American Government

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

CHAPTER 15

Foreign Policy

Time Line

1823	The Monroe Doctrine broadens the isolationist foreign policy first articulated by President George Washington
1941	Following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States enters World War II
1945	The United States drops two atomic bombs on Japan, ending World War II and beginning cold war competition with the Soviet Union
1973	America becomes more dependent on oil imports and the balance-of-trade deficit widens sharply
1990	Collapse of the Soviet Union brings the cold war to an end

This chapter divides American foreign policy into three historical periods. From 1789 to 1941 isolationism prevailed, as the United States remained distant from European balance-of-power politics. During the cold war period from 1945 to 1990, the United States sought to contain the Soviet Union within its post–World War II borders, and the two powers aimed their massive nuclear arsenals at each other. After 1990, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic ascendancy of Asian and European nations marks the beginning of a post–cold war era. The United States can no longer isolate itself from the rest of the world, nor can it dominate the world. Many nations are now in a position to affect American foreign policy interests.

Opinions differ on appropriate principles for conducting foreign policy in the 1990s. Some analysts point to the renewed relevance of isolationism when events are largely beyond American control. Isolationist principles may be appropriate, for example, in refraining from military intervention in remote regional conflicts, erecting barriers to immigration, and inhibiting imports of products manufactured overseas. Other analysts believe that multilateral competition is essential in an era where America no longer has the economic and political strength to dominate the world. For example, the United Nations may play a peacekeeping role in international crises, and international agreements are needed to curb drug trafficking and to slow production of ozone-depleting chemicals.

The foreign policy-making process may be pictured as a series of concentric circles with the president at the center. The president's important advisers have differences in perspective rooted in personal experience and institutional position. Legislators, interest groups, and politically active citizens with a strong interest in foreign policy issues also participate in the foreign policy-making process. In crisis situations, the circle of participants narrows; in routine trade, foreign aid, and weapons development discussions, the circle of participants widens.

Isolationism 1789–1941

A fledgling United States in 1789 had neither population nor resources to compete effectively with the great powers of Europe. During George Washington's presidency, the United States did not even maintain armed forces. In his farewell address, Washington warned his successors to avoid "entangling alliances" which might drag the United States into European wars and bring those wars to this continent. Future presidents heeded Washington's advice, and the United States avoided any alliance commitments for more than 150 years. Wide oceans insulated the United States from Europe and made isolationism possible.

The Monroe Doctrine

Washington's advice found direct expression in the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. The Monroe Doctrine stated that the United States would stay out of European wars and that European powers should not attempt to extend their influence into the western hemisphere. When World War I broke out in 1914, the United States could no longer maintain its isolationist posture toward Europe. The United States was now an important economic power, and American merchant shipping supplied Britain's munitions, food, and other vital materials during the war.[1]

The League of Nations

In the aftermath of World War I, the League of Nations was created to prevent major wars through collective security. Member nations agreed not to use force to settle their disputes. They also agreed to unite against any nation that attacked its neighbors. Although President Woodrow Wilson lobbied hard to build support for American participation in the League, Congress refused to ratify the treaty. The United States retreated into its traditional posture of isolationism. Isolationism ended once and for all when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the United States joined the war effort against Germany and Japan.

The Cold War, 1945–1990

After World War II, the Soviet Union acted quickly to occupy and establish political control in Eastern Europe. The Soviets had the military capacity to invade Western Europe as well. Only the United States, with its economy intact and holding a virtual monopoly on atomic weapons, could protect Western Europe from possible Soviet invasion.

Nuclear Weapons and Military Policy

Deterrence

American military policy in the cold war era was based on the premise that direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union would be avoided through deterrence. Overwhelming superiority in armed forces, coupled with a demonstrated willingness to use them, would convince adversaries that attack must fail.[2]

Massive Retaliation

The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 demonstrated the destructive power of nuclear weapons and U.S. willingness to use them. Deterrence in the 1950s was based on the doctrine of massive retaliation. American policy pledged that the United States would respond to serious acts of provocation by the Soviet Union with an all-out nuclear retaliatory attack.

By the late 1950s, the Soviet Union had developed a substantial arsenal of its own. The United States could no longer apply massive retaliation without being bombed itself. The threat of massive retaliation was therefore less credible, and theorists began to consider alternatives. President Kennedy in 1961 developed a new strategic weapons policy known as flexible response.

Flexible Response

Flexible response called for the buildup of conventional and tactical nuclear weapons to provide the president with military alternatives to all-out nuclear war. Thus, the level and form of response could be geared to the nature and scope of the attack. During a crisis, flexible response would make retaliation more believable yet provide time for leaders to work out a truce before full-scale nuclear exchanges took place.

The value of flexibility for nuclear peace was underscored by the Cuban missile crisis, in which the superpowers came closer to the brink of nuclear war than at any other time since World War II. American intelligence confirmed in October 1962 that the Soviet Union was constructing sites in Cuba for launching medium-range missiles capable of hitting major U.S. targets.[3] President Kennedy considered this activity an unacceptable threat to the United States. He and his advisors considered a set of alternative responses that included (1) a full-scale bombardment of the missile sites by the Air Force, (2) a naval blockade to force the Soviet Union to remove the missiles, and (3) taking merely diplomatic actions.

Kennedy selected the blockade; it represented a firm U.S. response while not requiring the Soviets to accept a humiliating military defeat or running the risk of nuclear war. The Soviet Union backed down in this crisis, partly because the United States had superiority in nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union then resolved to close the nuclear weapons gap.

Mutual Assured Destruction

Following the expansion of Soviet nuclear capability, American theorists refined the concept of nuclear deterrence. The doctrine of mutual assured destruction—or MAD, as it came to be called—was based on the premise that some weapons would survive a first-strike nuclear attack by an opponent.[4] If enough weapons could survive a first strike to allow a devastating retaliatory strike, those surviving second-strike weapons would be sufficient to deter the opponent from launching a first strike. If each side maintained enough second-strike weapons, then first use of nuclear weapons would be suicidal. There-

fore, both the United States and the Soviet Union built large nuclear arsenals. After 1963, the use of strategic nuclear weapons implied mutual assured destruction.

Arms Control

As the Soviets approached parity with the United States in the 1960s, arms control became an attractive alternative to the costs and risks of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race. Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis in 1963, a "hot line" agreement was signed with the Soviets to allow direct communication between leaders during crises, as well as a Partial Test Ban Treaty to limit environmental effects of atmospheric nuclear testing, slow the development of new weapons, and reduce superpower tensions.

Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) talks between the United States and the Soviet Union led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972, limiting defensive weapons, and a treaty, SALT I, freezing the number of offensive nuclear weapons held by both sides. In 1979, a SALT II treaty placed additional constraints on the arms race. The United States agreed to reduce its superiority in warheads while the Soviet Union destroyed some of its missile launchers. Although neither nation formally ratified SALT II, both nations agreed to respect its terms.

In December 1987, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan signed a treaty virtually banning intermediate-range nuclear forces (INFs) and began negotiations on reducing long-range strategic forces. In the United States, an expensive military buildup contributed to an unacceptably high national budget deficit. In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev was even more interested in relief from the burden of the arms race, as he attempted to reform and revitalize the Soviet economy. Where SALT had involved agreements limiting the pace of the arms race, the Reagan-Gorbachev negotiations achieved some actual nuclear disarmament. The Start II treaty, signed by President Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in July 1991, ended the American-Soviet nuclear arms race.

Many observers were relieved that the world was escaping the security dilemma fostered by the nuclear arms race. A security dilemma is created when one nation acquires arms for defensive purposes but a rival nation perceives that arms buildup as threatening. An arms race follows, and political conflict is more likely to lead to war.[5]

Containment as Political Strategy

The military strategy which evolved during the cold war was supported by a political strategy of containment. For more than four decades after World War II, containment aimed at preventing the expansion of Soviet power into new areas of the world without provoking direct military confrontation.

Containment in Europe

At the end of World War II, the United States recognized Soviet power and international communism as a primarily European threat to American national interests. The West feared that the Soviets, having installed communist governments in power in Eastern Europe, would seek political control throughout Europe by encouraging and supporting the efforts of European communist parties to seize power. Communists had played important roles as resistance fighters opposing the German occupation during World War II, and they enjoyed much popular support afterward.[6]

The Truman Doctrine

In response to a communist threat in Greece and Turkey in 1947, President Truman announced that the United States would "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." This pledge became known as the Truman Doctrine. President Truman's commitment to support "free peoples" everywhere helped lay the foundations for competition between the capitalist and communist worlds for the allegiance of less developed countries (LDCs) in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The Korean War

An important test of containment policy occurred in Korea in 1950, when the North Korean army attacked South Korea. President Truman assumed that North Korean aggression was sponsored by the Soviet Union and that containment of communism in Europe required containment of communism throughout the noncommunist world. Truman's earlier commitment to free peoples was now given a truly global meaning.

The United States intervened forcefully in nationalist conflicts throughout the 1950s and 1960s under its policy of global containment, overtly in Lebanon (1958), the Dominican Republic (1965), and Vietnam (1965) and covertly in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), and Cuba (1961). Vietnam was the most significant effort at containment.

The Vietnam War

In 1954, France had suffered a major defeat at the hands of Ho Chi Minh's nationalist movement and granted independence to the new government of North Vietnam. Provisions for internationally supervised elections to reunify North and South Vietnam peacefully were rejected by the U.S.-supported government in South Vietnam in 1956. Nationalist forces in South

Vietnam—the National Liberation Front (NLF)—began military action to overthrow the South Vietnamese government, with the support of communist North Vietnam.

Insurgency spread for several years, and the increasingly repressive and unpopular Diem government was removed in a coup in 1963. Already deeply involved in supporting the South Vietnamese government through military and economic aid, President Johnson committed the United States to direct, large-scale combat involvement in 1965 to prevent a military victory by the communists. Despite increasing U.S. bombardment and eventual commitments of over 500,000 troops, in 1968 the communist forces mounted the Tet Offensive, a large-scale attack throughout South Vietnam. Faced with a war that appeared both unsuccessful in Vietnam and politically unacceptable at home, President Johnson agreed to begin peace talks with the North Vietnamese. By 1973, American troops were withdrawn and Vietnam was reunified under North Vietnamese rule.[7]

The Korean and Vietnam wars were fought to implement the policy of global containment. If unopposed, it was argued, international communism would spread from country to country, toppling noncommunist governments like a row of dominoes.

Peaceful Coexistence

In the 1970s, both the United States and the Soviet Union acknowledged the inherent dangers of direct confrontation in an atomic age and the realistic need to pursue their global power competition through political, diplomatic, and economic means, not military conflicts. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev instituted the doctrine of peaceful coexistence between East and West as official Soviet policy. In the United States, detente was the concept used to describe the relaxation in tensions between East and West during the 1970s.[8]

Detente replaced the concept of cold war because of the Soviet Union's growing power and the desire by President Nixon and Henry Kissinger to promote friendly relations with China as a counterpoint to the Soviet Union. Arms control, trade, tourism, and scientific cooperation were among the features of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. Discussions between the superpowers provided a means for managing their conflicts at a low level of tension. Military force would be used in pursuit of national objectives, but not directly between Soviet and American armed forces.

A developing pattern of Soviet aggressiveness in Central America, Africa, and Afghanistan from the mid-1970s led to growing criticism in the United States of the concept of detente. In effect, the Soviets took advantage of the preoccupation with Watergate and the weariness of the American public with the Vietnam war. The late 1970s may be characterized as a period of waning detente, and by 1980, the Carter administration was adopting a much tougher posture toward the Soviet Union.

The Reagan administration took over the reins of government in 1981 determined to restore the commitment to containment in American foreign policy. Thus began the largest peacetime military buildup in history. Through primarily covert means, the United States also supported insurgencies against Soviet-supported regimes in Afghanistan in Asia, Angola in Africa, and Nicaragua in Central America.

Economic Affairs in the Cold War Era

We now turn to economic affairs in the cold war period. In 1945, Western Europe lay in ruins. The United States assumed the role of world economic leader and assisted the European states to rebuild their shattered economies. The Marshall Plan, named after Secretary of State George Marshall, provided over $12 billion to the Western European nations. The goal was to ease the conditions of human suffering in war-devastated nations and to promote strong capitalist economies as a bulwark against the spread of international communism and Soviet power.

The Bretton Woods conference of the world's major trading states established a system for the multilateral management of the world's money supplies, including such institutions as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The system was designed to stabilize the value of international currencies, regulate currency reserves and imbalances, and facilitate world trade.

The dollar became the principal international currency, with its value fixed by gold—the dollar was "convertible" at the rate of $35 per ounce. To revive war-ravaged economies in Western Europe and Japan, the United States deliberately ran a balance-of-trade deficit by importing more from these countries than it exported to them.[9] In the post–cold war period, foreign policymakers would devote much more time and attention to global economic issues, as we shall see below.

The Post–Cold War Period

Collapse of the Soviet Union

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended the intense nuclear confrontation that defined military strategy in the cold war period. The arms race had been a heavy burden to the Soviet Union. To compete with the United

States militarily, the Soviet Union spent a larger share of its much smaller economy to pay soldiers and buy weapons. Fewer resources were available for production of housing and consumer goods. Furthermore, the centrally planned Soviet economy did not allocate resources efficiently. Shortages of essential consumer goods, poor quality, and long waiting lines were part of the Soviet way of life.

In this setting, the forces for change in the Soviet political system gathered strength in the 1980s. President Mikhail Gorbachev initiated a broad program for reform. He was convinced that the Soviet Union could not reform its domestic political economy without reducing military spending and abandoning its costly imperial foreign policy initiatives. Under Gorbachev's leadership, the Soviet Union agreed to deep cuts in Soviet nuclear weapons, unilaterally withdrew Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, encouraged political self-determination in Eastern Europe, and tore down the Berlin Wall.[10]

Domestically, Gorbachev introduced *glasnost*, which meant broadening participation in political life, including free elections for the first time in Soviet history. He also pledged *perestroika*, or structural reform that meant that the centrally planned economy would be dismantled and free market principles introduced. Gorbachev sought to move slowly, to minimize the inevitable dislocation associated with a free market economy. Still, factories closed, people were thrown out of work, inflation soared, and uncertainty prevailed about how quickly market institutions would be introduced. The republics of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, which had been forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union after World War II, demanded full independence. Other republics, such as the Ukraine and Azerbaijan, which had been forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution, successfully sought a degree of autonomy.

In August 1991, Communist hard-liners detained Gorbachev in a coup attempt, hoping to roll back political and economic reforms. Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia, the largest republic within the Soviet Union, successfully led popular resistance to the coup attempt. By December 1991, Yeltsin had forced Gorbachev from office, dissolved the Soviet Union, and demanded faster economic reform. In the early 1990s, the struggle continues between conservatives—who do not want to entirely dismantle the shabby social equality, central economic planning, and political authoritarianism of the communist state—and the reformers who want to speed the pace of economic and political reform.

The Transformation of Military Strategy

After the Soviet collapse, the primary foreign policy concern of the United States, providing for the common defense against potential enemies, has

changed. A major issue is to what extent military spending can be cut without compromising the military's ability to protect essential American interests abroad. The general consensus among foreign policymakers is that levels of nuclear weapons should be reduced, although not eliminated. During the 1990s, the number of troops in uniform will be reduced, development of new weapons systems slowed, and military spending cut by approximately 30 percent from its 1988 cold war high.[11]

Arms Sales to Less Developed Countries

The process of cutting back on military spending is politically difficult. Unneeded military bases must be closed, and the communities which lose their bases lose thousands of jobs. A decision to forgo a new weapons system is economically devastating to arms-producing communities; about 1 million workers in the American arms industry are expected to lose their jobs by 1997.[12]

To cushion the blow, policymakers authorize sale of sophisticated airplanes, ships, and tanks to less developed countries (LDCs). The United States is the world's largest seller of weapons to other nations. While arms sales do keep American armaments workers employed, other consequences are unfortunate. The arms are purchased by governments in conflict with their neighbors; if they fight, better weapons are more destructive. The poorest nations are most heavily burdened by military expenditures. Resources spent on guns cannot be spent on schools and fertilizer to improve the lives of their people.[13]

Nuclear Proliferation

Nuclear proliferation means the spread of nuclear weapons capability to new states. In 1990, nuclear powers included the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China, and India. Some 30 other states have the economic and technological resources to build nuclear weapons. A great concern for the 1990s is that aggressive states (for example, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya) might develop nuclear weapons and threaten to use them. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty requires signatories to allow international inspection to ensure that nuclear materials are not diverted to weapons production. But these controls are not foolproof.[14] In 1993 Saddam Hussein thwarted efforts by international inspectors to inspect Iraqi nuclear materials. In 1994, President Kim Il Sung of North Korea embarked upon a program to develop nuclear warheads, in clear violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Contemporary Economic Issues

Although the U.S. economy is still the world's largest, other nations are challenging America's economic primacy. Members of the European Eco-

nomic Community have made substantial progress toward a single common market in Western Europe by reducing tariff barriers, moving toward a common currency, and coordinating economic policy. Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and other Pacific Rim nations take advantage of low labor costs and high rates of investment to produce high-quality and low-cost automobiles, textiles, and electronics for export to the United States.

Meanwhile, the American economy has lost its competitive edge. Since 1945, the United States had borne the burden of paying for the military requirements of Europe and Asia, and its investment in civilian research and development lagged behind that of the countries it was protecting.[15] Many manufacturing firms closed their doors and moved production to Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Americans imported more than they exported, creating large trade imbalances and putting pressure on the value of the dollar. An abysmally low rate of savings and investment eroded American technological leadership.

With the end of the nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, economic issues have become relatively more important in foreign policy debate.

Trade

One set of economic issues involves trade. Should the United States aggressively promote free trade, or should it take action to protect American jobs from overseas competitors? For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) enacted in 1993 reduces trade barriers between Cañada, the United States, and Mexico. NAFTA was condemned by those who feared that American factories would close and production would shift to Mexico to take advantage of low-cost labor. Most experts agreed that more jobs would be created than lost and that the economic effects of NAFTA would be small. But the opponents were strong because the jobs that were lost belonged to specific voters in specific congressional districts, and they fought hard for NAFTA's defeat.

Another trade issue is whether some nations, especially Japan and France, engage in unfair trade practices by maintaining tariff barriers on agricultural products, banning imports which fail to meet unreasonably exacting standards, selling products in America below production cost, and subsidizing industries so they can sell products in the United States at low prices.

A related trade issue is how major trading nations can best stimulate global economic growth. Japan and Germany argue that the United States must reduce its $300 billion annual budget deficit, which will increase funds available for research and investment and stimulate economic growth. The United States argues that the central banks in Japan and Germany should stimulate their economies by reducing interest rates, even if some small increase in inflation might result. These negotiations are difficult, because all nations seek to protect their own national interest in trade and economic policy discussions.[16]

Immigration

Another economic issue is immigration. An American tradition is to welcome hard-working immigrants who want to build a better life for their families. The 1990 census reveals that 20 million American residents, 8 percent of the population, are foreign-born. About 2 million legal immigrants arrive in America annually, mostly from Latin America. Some are escaping political persecution, but most seek economic opportunity. Immigration is now a political issue because large numbers of immigrants are arriving at a time when unskilled jobs are dwindling. Trade unions and unskilled workers are concerned that immigrants will work for less, and middle-class taxpayers worry that they will have to pay for schools and other social services used by a swelling immigrant population.

Foreign Policy Principles in the Post–Cold War Era

Several principles are appropriate for making and analyzing foreign policy decisions in the post–cold war era.

1. *Define national interests narrowly.* The objective of statecraft is to preserve the nation-state in a potentially hostile environment. As long as the United States is dependent upon oil imports, foreign policymakers must guarantee the flow of oil from the Middle East to the industrial countries. They must protect the security interests of America's major trading partners in Asia and Latin America. Ultimately, the United States must be prepared to defend its essential interests with military power.[17]

The military policy issue in the post–cold war era is how to enable the military to respond flexibly and quickly to regional conflicts using conventional weapons. For example, the military was asked to drive Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991 and to quell civil war in Somalia in 1992. The military plans to keep enough aircraft carriers, aircraft wings, and troops to respond to two international crises at the same time.

During the cold war era, the United States supported anti-Soviet or anticommunist governments regardless of their authoritarian nature and sometimes brutal record of repression and human rights abuses. It also undermined governments that were Soviet-influenced and opposed nationalist revolutionary movements that contained potential communist elements. In the early

post–cold war years, many nations are experimenting with democratic political reform. The United States is inclined to support these efforts.

However, whether promoting democracy is an essential American interest is doubtful. United States policymakers need stable governments with which they can work predictably, even if those governments are not democratic. When political conflicts grow too intense, some current democracies are likely to succumb to authoritarian challenges.[18] And in a few states, it is possible that Islamic fundamentalist majorities may run roughshod over the rights of Western-oriented minorities.

2. *Refrain from interfering in distant conflicts when prospects for success are uncertain.*[19] The America intervention in Somalia in 1992 to prevent mass starvation demonstrates that it is sometimes easy to alleviate a crisis situation but hard to solve the underlying political problems. American influence in the Middle East is limited by the rise of anti-Western Islamic fundamentalism. The U.S. government chose not to depose Iraq's Saddam Hussein after the 1991 Persian Gulf war because the United States could not ensure that Iraq would then have a stable government able to counter Iran in the Middle East. The United States can encourage the Israeli-Palestinian peace initiative begun in September 1993, but success ultimately depends upon the participants.

The United States has been reluctant to intervene in Bosnia despite the horrors of "ethnic cleansing" because American weapons cannot easily alter the deep ethnic antagonisms that underlie the conflict. Similarly, ethnic animosities in Sri Lanka, South Africa, Rwanda, and India cannot easily be calmed.

3. *Deploy military force only if clearly specified goals are likely to be achieved quickly and at minimal cost.* Local conflicts rooted in personality, ethnicity, and religious differences are too complex to be resolved through military intervention. The Vietnam war taught us the limits of military power. Ethnic tensions in Eastern Europe, in the republics of the former Soviet Union, in South Asia, and in the Middle East are certain to erupt in warfare occasionally. As arms sales increase, those conflicts will be ever more destructive. That will raise the costs should the United States decide to intervene to defend vital national interests.

Ronald Reagan's invasion of Grenada in 1983 and George Bush's Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991 achieved their objectives quickly. Similarly, American troops could be sent to Somalia to pacify warlords who had prevented distribution of food to several hundred thousand starving Somalis. But they could not be sent to Bosnia to end Serbian "ethnic cleansing" against Croats and Muslims. American public opinion turns against foreign military adventures when American troops return home in body bags. As American troops died in Somalia in 1993, foreign policymakers concluded that creating a stable government there was too uncertain and that troops should be withdrawn quickly.

4. *Pursue national objectives through multilateral actions.* Sovereign nations object to great powers using their military might to pursue their own national objectives. American soldiers were liberating heroes in Europe during World War II, but today they are regarded as imperialist aggressors in LDCs which experienced European colonial rule or American economic domination. Sentiments of anticolonial nationalism are strong in LDCs.

That is why the United States has supported United Nations decisions to send troops to several global trouble spots. For example, the United Nations condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 and authorized military action against Iraq. The United States provided most of the troops, weapons, and leadership, but many countries contributed some troops or paid part of the costs. United Nations peacekeeping forces have sought to prevent local fighting in Bosnia, Somalia, Lebanon, and Cambodia. These actions are authorized by a consensus of United Nations Security Council members; no single nation-state can be accused of pursuing its own foreign policy interests by intervening in a troubled area unilaterally.

The United States can no longer maintain a global police force. Other regional powers in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe will work out regional security arrangements and take the initiative in dealing with regional issues. For example, the United States is likely to defer to Western Europe in dealing with conflicts in Eastern Europe. Now that the United States has lost its lease on its military bases in the Philippines, Japan and China can be expected to take a larger role in Asian military affairs.

Many American foreign policy interests can be pursued effectively only through close cooperation with other nation-states. We cannot interdict the flow of illegal drugs into the United States without the cooperation of governments where farmers grow poppies and coca and dealers organize drug distribution. Recently, 70 percent of the federal drug budget has been spent on supply-interrupting activities. The success of these operations ultimately depends upon the willingness of governments in Mexico and Colombia to persuade local farmers to plant less profitable crops and to clamp down on processing laboratories.

Rapid population growth in LDCs and economic growth in the large more developed countries (MDCs) increase pollution and deplete productive resources. In general, the relatively affluent MDCs are more concerned with environmental issues than are the LDCs, which prefer to exploit resources to raise the standard of living of their impoverished populations. For example,

LDCs prefer to exploit their rain forests now rather than worry about global warming.[20] Having access to low-cost refrigerants today is more important to China than is the prospect of reducing the incidence of skin cancer in years to come. These environmental policy differences can be resolved only through negotiation and cooperation.

Foreign Policymakers

The structure of foreign policy-making resembles three concentric circles. The innermost circle consists of the president and trusted chief advisors. The middle circle includes other important executive branch personnel and congressional foreign policy leaders. The outermost circle is composed of interest-group representatives and the attentive public, who speak their minds and are heard but who do not participate directly in the decision-making process.

The President

The president is the chief foreign policymaker. As commander in chief of the armed forces, the president makes the ultimate decisions about committing American armed forces abroad. With input from a team of advisors, President Kennedy decided how the United States would respond in the 1963 Cuban missile crisis. President Bush sent an army to drive Iraq's Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait in 1991.

The president also appoints all key personnel in the foreign policy establishment: secretaries of the state and defense departments; leaders of semiautonomous agencies, including the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the Agency for International Development (AID), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); and all U.S. ambassadors. Presidents tend to appoint individuals to these roles who share their image of foreign policy problems and priorities.

These considerable powers guarantee that presidents play a strong role in shaping U.S. foreign policy, as the framers of the Constitution intended.

The National Security Council

The National Security Council (NSC), established in 1947, provides a personal staff of foreign policy advisors to the president. Its membership includes the president, the vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, and normally the director of the CIA and the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its director is the president's national security advisor.

In its early years, the NSC was primarily a coordinating rather than a policy-making body. Since President Kennedy, the national security advisor has largely eclipsed the secretary of state as the principal architect of foreign policy. The NSC studies problems, coordinates policy with other agencies, conducts policy analyses, and provides information to the president. The NSC is supreme because many government agencies need to be consulted on foreign policy issues, and the NSC is a convenient forum.[21]

Presidents must take into account that the Department of State, Department of Defense, and CIA are bureaucratic organizations with their own agency objectives and standard operating procedures. Their leaders tend to interpret the national interest in terms of their organizational goals and personal ambitions.[22] Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's foreign policy adviser, observed that foreign policy advisers do not present disinterested analysis in policy discussions. "Each of the contending factions has a maximum incentive to state its case in its most extreme form because the ultimate outcome depends, to a considerable extent, on a bargaining process. The premium placed on advocacy turns decision making into a series of adjustments among special interests," wrote Kissinger.[23]

Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also was established in 1947, taking over the functions performed by the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. The CIA reports to the NSC, and its director is an important advisor to the president on foreign affairs.

CIA activities fall into two broad categories: intelligence and operations. The intelligence function includes acquiring, analyzing, and interpreting information from diverse sources on subjects ranging from agricultural production abroad to estimates of military spending by foreign governments. The operations function includes involvement in the domestic politics of other countries. CIA plots to overthrow unfriendly governments and to assassinate foreign political leaders have aroused controversy. An important issue has been balancing the CIA's desire for secrecy with the responsibility of Congress to oversee and monitor intelligence activities.[24]

Department of State

The Department of State is responsible for the conduct of American diplomacy and the development and implementation of nonmilitary dimensions of U.S. foreign policy. Internally, the department is organized in terms of functions, such as political and economic affairs; issue areas, such as terrorism, drugs, and human rights; and geographic areas, such as oceans, Africa, and inter-American affairs. The department operates a network of some 300 embassies, missions, and consulates around the world and repre-

sents the United States in 50 international organizations. It is the official link between the government of the United States and the governments of other nations.

Department of Defense

The Pentagon is the symbol and headquarters of the Department of Defense. Its annual budget exceeds a quarter of a trillion dollars, and it employs 3 million civilian and armed forces personnel. This department spends over $100 billion per year on weapons, research, and construction. Therefore, military spending has a major impact on the American economy. In the 1990s, decisions on whether to continue funding weapons systems are made on the basis of both military considerations and the economic impact on local communities.

The United States has maintained a tradition of civilian control of the military. The secretary of defense is a civilian, and civilian secretaries are appointed to direct each branch of the armed forces. The senior officers or chiefs of staff for each branch of the services advise their civilian counterparts and, with the commander of the Marine Corps, constitute an advisory group called the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs is appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. This body, drawing on substantial staff and other resources, advises the president and Congress on armaments, military aid to other countries, and other security issues.

Congress

The principal congressional check on the executive branch in foreign policy is the power of the purse. Decisions on new weapons systems, aid to foreign governments, and all other policies involving public expenditure require that Congress appropriate funds. The Senate also has the constitutional right to approve treaties, but most international agreements are negotiated by the president and do not require Senate approval.

Congress also passes acts and resolutions to curb the president's foreign policy-making independence. The War Powers Resolution, passed in 1973 over President Nixon's veto, requires the president to seek congressional authorization after committing U.S. armed forces in combat roles abroad. Under this resolution presidents may commit forces on their own authority if the lives of American citizens are in danger or if U.S. armed forces have been attacked, but protracted involvement requires congressional approval. Presidents have regarded this resolution as a violation of the power of the commander in chief.

The Iran-contra affair in 1986 renewed congressional interest in strengthening its oversight of the intelligence community. In congressional hearings, Reagan administration officials admitted deliberately misleading members of Congress to avoid reporting on covert operations that violated congressional restrictions on aid to the contras. Members of Congress worried that a hidden body within the NSC, unaccountable within the executive branch or to Congress, had assumed the authority to conduct foreign policy. In defense, administration officials argued that secrecy was necessary to the success of their activities and that congressional intelligence oversight committees could not be trusted.[25]

One underlying issue illustrated in this case is the tradeoff between maintaining a democratic process of foreign policymaking and preserving secrecy and dispatch in foreign action. In time of military crisis and when fundamental national interest is involved, bipartisan support in Congress for presidential initiatives is likely. But in the post–cold war world, we must anticipate lack of consensus on foreign policy issues. Should the United States intervene in regional conflicts, lower trade barriers, cut down on immigration, and cooperate with other nations on global environmental issues? These issues are likely to be controversial. We can expect Congress to play an active role in the foreign policy decision-making process.

Bipartisanship

In crisis situations when the nation is confronted by a foreign enemy, politics tends to stop at the water's edge, and elites at the center of the foreign policy-making process tend to dominate. Elites in Washington also have a free hand to make policy decisions on foreign policy issues which do not affect strong domestic political constituencies.

During much of the post–World War II period, Congress accepted a diminished role in foreign policy, partly because presidents and Congress were in fundamental agreement on major foreign policy questions. Democrats and Republicans in Congress viewed the Soviet Union as the preeminent threat to U.S. national security and agreed that a policy of containment was the appropriate U.S. response. Presidents from Truman through Johnson could count on congressional support for their national security policies.

This bipartisan consensus culminated in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1964. The Joint Chiefs had recommended increasing the U.S. involvement in Vietnam early in 1964. Based on what later appeared to be very questionable evidence that North Vietnamese forces had fired on U.S. ships, the Senate, by a near-unanimous vote, passed this resolution authorizing President Johnson's subsequent actions to widen the war.[25] Opposition to the Vietnam war broke

the bipartisan consensus on U.S. foreign policy, setting the stage for Congress to assert greater influence.[27]

With the end of the cold war, the president must expect less bipartisan support in making controversial foreign policy decisions. Should American troops be sent in harm's way on humanitarian grounds when essential foreign policy interests are not involved? Should we forgo production of a new weapons system if doing so will force layoffs at a major military contractor? Should we lower trade barriers if doing so will help American farmers but hurt automobile workers? In the 1990s, these foreign policy issues are subject to the same partisan and ideological disputes as domestic issues.

When domestic political considerations are important, the influence of the outer circle expands.[28] For example, the earnings of farmers, automobile workers, and steel and textile producers are affected by foreign policy actions, and these groups take an active role in the policy-making process. Farmers supported a $13 billion foreign aid package to the former Soviet Union, some of which would purchase grain. Ethnic groups with roots in old Russia also supported the aid bill. In deference to American Jews, American policymakers have consistently supported Israel in Middle Eastern political issues. The United States continues an economic embargo of Cuba in 1994 only because of the strong feelings of anti-Castro Cuban exiles in Florida.

Isolationism, or avoiding entanglement in European political disputes, was the first principle of American foreign policy from 1787 until 1945. After World War II, Europe lay in ruins and America emerged as a military and economic superpower. During the cold war era from 1945 until 1990, the United States was the only nation with the military and economic power to contain possible Soviet aggression.

The post–cold war era, which began in 1991 with the collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union, poses a new set of foreign policy challenges. Policymakers are likely to define national interests more narrowly, to refrain from interfering in distant conflict when prospects for success are uncertain, and to cooperate with other nations in pursuit of shared objectives.

The president is preeminent in foreign policy. However, presidents depend on their advisers to identify problems, propose alternative solutions, and recommend courses of action. Representing different bureaucratic agencies and departments, these advisers bring different views and interests to bear. Presidents also clearly depend on public and congressional support for success in foreign policy. Foreign policy-making involves interactions among the president and various agencies and departments within the administration, relations between these actors and Congress, and involvement of special-interest groups. Bipartisanship often prevailed during the bipolar cold war confrontation with the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, partisan conflict on foreign policy issues is much more evident.

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