned?"

I think there can be no doubt that it was these latter things we aimed to attain. And having measurably accomplished the task, we did withdraw, or shall withdraw. We left behind, or shall leave behind, a few persons charged with the collection and proper administration of certain revenues, but such arrangements . . . are no more in the nature of exploitation or oppression than the appointment of a person under deed of trust is in the nature of exploitation and oppression.<sup>45</sup>

It would be superfluous to discuss how the United States proceeded to foster progress, prosperity, and an end to tyranny and malefactions in Haiti, San Domingo, Nicaragua, Honduras, and the other parts of Latin America "where we have traditionally been a friend and protector" (see p. 94). The immunity of doctrine to mere fact, in such cases, easily compares with the so-called Communist countries. Such pronouncements closely resemble the blather produced by pundits of the press as the Vietnam war came to an end: The United States involvement was "honorable" though "fraught with mistakes and misjudgments"; "good impulses came to be transmuted into bad policy"; it would be unfair to leave "the impression somehow the United States was responsible for the carnage in Southeast Asia"; our "blundering efforts to do good" turned into a "disastrous mistake"; and so on.<sup>46</sup> Again, it is remarkable how impervious the state religion is to mere factual evidence, extended now over eighty years of imperial aggression, following upon the bloody conquest of the national territory.

I have been discussing one major persistent theme of United States foreign policy, and not a very surprising one—namely, the attempt to create a Grand Area, a global economy, adapted to the needs of those who design United States government policy and the corporate interests that they largely represent. One concomitant of this dominant commitment is the repeated reliance on military force. This is, of course, only the most visible and dramatic device—United States policy towards Chile under Allende or Brazil since the early 1960s illustrates more typical and preferred procedures. But military force is the ultimate weapon to preserve a Grand Area. It is not exactly something new in American history.

James Chace, editor of *Foreign Affairs*, comments on this matter in a recent article. He counts up 159 instances of United States armed intervention abroad prior to 1945. Since World War II, he adds, "We have used military forces in Korea, Indochina, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic and the Congo." He then cites various reasons why we should expect all of this to continue: fears of resource scarcity, concern for the United States sphere of influence in the Caribbean and "regional balances of power" elsewhere, and, finally, the American "concern for human rights and the espousal of liberal, pluralistic democracies."<sup>47</sup>

Recall the cases cited, or other examples of intervention not cited: Iran, Cuba, Guatemala, Chile. In which of these cases was American intervention motivated by concern for human rights and espousal of liberal, pluralistic democracies? It remains a matter of great interest and importance that such utter nonsense can be produced with a straight face and be taken seriously in journalism and academic scholarship.

Chace points out (in part, correctly) that the American people continue to support an activist, interventionist foreign policy. One of the contributing factors is the ideology of American benevolence and international good will, as illustrated in his own remarks. I have cited a number of examples to show how this doctrinal framework governs scholarship, as well as the mass media, journals of current affairs, and the like. Most of these examples illustrate how the facts are simply ignored in the interests of doctrinal purity. But it is interesting to see that even direct and overt self-contradiction poses no particular problem for the secular priesthood, which rarely achieves the sophistication of its theological counterparts. As an illustration, consider another article in which

Chace returns to the same themes.<sup>48</sup> Here he discusses the "ironies and ambiguities" of "the American experience," referring to the "moral concern" that is "a typical expression of the American spirit" though "we have found that the pursuit of justice sometimes leads to consequences contrary to those we had intended [and] that, at times, our proclaimed ideals serve to hide—from ourselves even more than from others—motivations of a darker and more complex character." "Experience should have taught us," he concludes, "that we do not always completely understand our own motivations," though he does not discuss the elaborate system of deceit that has been constructed to prevent such understanding. What is remarkable, however, is his discussion of particular cases, for example the *Realpolitik* of the Nixon-Kissinger period. "We were determined to seek stability," Chace asserts, and as an illustration—literally—he offers "our efforts to destabilize a freely elected Marxist government in Chile." Even a direct self-contradiction in successive sentences<sup>49</sup> does not suffice to raise a question about "our own motivations." Rather, the example falls under the category of "irony."

This category serves in the most astonishing ways to disguise reality in the ideological disciplines. Here is a final example, particularly revealing, I think, because of the source. Norman Graebner is an excellent historian, a critic of Cold War idiocies, a "realist" of more or less the variety of George Kennan, to whom the study from which I will quote is dedicated.<sup>50</sup> Graebner accepts the conventional belief that American foreign policy has been guided by the "Wilsonian principles of peace and self-determination." The United States is not "an aggressive, imperialist country" in the twentieth century, as is demonstrated by the many "references to principle" in "its diplomatic language," references notably lacking in the rhetoric of truly aggressive and imperial powers, of course. The "traditional American dilemma" lies in the delusion that, given "the energy or determination of its antagonists," nevertheless "the nation was always assured that it could anticipate the eventual collapse of its enemies and the creation of the illusive world of justice and freedom." He asserts without qualification that "certainly all fundamental American relations with the U.S.S.R. and mainland China after 1950 were anchored to that assumption." It is this "American idealism" that caused so many problems in the postwar period.

Having laid down these basic principles, Graebner proceeds to investigate some particular examples of foreign policy in action. He then makes the following observation: "It was ironic that this nation generally ignored the principles of self-determination in Asia and Africa where it had some chance of success and promoted it behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains where it had no chance of success at all."

Consider the logic. A general principle is proposed: The United States follows the Wilsonian principles of self-determination. Then specific examples are surveyed. We discover that where the principles could be applied, they were not applied; where they could not be applied, in enemy domains, they were advocated (and their advocacy demonstrates that we are not aggressive and imperialistic). Conclusion: It is ironic that the general thesis fails when tested. But the general principle remains in force. In fact, Graebner goes on to lament that "this nation's selfless search for order in world affairs could not sustain the gratitude of a troubled world."

By similar logic a physicist might formulate a general hypothesis, put it to the test, discover that it is refuted in each specific instance, and conclude that it is ironic that the facts are the opposite of what the principle predicts—but the principle nevertheless stands. The example illustrates the difference between ideological disciplines such as academic history and political science, on the one hand, and subjects that are expected to meet rational intellectual standards, on the other.

This example is interesting precisely because the historian in question was an early critic of Cold War doctrine. He argues, on Kennanesque lines, that United States policy was in error. "Error," however, is a socially neutral category. To invoke it is to remain safely within the bounds of the primary dogma: that the United States simply responds to external challenges, and that its policy reflects no special material interests of dominant social groups.

This discussion has so far been fairly abstract. I have not tried to deal with the human consequences of the policy of military intervention against those too weak to strike back, or other measures undertaken to ensure the stability of the Grand Area—policies that it is only reasonable to assume will continue in the future, since there have been no significant institutional changes,

and even the critique that developed in some circles during the Indochina war has been fairly well deflected and contained. We may recall how all of this looks from the wrong end of the guns. Eighty years ago a Filipino nationalist wrote that the Filipinos "have already accepted the arbitrament of war, and war is the worst condition conceivable, especially when waged by an Anglo-Saxon race which despises its opponent as an alien or inferior people. Yet the Filipinos accepted it with a full knowledge of its horror and of the sacrifices in life and property which they knew they would be called upon to make."<sup>51</sup> It will be recalled that on that occasion too, our selfless leadership was merely attempting "to fulfill God's purposes in history." Even James Chace concedes that in this case, though there were "moral purposes" alongside of self-interest, "We were hard put to find a moral defense for our behavior. The atrocities committed by American troops there were horrifying, as they resorted to a no-quarter war, taking no prisoners, burning villages and often shooting innocent men, women and children."<sup>52</sup>

One might think that after Vietnam it would be superfluous to go into this matter. Unfortunately, that supposition would be false. When President Carter, in the midst of one of his sermons on human rights, explains that we owe no debt and have no responsibility to Vietnam because "the destruction was mutual,"<sup>53</sup> there is not a comment nor a whisper of protest in the American press. And the history of that "tragic error" is now being rewritten to make the people of Indochina the villain of the piece. And when Ford and Kissinger sent their bombers over Cambodia in one final act of violence and murder in that land ravaged by American terror at the time of the Mayaguez incident in May 1975, even Senator Kennedy, one of the very few senators to have shown genuine concern over the human consequences of the American war, saw fit to state that "the President's firm and successful action gave an undeniable and needed lift to the nation's spirit, and he deserves our genuine support."<sup>54</sup> The world was put on notice—as if notice were needed—that the world's most violent power had not renounced its commitment to the use of force as a consequence of its defeat in Indochina, at least when the victims are defenseless.

The pattern has continued since. Consider what happened in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea in August 1976, when two American soldiers were killed by North Korean troops as they attempted to trim a tree under circumstances that remain disputed. For the sake of discussion, let us assume the American account to be entirely accurate: The North Koreans simply murdered them in cold blood. The United States army then cut down the tree, with a considerable show of force, including a flight of B-52s. An important account of this incident was given by William Beecher, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, now a diplomatic correspondent. He writes that the original plan was to have the B-52s drop "about 70,000 tons of bombs on a South Korean bombing range only about 10 miles from Panmunjom. . . . But well-placed sources say that at the eleventh hour it was decided that to drop the bombs would be too provocative and might trigger a military response from the truculent North Koreans."<sup>55</sup>

Let us assume that the figure of seventy-thousand tons—more than three Hiroshima equivalents—is mistaken. But why should heavy bombing a few miles from Panmunjom appear "provocative" to the "truculent North Koreans"? Perhaps because they retain some memories of things that happened a quarter-century ago when the United States Air Force so thoroughly devastated their land that there were simply no remaining targets. In keeping with the principle of believing only the American side of the story, let us recall how these events were officially perceived in an Air Force study of "an object lesson in air power to all the Communist world and especially to the Communists in North Korea," a "lesson" delivered a month before the armistice:

On 13 May 1953 twenty USAF F-84 fighter-bombers swooped down in three successive waves over Toksan irrigation darn in North Korea. From an altitude of 300 feet they skip-bombed their loads of high explosives into the hard-packed earthen walls of the dam. The subsequent flash flood scooped clean 27 miles of valley below, and the plunging flood waters wiped out large segments of a main north-south communication and supply route to the front lines. The Toksan strike and similar attacks on the Chasan, Kuwonga, Kusong, and Toksang dams" accounted for five of the more than twenty irrigation dams targeted for possible attack—dams up-stream from all the important enemy supply routes and furnishing 75 percent of the controlled water supply for North Korea's rice production. These strikes,



largely passed over by the press, the military observers, and news commentators in favor of attention-arresting but less meaningful operations events, constituted one of the most significant air operations of the Korean war. They sent the Communist military leaders and political commissars scurrying to their press and radio centers to blare to the world the most severe, hate-filled harangues to come from the Communist propaganda mill in the three years of warfare.

In striking one target system, the USAF had hit hard at two sensitive links in the enemy's armor—his capability to supply his front-line troops and his capability to produce food for his armies. To the U.N. Command the breaking of the irrigation dams meant disruption of the enemy's lines of communication and supply. But to the Communists the smashing of the dams meant primarily the destruction of their chief sustenance—rice. The Westerner can little conceive the awesome meaning which the loss of this staple food commodity has for the Asian—starvation and slow death. "Rice famine," for centuries the chronic scourge of the Orient, is more feared than the deadliest plague. Hence the show of rage, the flare of violent tempers, and the avowed threats of reprisals when bombs fell on five irrigation dams.<sup>56</sup>

Recall that this is not quoted from Communist black propaganda but from an official United States Air Force study.

The North Koreans, truculent as ever, could not see the beauty of this magnificent air operation, and might find heavy bombing "provocative" today as well, so the original plan was called off.

Only a few years after the USAF succeeded in bringing starvation and slow death to the Asians in Northeast Asia, they were at it again in Southeast Asia. As that war ended, after vast destruction and massacre, the United States insisted on a show of force against defenseless Cambodia during the *Mayaguez* incident. Sihanoukville was bombed, but a planned B-52 attack was called off—wisely, the *New Republic* commented, because of "predictable domestic and world reaction" and possible adverse effects on the *Mayaguez* crewmen—not because it would have constituted another major massacre of Cambodians.<sup>57</sup> A year later United States planes almost carried out heavy bombing in Korea to impress the truculent North Koreans. The American people continue to support an activist foreign policy, so the polls indicate, and the articulate intelligentsia are as usual urging us to forget the "errors" and "miscalculations" of the past and to set forth again on our campaign to instill our moral ideals in an evil and ungrateful world. The institutional structures that lie behind the military episodes and other interventions of the postwar years and the ideological framework of Grand Area planning all remain intact, subjected to little public challenge, effectively removed from popular scrutiny or, in part, even scholarly analysis. It is only reasonable to conclude that the editor of *Foreign Affairs* is quite right when he predicts that military intervention will continue, as will other attempts to enforce "stability" through "destabilization" and to contain and destroy movements that threaten to secede from the Grand Area. It is this threat, whether called "Communist" or something else, that the United States government will bend every effort to contain and destroy, by force if need be, by more delicate means if they suffice, while the intelligentsia divert us with tales about our selfless devotion to principle and moral idealism.

## Chapter Two: Foreign Policy and the Intelligentsia

1. For references and further comment, see my *For Reasons of State* (New York: Pantheon, 1973). Cf. also the description of refugees in South Vietnam by Leo Cherne, chairman of the executive committee of Freedom House and chairman of the board of directors of the International Rescue Committee: "There are more than 700,000 additional refugees who have recently fled the countryside dominated by the Vietcong and with their act of flight have chosen the meager sanctuary provided by the government of South Vietnam" ("Why We Can't Withdraw," *Saturday Review*, December 18, 1965). On U.S. programs of forced generation of refugees at that time and later (and indeed, since 1962), see *For Reasons of State*, see also Chapter 5 of the present volume. To cite one example, as Cherne wrote about the refugees fleeing the Vietcong, a government-sponsored study explained that U.S. air and artillery bombardment impel the villagers "to move where they will be safe from such attacks . . . regardless of their attitude to the GVN [the U.S. client government]." No doubt some Soviet Cherne is now writing about how refugees are fleeing to the meager sanctuary of Kabul, trying to escape the murderous terrorists who dominate the countryside, agents of Western imperialism.

To show that there are no limits to cynicism, Cherne adds that "the South Vietnamese ask only to be left in peace to overcome" the defects of the GVN, "its instability, the imperfections of its democratic institutions, and the inadequacy of its economic and social programs." With as much justice, his Soviet counterpart could now explain how the people of Afghanistan ask only to be left in peace to overcome the similar problems of their struggling nation, defended from aggression by Soviet benevolence. The extent to which such remarkable assertions pass without arousing horror and indignation, even comment, is a fair measure of the extent to which Bakunin was correct in describing "worship of the state" as the malady of the intellectuals.

2. *New York Times*, February 6, 1966.

3. *New York Times*, September 28, 1974. See Chapter 1, note 33, for a similar example from liberal scholarship. Examples are legion.

4. Peter L. Berger, "When Two Elites Meet," *Washington Post*, April 18, 1976, reprinted from *Commentary* (March 1976).

5. Samuel P. Huntington, in M. J. Crozier, S. P. Huntington, and J. Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission* (New York: New York University Press, 1975). See also Chapter 1, note 34.

6. See Chapters 3 and 4 for some specific examples, and N. Chomsky and E. S. Herman, *The Political Economy of Human Rights*, 2 vols. (Boston: South End Press, 1979), for extensive documentation and discussion.

7. See my articles "Watergate: A Skeptical View," *New York Review* (September 20, 1973); editorial, *More* (December 1975); and introduction to N. Blackstock, ed., *COINTELPRO* (New York: Vintage Books, 1976).

8. On the limited nature of opposition to the Vietnam War among the intelligentsia, see Chapter 1. For some acute commentary on critique of the student movement and the refusal to join popular opposition to the war, see Julius Jacobson, "In Defense of the Young," *New Politics* (June 1970).

9. *Boston Globe*, October 18, 1976. Variants of this argument are common. Recall the observation by Martin Peretz, editor of the *New Republic*, cited in Chapter 1: "The American collapse [in Indochina] will read in history as among the ugliest of national crimes" (June 11, 1977). Peretz makes an interesting contribution to the new version of history now being created. He states that the book he is reviewing "stakes out significant independent ground — implicitly against the peace movement" by arguing "that a political settlement was possible," thus implying that "the peace movement" was against a political settlement. Of course, everyone on every side was in favor of a political settlement, but they differed on the terms: Crucially, should the National Liberation Front, which the United States government always knew to be the only mass-based political force in South Vietnam, be permitted to share in (hence presumably to dominate) the governance of the South? The "peace movement," to the extent that such an entity can be identified, argued for a political settlement on these terms, which the United States government rejected on the grounds that if the group it supported were to enter a coalition with the NLF, "the whale would swallow the minnow," in the picturesque phrase of government expert Douglas Pike. Until it committed the ugly crime of failing, the United States government was committed to blocking any such political settlement. Placed against the background of the actual history, which he knows well enough, Peretz's argument that it was criminal for the United States to desist can be understood in its full significance.

10. See Chapters 3 and 6 of the present volume.

11. Brace Andrews, *Public Constraint and American Policy in Vietnam*, SAGE Publications, International Studies Series, vol. 4 (1976). Note that the facts are somewhat ambiguous, as Andrews explains, in that much of this opposition was of the "win or get out" variety.

12. *Crisis of Democracy* (above, note 5). See Chapter 1, above.

13. For particularly inane musings along these lines, see Sandy Vogelsang, *The Long Dark Night of the Soul* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).

14. Nathan Glazer, "American Jews and Israel: The Last Support," *Interchange* (November 1976).

15. Gordon Connell-Smith, *The Inter-American System* (Oxford: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1966), p. 343.

16. Consider Henry Kissinger's characterization of the "statesman": "He judges ideas on their utility and not on their 'truth.' "The word "truth" is placed in quotes, reflecting the contempt that Kissinger has always felt for this concept. In the same essay he complains of the difficulty of dealing with the "ideological leadership" of the Communist states: "The essence of Marxism-Leninism ... is the view that 'objective' factors such as the social structure, the economic process, and, above all, the class struggle are more important than the personal convictions of statesmen. . . . Nothing in the personal experience of Soviet leaders would lead them to accept protestations of good will at face value," as we do all the time. "Domestic structure and foreign policy," in *American Foreign Policy* (New York: Norton, 1969).

A few pages later Kissinger identifies "the deepest problem of the contemporary international order": It is nothing like starvation, war, oppression, or other trivia that occupy superficial minds, but rather the fact that current debates are peripheral to the "basic division" between two styles of policy and a "difference of philosophical perspective" that separates the West, which "is deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer," from "cultures which escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking," and still believe "that the real world is almost completely *internal* to the observer." The French Revolution, Lenin, Mao, and others failed to cross this philosophical barrier (though Russia, he concedes, has partly come to recognize that there is a real world outside of our heads). Just how this squares with the idea that the Communists are difficult because of their absurd concern for objective reality is not easy to determine, but perhaps this all-too-typical nonsense should simply be dismissed as a parody of the academic intellectual, which was in fact quite effective with the media and, remarkably, with the academic world as well. See Chapter 6.

17. The term is used by Isaiah Berlin, "The Bent Twig," *Foreign Affairs* (October 1972). The context suggests that he has in mind primarily the subservient intelligentsia of the state socialist societies, an apt but insufficiently general usage.

18. It is worth noting Kissinger's uncritical acceptance of the legitimacy of this concept of "the expert" as someone who grovels before authority, whatever may be the truth—or as he would say, the "truth" (see note 16).

19. In the essay cited in note 16, Kissinger observes that "law and business . . . furnish the core of the leadership groups in America." So far, he is correct. But which lawyers? Those who defend civil rights of blacks? Obviously not. Rather, overwhelmingly, those linked to corporate power. And which businessmen? The corner grocer? Evidently it is the "business elite," whose special talent, Kissinger adds, is their "ability to manipulate the known"—an ability that they share with carpenters and the peasants who have yet to learn about the existence of the external world. Putting aside the typical obfuscation, the fact that Kissinger carefully skirts is that foreign policy is largely in the hands of those with private power. Some ideologists are more straightforward, e.g., Huntington, who writes (in *The Crisis of Democracy*) that "Truman had been able to govern the country with the cooperation of a relatively small number of Wall Street lawyers and bankers," though he fears that these happy days are gone, since other groups have been "mobilized and organized" to advance their own interests, leading to a "crisis of democracy." See Chapter 1.

20. *Trialogue* (Fall 1976).

21. For example, Leon Wieseltier explains that my political writings "are a monument to left-wing paranoia, devoted as they are to demonstrating that the press in this country is 'a system of state-supported propaganda'; nothing that Chomsky wrote about the slaughter in Cambodia was quite as angry as his attack on Jean Lacouture for misquoting the number of its victims" (*New Republic*, September 25, 1981). Turning to the facts, the alleged quote is simply a fabrication. Secondly, the nature of my "attack" on Lacouture is accurately illustrated in this summary passage: "In what passes for intellectual discourse in the West, political discussion included, correction of errors is rare indeed, as a glance at review journals will indicate. Lacouture deserves credit for departing from the general norm. We think that his corrections are inadequate and disagree with some of the conclusions expressed in them, but we want to stress that it is no crime to misread—it is a rare review that avoids error—and it is only proper to issue corrections when errors are discovered"

(*Political Economy of Human Rights*, vol. 2, p. 377). In contrast, we described "the record of atrocities" of the Khmer Rouge as "substantial and often gruesome," etc.

Wieselstier does believe that some criticism of the press is not paranoid: "There is a scandal, and it is the moral and political prestige of the PLO [in media] coverage of the Middle East," something that will be apparent to every reader of the American press.

Since my "attack on Lacouture" has taken on a mythical life of its own, perhaps a word about the facts is in order (*ibid.*, for details). Lacouture's review of Francois Ponchaud's *Cambodge annee zero* appeared in the *Nouvel Observateur* and the *New York Review* in early 1977, and was widely quoted in the press here as an authoritative account of Ponchaud's work. I read the book and found that there was scarcely a reference to it in the review that was even near accurate. In the case to which Wieselstier alludes, Lacouture claimed that the Khmer Rouge had "boasted" of having murdered some a million people, apparently basing himself on Ponchaud's estimate that 800,000 had been killed during the war and that some 1.2 million had died from all causes since. I wrote Lacouture a personal letter, pointing out a series of such errors and suggesting that he issue corrections. In publishing partial corrections in the *New York Review* (never in France), Lacouture posed to me the question whether it is an important matter "whether the regime has murdered thousands or hundreds of thousands of wretched people" (the original claim was a "boast" of 2 million murdered). In a review-article in the *Nation* in which we recommended Ponchaud's book as "serious and worth reading," noting his "grisly account of what refugees have reported to him about the barbarity of their treatment at the hands of the Khmer Rouge," E. S. Herman and I responded to Lacouture's rhetorical question, stating that we felt that facts do matter, and that a factor of 100 or 1000 in estimates of killings is not insignificant. We also noted that there was wide disparity in estimates of killings, ranging from the *Far Eastern Economic Review* ("possibly thousands" killed) to Lacouture's original 2 million figure, adding that we were in no position to determine which estimates were correct; Lacouture himself oscillated from a boast of 2 million murdered to possibly thousands killed, within a few months. This was followed by a remarkable campaign of deceit and outright prevarication in the international press, alleging that I was denying Pol Pot crimes; some of the press (including the *New Republic*, repeatedly) refused the normal right of reply. To mention only one example, in the author's preface to the American edition of his book, Ponchaud cites my praise for it and in turn praises me for "the responsible attitude and precision of thought" shown in what I had written about Cambodia (which in fact includes everything that appeared during the Pol Pot period). In the author's preface to the world edition, dated the very same day, these passages are eliminated and replaced by the allegation that I "sharply criticized" his book, claim that there were "no massacres," and insist that one rely on "deliberately chosen official statements" of the regime while excluding the testimony of refugees—all falsehoods, as Ponchaud knew very well; compare the simultaneous American edition, which is not available elsewhere while the world edition is unavailable in the U.S. His allegations in the world edition were widely repeated and in fact seeped back to the United States, while his comments here were ignored, as was the exposure of this deception. This is not the place to review the record, which provides an intriguing insight into the attitude of much of the intelligentsia towards the curious idea that one should try to keep to the truth, even when joining in the chorus of condemnation of an official enemy.

22. The following remarks on the War-Peace Studies Project relies on Laurence H. Shoup, "Shaping the Postwar World," *Insurgent Sociologist*, vol. 5, no. 3 (Spring 1975), where there are explicit references for the quotes that appear below. See now also the important study by L. Shoup and W. Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust* (New York: Monthly Review Press), to my knowledge the first serious study of this project, issued in early 1977 to a resounding silence, apart from ritual denunciation in the journal of the CFR by William Bundy (*Foreign Affairs*, October 1977).

23. Cf. Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War* (New York: Random House, 1968), and David P. Calleo and Benjamin M. Rowland, *America and the World Political Economy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973). Kolko is, to my knowledge, the first historian to have seriously investigated this question. Calleo and Rowland conclude that "the war had exhausted British economic power. To a considerable extent, the United States was responsible. Throughout the War, Hull, determined to break up the British bloc, had used the leverage of Lend-Lease skillfully and systematically to reduce Britain to a financial satellite." The British, of course, were aware of what was going on; Calleo and Rowland quote an "outraged" communication from Churchill to Roosevelt on the subject. See also Introduction, note 16.

24. There has been much debate over the question of how or whether Western policy deliberately contributed to this outcome. Albert Speer recalls "one single case" of direct cooperation between Hitler and the West—namely, an arrangement for the transfer of German troops cut off by the British fleet on a Greek island to the Russian front, to allow the British, rather than the Russians, to take Salonika. Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich* (New York: Macmillan, 1970; Avon Books, 1971), p. 509.

25. Cf. Chapter 11, note 4.

26. Cf. Kolko, *op. cit.*, pp. 302f.

27. The Western Hemisphere was then and for many years after the major producing area. Until 1968 North America surpassed the Middle East in oil production. Cf. John Blair, *The Control of Oil* (New York: Pantheon, 1976).

28. For discussion of how this principle was applied or abrogated to extend the power of the American oil companies, see *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy* (henceforth, *MNOC*), Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, January 2, 1975 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975).

29. Cf. Michael Tanzer, *The Energy Crisis* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), in particular, his discussion of the devices used to shift other countries to an oil-based economy. Cf. also Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

30. This plan was actually imposed on the oil companies by the government, naturally over the strong objections of the British. This is one of several instances that reveal how the government may disregard the parochial short-term interests of even major segments of the corporate system in order to safeguard the more general interests of American capitalism. For discussion, see Chapter 11.

The 40 percent American share was distributed among the five major American companies, who were persuaded to relinquish 1 percent each to American independent companies for "window dressing," according to the Middle East coordinator for Exxon (*MNOC*, p. 71). It should be remembered that this was shortly after President Truman had killed a grand jury investigation of the oil cartel on grounds of "national security," on recommendation of the Departments of State, Defense, and Interior, who advised that the "American oil operations are, for all practical purposes, instruments of our foreign policy"—and who might have added, reciprocally, that our foreign policy is to a significant extent guided by long-term oil company interests.

31. Yoshio Tsurumi, "Japan," in "The Oil Crisis: In Perspective," *Daedalus* (Fall 1975). Discussing the prewar period, the same author has commented on "the American myth that the government and business circles of the United States operate at arms-length, if not in outright adversary relationships"—Reviews, *Journal of International Affairs* (Spring/Summer 1976). It should be noted that under the conditions cited in the preceding note, local conflict may occasionally arise, since, insofar as it functions as a generalized agency of American capitalism, the government may have concerns different from those of some particular segment.

32. For a review of the contents of these memoranda, see Richard B. Du Boff, "Business Ideology and Foreign Policy," in N. Chomsky and H. Zinn, eds., *Critical Essays*, published as volume 5 of the Gravel edition of the Pentagon Papers (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972). For further analysis of the contribution of the Pentagon Papers to the understanding of United States imperial planning, see John Dower, "The Super-dominance in Postwar Asia," in the same volume, and my *For Reasons of State*, particularly pp. 31-66.

33. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (March 1976).

34. Robert L. Gallucci, *Neither Peace nor Honor: the Politics of American Military Policy in Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975). The limitation to "military policy" is crucial; basic decision-making with regard to the American involvement in Vietnam is nowhere discussed.

35. Largely as a result of the impact of the student movement, it became difficult to ignore completely the so-called radical critique—though, as noted, it is not obvious why the assumption that the United States behaves much as all other great powers do should be considered particularly "radical." There are, in fact, several publications attempting to deal with it. The most serious, to my knowledge, is Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971). For a discussion of gross errors of fact and logic that entirely undermine his analysis (and others), see my *For Reasons of State*. For a very penetrating discussion of critical literature on the "radical critique," see Stephen Shalom, "Economic Interests and United States Foreign Policy," unpublished, adapted from the author's Boston University Ph.D. dissertation: "US-Philippine Relations: A Study of Neo-Colonialism" (1976).

An interesting example of the evasion and misrepresentation of the "radical critique" appears in the study by Leslie H. Gelb, who was director of the Pentagon Papers project (*The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked*, with Richard K. Belts [Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979]). He begins by outlining nine "wide-ranging explanations of U.S. involvement given in the Vietnam War literature." The first two of these are "idealistic imperialism" and "economic imperialism" (the latter explanation is allegedly mine; for comment, see *For Reasons of State*, pp. 63—65). Gelb then explains why these "stereotypes fail," including the first two, and crucially the second, which, when presented without his distortion, is the thesis that is documented in the Pentagon Papers and elsewhere, a fact that Gelb systematically ignores. Curiously, his analysis of defects covers all of the theories presented with the exception of the first two theses, which are ignored in this analysis of defects and subsequently. The only comment that has even marginal bearing on the alleged

failure of this "stereotype" is this: "But however these explanations are combined, they are better as answers to the question of why the United States originally became involved and committed in Vietnam than as analyses of the process of involvement, the strategy for fighting the war, and the strategy for ending it." Even that statement is false: In fact, the "radical" thesis documented in Gelb's Pentagon Papers study and ignored in his book provides quite a convincing explanation for the evolution of U.S. strategy throughout Indochina and also for the Nixon-Kissinger effort to salvage victory from defeat (cf. Chapter 3), and furthermore for the postwar policy of exploiting and maintaining the quite substantial, even if only partial, U.S. victory—namely, the destruction of Indochina, which succeeds in deflecting the dread "domino effect" of successful development that might be emulated elsewhere (cf. Chapter 4, note 1). But even assuming Gelb's comment to be accurate, note the implications. A study of the sources of U.S. policy is dismissed as irrelevant and beside the point; we must restrict attention to the execution of this policy. When Gelb refers to "doves," he restricts attention to "pessimists," who thought that the United States would fail, and who "were not ignored," Gelb observes, which shows that "the system worked." The only analyses of U.S. policy that can be seriously considered are those that sought to explain why "the United States failed in Vietnam," not those that reject the assumption that the United States had a right to succeed.

Gelb is one of those who regard concern for French sensibilities and the French role in Europe as being of paramount importance in guiding U.S. policy in the early years. While this may have been a minor factor, the documentary record shows clearly that imperial strategy concerning the Far East was a far more predominant one. Gelb is not unaware of the latter factor, but misrepresents it, without providing any evidence, as "an inversion of Marxist theory," in which "economic interest was used as a cloak for political interest." The popularity of the former thesis (which is widely regarded as the "sophisticated" theory) can easily be explained by the fact that it is far less threatening to the state religion than the actual record of planning revealed in considerable detail in the Pentagon Papers.

Even on the narrow issue of strategy for realizing the objectives that Gelb misstates, his use of documentary evidence is worth careful investigation. For example, in discussing the aftermath of the Geneva Accords in 1954, he does not so much as mention the National Security Council response (NSC 5429/2, August 20, 1954); for good reason, as we see when we consider the contents of this document, which laid plans for U.S. subversion and aggression throughout East Asia in response to the dangerous threat that peace might be brought to Indochina. Cf. *For Reasons of State*, pp. 100f. (Also p. 150, below) Interestingly, this document is even severely misrepresented in the Pentagon Papers study itself, as noted in *For Reasons of State*.

36. Laurence B. Krause, "The International Economic System and the Multinational Corporation," in *The Multinational Corporation, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (September 1972).

37. Ray, "Corporations and American Foreign Relations."

38. Gaddis Smith, "The United States as Villain," *New York Times Book Review*, October 10, 1976.

39. Cited in Charles B. Maurer, *Call to Revolution* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1971), p. 174.

40. A fact of which the business press is not unaware, though businessmen constantly whine of their difficulties in reaching public opinion with their "message." See Chapter 1.

41. See Chapter 11.

42. "International Economics," *Business Week*, March 29, 1976.

43. *Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, second session, Part VIII, U.S. Government Agencies and Programs, January 15 and 16, 1964 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), pp. 953f.

44. In much of Latin America and Asia, the AID-trained police have proven to be among the most vicious torturers and murderers. El Salvador is a recent example. See Introduction. The U.S.-trained military have been no less adept at repression and slaughter. On this topic, see *The Political Economy of Human Rights*, vol. 1, and references cited there.

To cite only one example, consider Somoza's Nicaragua. A National Guard offensive resulted "in thousands of deaths in the countryside, where whole villages suspected of harboring guerillas were destroyed," and villagers describe "aerial bombings, summary executions and gruesome tortures ... it is also believed by many that an ongoing American-backed 'peasant welfare' program [heavily financed by AID] is actually a cover for anti-guerilla activities" in the north, where these military exercises were being conducted. Furthermore, "about 85 percent of the National Guard leadership is directly trained in anti-guerilla warfare by the United States" in Nicaragua, which is "the only country which sends the entire annual graduating class of its military academy for a full year of training" at the United States Army school in the Panama Canal Zone.

Stephen Kinzer, "Nicaragua, a Wholly Owned Subsidiary," *New Republic* (April 9, 1977). In a pastoral letter the seven principal Catholic prelates of Nicaragua denounced the "atrocious climate of terror" that reigned in the country. Jean-Claude Buhner, "Les droits de l'homme en Amerique centrale," *Le Monde diplomatique* (May 1977). Even the generally ludicrous State Department *Human Rights Reports* concede that there may have been a few problems in Nicaragua (primarily, as a result of Cuban-supported guerrilla activities), while naturally ignoring entirely the United States role. Cf. *Human Rights Reports*, submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, of the U.S. Senate, March 1977 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977). For discussion of these reports, see *Political Economy of Human Rights*, vol. 1.

45. Otto H. Kahn, *The Myth of American Imperialism*, publication of the Committee of American Business Men, an address given December 30, 1924, at a meeting on the subject of American imperialism organized by the League for Industrial Democracy, p. 4, section entitled "The Allegation of Political or Military Imperialism."

46. For references, see chapter 4.

47. James Chace, "American Intervention," *New York Times*, September 13, 1976.

48. Chace, "How 'Moral' Can We Get?" *New York Times Magazine*, May 22, 1977.

49. To be sure, the contradiction can easily be resolved. We can take these statements as an indication of what is really meant by the term "stability" in the rhetoric of American political analysis.

50. Norman A. Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy: 1945—60* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1962).

51. Sixto Lopez, "The Philippine Problem: A Proposition for a Solution," *The Outlook*, April 13, 1901.

52. "How 'Moral' Can We Get?" The word "often" is a bit of an understatement.

53. News conference, March 24, 1977; reprinted in the *New York Times*, March 25.

54. Commencement address at Bentley College. *Boston Globe*, May 18, 1975. See Chap. 4.

55. William Beecher, "US show of force impressed N. Korea," *Boston Globe*, September 3, 1976.

56. Quarterly Review Staff Study, "The Attack on the Irrigation Dams in North Korea," *Air Universities Quarterly Review*, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 1953—54). Cf. also Robert Frank Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950—1953* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), pp. 623f.

57. John Osborne, *New Republic*, June 7, 1975. See Chapter 4 for the further thoughts of this courageous defender of the nation's honor.