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Aristotle built upon the relationship among war, justice and human psychology that Plato had begun to outline. But what truly differentiates Aristotle from Plato in terms of justice and war is that Aristotle explicitly stated the proper relationship between the two. While Plato had begun to construct his theory about the proper relationship between war and peace in the *Laws* (628d), Aristotle plainly stated that war should always be fought for the sake of peace (*Politics* 1333a30). This peaceful telos of war, along with several other factors, leads us to see that Aristotle supported some of the central principles of what would become Western Just War Theory. However, several of the causes of war, such as war for the sake of enslavement and for resources, which are completely contrarian to Just War Theory, Aristotle argued were just by nature. But it is important to note that, regardless of the reasons that he gave, Aristotle wrote of war as something that needed to be justified ethically. The need for this justification implies that some wars are unjust, presumably those fought for the wrong *telee*.

Aristotle described several possible *telee* for just wars: the acquisition of property, the establishment of proper leadership and peace. The establishment of proper leadership includes enslaving those who are slaves by nature and also rulership over those who are incapable of ruling themselves (cite). Aristotle was content to define peace among poleis as simply the absence of war. However, peace within a polis is more complex. Within a polis peace is rather the establishment of an order that is in harmony with nature. In a way, Aristotle returned to a view of justice that is similar to Herodotos: humans are part of the cosmos and the cosmos is just. Unlike Herodotos, however, Aristotle believed that neither fate nor the cosmos will establish peace and justice. Like Plato, Aristotle argued that humans must choose to construct peace and justice. For peace within a polis should properly be used for the pursuit of virtue. These virtues require an orderly structuring of the human soul.

Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle did not see war as something necessary for the proper cultivation of the human soul. While military training was necessary for the protection of the polis, war and military training had no intrinsic value for a virtuous soul. Because he rejected the possibility of war or military affairs having value in and of themselves, Aristotle departed from the Greek creative warfare tradition. We have seen evidence of military affairs having some sort of intrinsic value in Herodotos, Thucydides and Plato. For those writers, warfare was necessary for cultivating a certain toughness that was required for mere survival or for the maintenance of justice itself. But Aristotle could only justify war by its outcomes: the protection or establishment of a just polis. A just polis, in turn, was meant to produce conditions that cultivate virtues in the human soul.

While Plato had found the origins of war within the human soul, Aristotle saw war as a natural process, an activity that is potentially in harmony with the cosmos. Classifying war as such a process made sense for Aristotle, as humans were a type of animal, the *polikon zoon*, who have specific purposes as natural beings (1253a2). Therefore, as a natural process, war is acceptable for them to practice provided that they use it to achieve the telos that is in accordance with nature. But while war is a natural process, Aristotle did not place the origins of war with fate, as had Herodotos. Like Thucydides and Plato, Aristotle saw war as originating from humanity. But because he saw humanity as part of nature, Aristotle was inclined to call human psychological impulses natural.

While Aristotle does not directly state that human nature is the origin of war, indirectly he mentioned two aspects of the human soul that could be called the origins of war: spiritedness

and acquisition. However, unlike the spiritedness mentioned in any of Plato's works, which seems to be more of a willingness or desire for conflict, spiritedness for Aristotle is "a commanding and an unconquerable thing." (1327b36) War arises from spiritedness because of a person's desire either not to be conquered or their desire to command others. But Aristotle also saw war as arising from the need for acquisition. This acquisition is not like the appetite that Plato described in the Republic, as that appetite is used interchangeably to describe a desire for more resources and also the hunger for food and sex. Instead, this acquisition is concerned with the establishment of either a household or a polis. Aristotle mentioned how war arises from acquisition in his description of domestic affairs:

Accordingly, if nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, all animals must have been made by nature for the sake of men. It also follows that the art of war is in some sense a natural mode of acquisition (1256b15).

For Aristotle, acquisition is not so much about fulfilling some inner desire as it is taking what one is entitled to by nature. For in his view, there are objects, animals and other humans existing in nature that humans are entitled to use. War is justified for Aristotle if one intends to use these resources, from objects to humans, in accordance with nature. To Aristotle, there is a political hierarchy that is justified by nature. I will not go into much detail about what Aristotle saw as the proper hierarchy, which included the social positioning of women and children. But what is important for us in this paper is that Aristotle thought Greeks were entitled to rule over barbarians, and that within the Greek population there were some who were entitled to mastery while others were slaves by nature (1255a3). Because Aristotle saw this arraignment as justified by nature, he approved the use of war, a natural process, to attain this state.

Aristotle did not mention that there are any restrictions on the proper way to conduct this war. This lack of discussion of any sort of *jus in bello* is unusual, as it was mentioned explicitly by Herodotus and Thucydides. Plato gave detailed guidelines for *jus in bello* in his description of the kallipolis. But Aristotle did not make mention restrictions or guidelines for how to fight a war in the Politics. However, by explicitly outlining the proper reasons for going to war, which primarily concerns the *telos* of a war, Aristotle lays the groundwork for *jus ad bellum* thought.

A just war for Aristotle is one that seeks to establish the natural hierarchy of Greeks over non-Greeks and masters over slaves. A just war, then, is one that combines, in the proper way, the desire for acquisition and the desire to be unconquered and to command others. By combine properly, I mean that those who deserve to acquire by nature are allowed to do so and those who are spirited and deserve to remain unconquered are allowed to do so:

Training for war should not be pursued with a view to enslaving people who do not deserve such a fate. Its objects should be these: first, to prevent us from ever becoming enslaved ourselves; secondly, to put us in a position to exercise leadership, but leadership directed to the interest of those who are ruled, and not to the establishment of a general system of slavery; and thirdly, to enable us to make ourselves masters of those who naturally deserve to be slaves (1333b37).

It should be noted that even the principle that Aristotle shares with Just War Theory, that wars of defense are just, is argued in terms of this natural hierarchy. For in Just War Theory, wars of defense are framed as a sovereign power exercising its right to protect its sovereignty. Aristotle does not have such a concept of sovereignty. A war is justified only if the power that fights it is justified by nature. This is to say, the only wars that are just are those which are concerned with either the defense of or the establishment of an Aristotelian government.

Because war is not a *telos*, but only something that can serve to either protect or establish a polis, poleis that view fighting war and the preparation of war as their primary purpose are unjust. In this way, Aristotle built upon the critiques of Sparta and Crete that Plato had begun in

the Laws. Aristotle critiqued the Spartan constitution not only on purely theoretical grounds, but also by the current dissolution of its hegemonia:

Today the Spartans have lost their empire (uparchei); and we can all see for ourselves that they are not a happy community and that their legislator was not a good one... There is another reason why a city should not be considered happy, or its legislator praised, when its citizens are trained for victory in war and the subjugation of neighboring poleis. Such a policy involves a great risk of injury. (1333b5-29)

He goes on to argue that instead of focusing on dominating outsiders, a successful legislator should focus on dominating the inhabitants of his polis and establishing peace and justice. While modern readers would attribute such language to a totalitarian government, Aristotle emphasized, "Ruling over freemen is a finer thing and one more connected with goodness, than ruling despotically." (1333b28) But while Aristotle only considered as just those wars which are fought to establish or protect a particular political establishment, he did not seem to consider unjust wars particularly tragic.

While he did not lament over the horrors of war, Aristotle nonetheless condemned as unjust those poleis that do not fight wars for the sake of peace. Aristotle did not consider these wars to be unjust because they needlessly violate the peace of other poleis or even because they needlessly kill people, a central argument to modern critiques of unjust wars *xliv*. Instead, those who initiated the war are fighting for the wrong reasons, as they are confused about the natural order of human affairs:

The whole of life is also divided- into work and leisure, and into war and peace; and of actions some are necessary and useful whereas others are noble. And in these actions it is necessary to make the same choice as regards the parts of the soul and the actions of those parts: War must be for the sake of peace, work for the sake of leisure and things necessary and useful for the sake of the noble (1333a30).

These noble things, which are only attainable with peace and leisure, Aristotle mentioned in greater detail in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but in the *Politics* he briefly described the life for which all strive: a life of virtue consisting of the goods of the body, goods of the soul and external goods, such as the wealth necessary to live a good life (1323a21). Therefore, those who lead unjust wars are not unjust not so much because they are doing harm to others but rather because they are denying themselves the chance to attain a good life. Because this good life is one that is in harmony with the cosmos, for Aristotle, unjust wars are unnatural both for the aggressors and those whom they attack.

This passage also shows us that Aristotle did not find anything worthwhile in war itself. War is strictly a means to an end: the creation of peace. This rejection of any intrinsic value of war is another way that Aristotle laid the groundwork for Western Just War Theory. For Just War Theory frames discussion of war as something that is necessary for the establishment of either peace or freedom, never as something that is necessary for the human condition. Herodotus had seen war as necessary for the accumulation of honor. Thucydides saw war as needed in order to attain power, a natural human impulse. Plato needed some sort of militarism to ensure that the citizens' souls were properly fierce in order to ensure that a just regime could exist. But for Aristotle, war is only worthwhile as a process for the establishment of peace. The concerns of how to attain honor or even the expenditure of human aggression through war are completely disregarded by Aristotle.

It seems that the only remnant of creative war tradition within Aristotle's thought is that of military training. Military training is necessary for the leadership, even if they never actually experience war (1333b37). Even this military training differs from creative warfare in an essential way: Aristotle justified this training by its *telos*, rather than finding something

intrinsically worthwhile (1334a11). However, it could be argued that creative warfare is telological, as it is primarily concerned with the acquisition of honor. If we take this position, then if Aristotle justified military training by appealing towards honor, he would still be within the creative warfare tradition. But Aristotle does not. Like all other activities, Aristotle measured the usefulness of military training by its ability to produce a life of virtuous contemplation.

Aristotle saw the cosmos as amicable to peace and the cultivation of human virtue. War was a necessity in order to establish the polis in which humans could gather and attain the goods necessary to live a virtuous life: external goods, goods of the body and goods of the soul. Because war was necessary for this cosmologically ordained condition, it was in a sense justified. Aristotle did not explicitly condemn wars that do not have the purpose of establishing this type of regime. But given his arguments against regimes that are not centered around the goal of attaining this telos of human life, we can surmise that he would have considered those wars unjust. Because Aristotle saw the establishment of peace the only reason to fight a war, he placed himself against the Greek creative war tradition, in which fighting war had some intrinsic value. Aristotle did concede that military training is necessary for leadership, but not actual combat. By describing war only as a means towards some goal, and in particular a means that needs to be justified, Aristotle began to lay the ground work for an ethical discourse that could be used to judge total war.

xliv Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, Fourth Edition. Basic Books, New York NY, 2006. pg. 22